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Summary 
The thesis is a collection of six stand-alone chapters aimed at setting the 
foundations for the philosophy of computational social science. Agent-based 
modelling has been used for social research since the nineties. While at the 
beginning it was simply conceived as a methodological alternative, recently, the 
notion of ‘computational social science’ has started to be used to denote a 
separate disciplinary field. There are important differences with mainstream 
social science and traditional social research. Yet, the literature in the field has 
not accounted for these differences. Computational social science is a strongly 
practice-oriented field, where theoretical and philosophical concerns have been 
pushed into the background. This thesis presents an initial analysis of the 
methodology, epistemology and ontology of computational social science, by 
examining the following topics: 1) verification and validation and 2) modelling 
and theorising, 3) mechanisms 4) explanation 5) agency, action and interaction 
and 6) entities and process philosophy. 
Five general conclusions are drawn from the thesis. It is first argued that the 
wider ontological base in agent-based modelling allows for a new approach to 
traditional social dualisms, moving away from the methodological individualism 
that dominates computational social science. Second, the need to place a 
distinction between explanation and understanding and to make explanatory 
goals explicit is highlighted. Third, it is claimed that computational social science 
needs to pay attention to the social epistemology of the field, for this could 
provide important insights regarding values, ideologies and interests that 
underlie the practice of agent-based modelling. Fourth, it is suggested that a 
more robust theorisation regarding the experimental and model-based character 
of agent-based modelling should be developed. Finally, it is argued that the 
method can greatly contribute to the development of a processual account of 
social life.   
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Introduction 
The following text is meant to set the foundations for the philosophy of 
computational social science. Agent-based modelling has been used for social 
research since the nineties. While at the beginning agent-based models were 
simply conceived as a methodological alternative, recently, the notion 
‘computational social science’ has started to be used to denote a separate 
disciplinary field (Bankes, Lempert, & Popper, 2002; Castellani & Hafferty, 2009; 
Cioffi-Revilla, 2014; Gilbert, 2010; Squazzoni, 2012). Although ‘computational 
social science’ can be found in the literature describing several forms of 
computer assisted social research, in this text, the concept will be used 
exclusively to refer to the field of agent-based social simulation.  
There are important differences between computational social science and 
mainstream social science relying on traditional disciplinary-based social 
research (Campbell, 1969; Wallerstein, 1996): 1) Computational social science is 
a highly interdisciplinary field, including practitioners with backgrounds in the 
social, natural, biological and applied sciences, 2) there are differences in 
modelling approaches, depending on whether the model originated within 
academia, industry or the public sector (David, Bruno, Simão, & Coelho, 2004; 
Heath, Hill, & Ciarallo, 2009), 3) it has a particular organisational structure that 
relies heavily on technological resources, which poses particular challenges for 
traditional disciplinary delimitations of collaborative work in academia (David, 
Simão, & Coelho, 2005; Shrum, Genuth, & Chompalov, 2007) and 4) it is 
influenced by the literature of traditional social sciences, but also by the 
literatures of other fields, such as complexity theory and artificial intelligence 
(Conte & Castelfranchi, 1995; Gilbert, 1995).  
Along with these differences in the structure of the research practices, 
computational social science puts forward an agenda that revolves around the 
use of agent-based modelling. The centrality of the method in the research field 
derives from the way computer simulation changes the way in which social 
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problems are approached and theorisation is produced. Computer programming 
provides a distinctive alternative in terms of modelling. First, because of the 
interesting trade-off between flexibility and formality provided by programming 
languages, which sets this method apart from other equation-based simulation 
and traditional analytical methods, and, second, because of the increase in 
information processing and production capabilities (Franklin, 1994; Gilbert, 
2008; Humphreys, 2004; Ostrom, 1988; Wolfram, 2002). Agent-based modelling 
differs from traditional disciplinary areas in several practical and philosophical 
aspects, to an extent that it is plausible to make a case for the configuration of a 
new disciplinary area (Abbott, 2001a; Becher, 1981; Biglan, 1973; Keller, 2003). 
Within this disciplinary configuration of computational social science, however, 
epistemological and ontological elements have been notably neglected. During 
the early years, practitioners focused mainly on methodological issues (Axelrod, 
1997a; Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005; Troitzsch, Mueller, 
Gilbert, & Doran, 1996). In later years, following a process of consolidation and 
maturation, the research moved towards case-based empirical analysis (David et 
al., 2004; Meyer, Lorscheid, & Troitzsch, 2009). Epistemological and ontological 
issues have rarely been discussed. They are usually addressed using traditional 
philosophy of social science, particularly the one advanced by methodological 
individualism. The thesis will argue that this particular way in which the field has 
developed is both misguided and deficient. It is misguided because the practice 
of agent-based modelling presents challenges for the traditional 
conceptualisation of social philosophy in terms of the micro-macro and 
structure-agency dualisms. It is deficient because the philosophy of 
computational social science requires the discussion of many topics that have 
been poorly addressed, or not addressed at all, in social theory and philosophy, 
such as the experimental features of computational simulation.  
The main goal of the text, then, is to provide the philosophical foundations for 
correcting this misguided approach to the practice of agent-based social 
simulation. It is meant to identify those areas that have been neglected or 
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misconceptualised in the everyday practice of social simulation and suggest 
ways in which further philosophical development should proceed. The 
discussion strongly focuses on current practices within the field, for 
practitioners of agent-based modelling are the main audience. This decision 
limits the scope of the argument: it methodologically bounds the ideas advanced 
here to the domain of agent-based modelling, due to the dominant role the 
method plays in the field. This minimises the extent to which some more general 
issues associated with broader areas such as the philosophy of simulation are 
accounted for. Because of the difference between equation- and agent-based 
modelling, for example, philosophical issues associated with discretisation or 
formal analytical verification are not discussed in detail. In spite of this 
argumentative restriction, non-practitioners with interest in philosophy and 
social theory could find the discussion useful, for many of the conclusions drawn 
regarding agent-based modelling can be linked back to mainstream social 
science and philosophy. The last two chapters on ontology, for example, advance 
a discussion of the philosophical foundations of the micro-macro/structure-
agency dualisms, which could provide insights beyond the particular approach to 
the dualism in computational social science. In turn, the discussion in the fourth 
chapter about explanation and understanding in agent-based modelling, for 
example, presents a specific context where this relatively new distinction in 
philosophy of science can be further explored.                       
In order to address the different areas in computational social science where this 
philosophical exploration should be carried on, the text has been organised as a 
collection of six stand-alone chapters discussing various aspects of the 
methodology, epistemology and ontology of social simulation. The six chapters 
are intended to be readable as independent essays, although they all contribute 
to the overall argument, which will be specified more explicitly in the 
‘Conclusions’ section. This format of stand-alone chapters has both advantages 
and disadvantages. The main advantage is that the reader will be able to read the 
thesis in any order, depending on interests and background knowledge. Some 
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chapters, for example, keep the discussion mostly within the boundaries of 
computational social science, whereas others make strong links with social 
theory or philosophy of science. The main disadvantage is that there is some 
overlap in the material of different chapters. This overlap, it is hoped, will still 
allow understanding the different ideas put forward, without making the reading 
excessively repetitive.  
The text is organised using a stand-alone structure for the chapters because the 
presentation does not follow a single strand. The argument is not articulated by a 
progressive addition of elements to a gradually developing single line of thought. 
It presents, instead, a network of issues related to the philosophy of 
computational social science by bringing together the literature on social theory, 
modelling, mechanism, causation, confirmation, computational simulation, 
explanation and experimentation. Such an argumentative structure cannot be 
adequately articulated in a monograph, where the argument is meant to start 
with some basic issues and increase in elaboration. The text is written focusing 
on this network of topics because it is believed that the stand-alone format could 
better facilitate progress on this area. The articulation of a proper philosophical 
framework depends on the identification and discussion of several 
interconnected topics. These topics are sufficiently autonomous to be 
approached individually, but sufficiently dependent when applied to 
computational social science, as to require parallel discussion.  
While the chapters do not follow a single line of argument, there is a basic 
underlying structure for the text. The first two chapters are mostly focused on 
methodology: 1) verification and validation and 2) modelling and theorising; the 
following two on epistemology: 3) mechanisms and 4) explanation; and the final 
two on ontology: 5) agency, action and interaction and 6) entities and processes. 
Additionally, the odd chapters are about topics that are more common in the 
literature in computational social science, but advanced in this text following a 
new perspective. The even chapters address more general concerns, related to 
the topic of the previous associated chapter.        
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The first chapter discusses the processes of verification and validation in agent-
based modelling. The former is usually taken as evaluating the soundness of the 
computational model, whereas the latter is meant to evaluate the adequacy of 
the connection between the computational model and the phenomenon being 
simulated. The chapter addresses critically the way these goals for the two 
processes have been established. The criticism is twofold: First it is shown that 
the philosophical foundations of the conceptualisation of verification and 
validations are flawed. Second, it is suggested that the traditional 
conceptualisation of these processes hinders the identification of the ways in 
which the result of a computer simulation can provide warrants for belief about 
the adequacy of representation. This latter claim is further supported by a 
discussion on how judgments about the adequacy of a simulation are heavily 
influenced by social epistemological factors, such as the cognitive states of the 
knowing subjects.  
The second chapter addresses the activities of modelling and theorisation. 
Because of the complexity of the topic, this chapter is preceded by a prologue in 
which the main aspects of the contemporary literature on modelling, 
experimentation, theorisation and computer simulation, both for natural and 
social sciences, are reviewed. Developments in these four areas of study are used 
to put forward the foundations for an approach to modelling and theorisation in 
computational social science. Two main assumptions underlie the structure of 
the argument in the chapter. First, there is a strong connection between the two 
activities due to the way that they have been approached in computational and 
mainstream social science. Second, although the two activities are strongly 
connected conceptually, there is an important difference between them 
regarding their effects on the practice of science as a whole. Modelling is 
analysed in relation to the implications that the notion  ‘artificial societies’ has on 
the practice of agent-based modelling in terms of manipulation, representation 
and validation. Theorising is analysed regarding more general issues about 
realism, microfoundations and generalisation in modelling.   
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The third chapter analyses an approach to explanation using social mechanisms. 
The new mechanist movement has gained increasing attention in the philosophy 
of social and general science. There are several approaches to mechanism and 
social mechanism in contemporary philosophy. The chapter particularly focuses 
on the account put forward by analytical sociology, for this new movement 
explicitly refers to agent-based modelling as a useful methodological tool for 
discovering mechanisms. It is shown that the philosophical agenda advanced by 
analytical sociology does not do justice to the distinctive methodological features 
of agent-based modelling. Its account of social mechanism is shown to be 
deficient because of the way it conceptualises production and causation, which 
are two crucial features of contemporary mechanism in philosophy of science. It 
also misplaces what should be the focus of the process of theorisation in social 
mechanisms. 
The fourth chapter provides a general account of explanation in computational 
social science. It focuses on the epistemological notions of explanation and 
understanding. The former has had a privileged status in epistemology, but 
traditional theories of explanation neglect the impact of non-epistemological 
aspects, while remaining vague about what epistemological goals should be 
valued. The chapter introduces the notion of understanding to emphasise the 
need to account for the interplay of different goals of explanation. It is argued 
that, in computational social science, a correct approach to explanation and 
understanding depends on a correct approach to what it means to use 
computational models to represent social phenomena. This requires, on the one 
hand, overcoming the longstanding belief that providing information about 
individual intentions yields understanding and, on the other, overcoming the 
longstanding assumption of generative social science that explanation has to do 
with the possibility of simulating a phenomenon from the bottom-up. The 
challenges for explanation and understanding using agent-based modelling, it is 
argued, derive from the particular combination of the model-based and the 
computational character of these models.         
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The fifth chapter explores the connection between agency, action and interaction 
in computational social science. The field has articulated the connection between 
these concepts through a hierarchical model, with the notion of agency at the 
bottom, followed by action and ending with interaction. The connection between 
agency and action is given in terms of operationalisation; the connection 
between action and interaction, in terms of reduction. The chapter argues that 
this approach has been based on a simplistic interpretation of the main 
philosophical tenets of methodological individualism. It overlooks the important 
role that concepts such as rationality and purposiveness play in a reductive 
interpretation of the micro-macro link and a neglect of the processual character 
of both social life and agent-based modelling. It is claimed that a review of the 
methodological features of agent-based modelling reveals a way in which these 
models can move past methodological individualism and provide an 
understanding of social dynamics in a non-reductive fashion. 
The sixth chapter discusses the way that the entity-based and the dynamic 
aspects of agent-based modelling have been conceptualised in computational 
social science. Object-oriented programming provides a way to build a 
computational model composed of several heterogeneous and autonomous 
interacting entities. While this feature has not led to an inquiry about 
computational agency, it has been taken as a support of methodological 
individualism. This has been reinforced by the notion that the dynamic character 
of a simulation provides evidence for a bottom-up level transition. It supposedly 
shows how social macropatterns emerge from microinteractions. The chapter 
challenges both theses. It is shown that computational social science provides 
evidence for the development of a theory of agency that significantly differs from 
that of methodological individualism and that there is, in principle, no reason to 
assume methodological individualism should be preferred. Additionally, it is also 
argued that the interpretation of the dynamic character of a simulation as a level 
transition is inadequate because of the vagueness and ambiguity surrounding the 
notion of levels in scientific endeavour and because it diverts attention away 
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from the spatiotemporal extension of social processes, which should be the real 
focus of inquiry.                  
The overall rationale for the six chapters is supported by five underlying 
concerns that are briefly addressed in ‘Conclusions and Future Work’: 
individualism and social dualisms, explanation, social epistemology, models and 
experiments, and process philosophy. These five concerns constitute the basic 
network of issues on which the philosophy of agent-based social simulation 
presented in this text is built upon. The conclusions chapter draws on the 
argument developed throughout the thesis in order to delineate basic 
recommendations about how these five major concerns should be further 
addressed in the philosophy of computational social science. 
This introduction chapter has addressed the motivation behind both the subject 
and the structure of the thesis. A description of the topic in each chapter was 
presented. The thesis starts in the next chapter with a discussion about 
verification and validation. It is the first of the methodology-centred chapters 
and the one computational social scientists will find most familiar, for this is a 
topic that has received significant attention in the methodological literature in 
computational social science.       
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Verification and Validation  
One important requirement in empirical science is the development of tools for 
evaluating the robustness of the process and results of scientific endeavour. In 
computational social science, the outcome of the research carried out employing 
agent-based modelling is usually evaluated on two major aspects, through the 
processes of verification and validation. These two concepts were inherited by 
computational social science from the wider field of computer programming, 
where they have played an important role in the discussion about computer 
model adequacy (Colburn, 2000; Fetzer, 2001).  
This chapter analyses the challenges the empirical nature of social simulation 
poses for the concepts of verification and validation. Because of the focus on 
computational models, the most basic challenge from an empirical perspective is 
the justification of knowledge produced in social simulation in terms of the 
representational adequacy of the computer model. The chapter will focus on the 
issue of representational adequacy from three different perspectives: the alleged 
formal nature of the process of verification, the theory-model connection during 
the process of validation and the social underpinnings of the processes of 
commensuration and interpretation.      
The chapter is organised as follows: The first section will discuss the basic 
elements underlying the practice of verification and validation in computational 
social science. The second section will address the problem of verification and 
validation within the wider problem of justification of knowledge in empirical 
research and what it means to associate verification with a formal translation. 
Special attention will be put on how the conceptual and the computational model 
are connected. The third section will focus on how the notion of representation is 
associated with the theory-model relationship. Additional distinctions in 
modelling and representation will be made. Finally, the effect social factors have 
in the practice of verification and validation will be presented. The poorly 
acknowledged existence of community-based criteria of validation will be the 
main focus of this section.                 
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The verification and validation distinction  
Verification and validation are the two concepts most commonly used to 
describe the processes through which a simulation’s adequacy is tested. While 
these two concepts dominate the literature, sometimes they can be found 
together or used interchangeably with other concepts, such as confirmation, 
corroboration, certification, data assimilation, calibration, etc. The 
overabundance of concepts used to discuss model adequacy makes it sometimes 
difficult to distinguish between verification and validation. It is one of the 
reasons why these two concepts are sometimes used in a different, 
interchangeable or coextensive manner in the literature. 
In computational social science, however, the concepts are generally defined 
according to their use in computer science and software engineering. “Model 
verification deals with building the model right. […] [Whereas] [m]odel 
validation deals with building the right model” (Balci, 1997, p. 135 Emphasis in 
the original). There is some divergence on how “right” is evaluated for each case. 
Regardless of the particular understanding, the process of evaluating the 
adequacy of a simulation is usually understood according to the steps depicted in 
Figure 1 below (Heath et al., 2009). Verification focuses on a transformational 
relationship between the conceptual model and the computational model, while 
validation focuses on the representational relationship between the 
computational model and the target phenomenon. The computational model is 
the model written on a programming language that is compiled/interpreted by a 
physical machine. The conceptual model is a pre-computational model, 
formulated in natural language, mathematics, pseudocode, etc. It sometimes 
includes significant visual aids, such as diagrams (Robinson, 2004). 
Figure 1 
Not all approaches to verification and validation are suitable for computational 
social science. Definitions of verification focusing on checking the soundness of 
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an analytical model, for example, do not fit the practice of agent-based modelling. 
Unlike traditional simulation methods, agent-based models do not solve by 
‘brute force’ a system of equations for which there is no closed-form solution. 
Although agent-based models can include diverse analytical calculations, the 
verification of the model as a whole depends on the richer syntactic structure of 
programming languages.     
Definitions that apply to the practice of agent-based modelling can also differ on 
those elements considered relevant during the process of evaluating the 
simulation’s adequacy. Gilbert and Troitzsch, for example, define verification as 
“[t]he process of checking that a program does what it was planned to do” (2005, 
p. 22). This definition emphasises the technical aspect of verification. When a 
computer model is executed, the simulation could crash or produce clearly 
inconsistent results. Verification is meant to deal with this kind of problem. It is 
also aimed at reducing the chance of bugs going unnoticed all the way up to the 
process of publication. This approach to verification combines two different sets 
of techniques. The first one aims at better programming practices, such as coding 
elegantly and adding comments to the code; the second, at identifying specific 
technical problems. For this, verification is performed using techniques of 
traditional statistical methods, such as corner testing, and techniques more 
specific to computer programming, such as unit testing (Gilbert, 2008). This 
approach to verification focuses on the implementation of the computer model 
and looks forward towards the execution of the simulation and its validation.  
Other approaches, such as Rand and Rust’s (2011), keep the emphasis of 
verification on the debugging, but look backwards instead, in terms of the 
connection with the conceptual model. For Rand and Rust, verification is the 
process to determine “[…] how well the implemented model corresponds to the 
conceptual model” (2011, p. 187). Although the focus on the process of 
debugging is still there, the emphasis on better coding practices seen on Gilbert 
and Troitzsch’s approach is replaced by an emphasis on what Rand and Rust 
label ‘documentation’: a process of producing extensive description of the 
conceptual and the computational models, in such a degree of specificity that 
allows for an easy comparison between the two.  
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These terminological differences do not reflect any significant epistemological 
incompatibilities in the approach to verification and validation. They show, 
instead, the practical underpinnings of the problem of evaluating a simulation. 
Every simulation presents specific challenges for verification and validation. 
Balci (1997), for example, lists over a hundred verification and validation 
techniques regularly used in simulation studies. Not all techniques are suitable 
for any given simulation or simulation method. As said, in agent-based modelling 
formal verification and validation techniques are hardly applicable because they 
rely on logical tests that depend on a high degree of formalisation of the model. 
That is hardly the case in agent-based models (Louie & Carley, 2008; Rand & 
Rust, 2011). Likewise, the verification and validation of an abstract model, such 
as Schelling’s (1971), requires different criteria than those required by a 
facsimile model, fed by large amounts of empirical data. Assessing the adequacy 
of a simulation appropriately necessarily requires critical insight from the 
researcher (Balci, 1997; Sargent, 2008).  
Although a large part of the difficulties for verification and validation derive from 
the practical underpinnings of these processes, some other difficulties have 
philosophical roots. The foundations of these philosophical difficulties will be 
analysed next. The general argument aims at showing that the process depicted 
in figure 1 fails to capture some crucial methodological and epistemological 
issues arising during the evaluation of a simulation’s representational adequacy. 
It will be shown that the process should be better understood following the 
process depicted in Figure 2, below. The most important difference is the 
introduction of the ‘model of the phenomenon’, which is a post-computational 
conceptual model. It aims at making sense of the results of the simulation by the 
development of a narrative linking both to the computational and the conceptual 
models. There is a more complex network of relations between the models that 
will be explained throughout the text.   
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Figure 2 
The (non)formal character of verification 
Evaluating a simulation’s adequacy through verification and validation is a 
particular instance of the wider problem of justification of knowledge. The 
concepts of verification and validation had a long history before its introduction 
in computer science. This section will show that the verification-validation 
distinction in computer programming has been understood in a way that 
matches the approach to closed formal systems, but neglects key 
representational issues typical of empirical systems. For that, the section will 
start with a review of the difference in knowledge justification between closed 
formal and open empirical systems. It will later show how the verification-
validation distinction replicates to a certain extent the philosophical 
assumptions behind the evaluation of former. It will end with a discussion of why 
these assumptions fail to account for key representational issues of the practice 
of computer simulation.                
Verification is etymologically linked to the concept of truth. In closed formal 
systems, such as classical logic systems, it focuses on the truth of the premises, 
which, in these systems, is determined internally by rules and definitions. 
Validation, on the other hand, focuses on the correctness of the arguments i.e. a 
valid argument is one in which the conclusion cannot be false if the premises are 
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all true. This because a valid argument is supposed to be truth-preserving. There 
is a clear distinction between the two concepts. Verification focuses on the truth 
value of statements, whereas validation focuses on the adequacy of the inference 
connecting those statements. In open empirical systems, truth is not defined 
axiomatically, but according to a given target phenomenon. The justification of 
knowledge has to find solutions for the problems of induction and perception. 
The latter deals with issues about the nature of the sensory experience and the 
warrants for belief about the world provided by this experience (BonJour, 2013). 
The problem of perception is linked to important philosophical issues, but they 
will not be dealt with here, for perception and its possible pitfalls are not 
addressed on the literature about verification and validation in agent-based 
modelling. The problem of induction, on the other hand, deals with issues about 
the warrants for belief in the knowledge acquired through experience (Nola & 
Sankey, 2007). Unlike perception, a great deal of literature about verification and 
validation deals with the philosophical implications of inductive procedures.  
The challenges posed by the problem of induction to the justification of 
knowledge in modern science are usually traced back to Hume’s (1999, 2007) 
discussion about inference and causal connection. One of the main implications 
from this discussion is that conclusions from inductive reasoning do not have the 
same necessity that conclusions from deductive reasoning have i.e. validation 
cannot be understood as truth-preservation. This has led to emphasise the role 
of scientific method in the production of knowledge: Its rigor is meant to confer a 
higher status to the knowledge produced by empirical science. It is supposed to 
elevate this knowledge above mere opinion or belief. The question, however, is 
how the rigor and the principles of the scientific method can be taken as proof or 
indicator of the truth of this knowledge.     
Several alternatives have been historically proposed to deal with this problem, 
but none of them has provided solid foundations to the problem of truth in 
inductive research. These drawbacks, however, have not led to the conclusion 
that it is impossible to reach true knowledge, but have simply reshaped the 
problem of induction and truth as a problem of approximation or convergence 
(Popper, 1962; Putnam, 1978). The questions of how this approximation occurs 
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and how much truthness can be reached underpin important methodological 
debates in contemporary science, such as the qualitative-quantitative divide in 
social science (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). It has also led to connect 
scientific practices with the inquiry about the relationships between language, 
mind and reality, for example, by the exploration of the requirements for an 
adequate theory of truth (Horwich, 2009; Putnam, 1978). This is a lengthy and 
complex debate that cannot be possibly reproduced fairly in this text. There are, 
however, two important consequences of this historical debate for the current 
discussion: first, the problem of truth has been reformulated in general empirical 
science as a problem of validation; second, because of the empirical nature of 
inductive knowledge, validation has been strongly linked to theory (Goldman, 
1999; Hacking, 1999; Kuhn, 2000).     
These two consequences have important implications for the practice of agent-
based modelling. In what follows, the problem of truth as validation will be 
explored. In the next section, the problem of validation and its link to theory will 
be addressed. The reformulation of truth as a problem of validation leads to a 
revision of the rationale behind the process depicted in figure 1. In closed formal 
systems, the distinction between verification and validation is well established 
and the two elements have a clear goal and ambit of application. Yet, if truth 
becomes a problem of validation in empirical research, it could be questioned 
why two separate concepts are kept in computational social science. The reason 
lies in the methodology of computer science. One influencing idea in the 
discipline is that the practice of computer programming can be developed in an 
analogous way to the study of closed deductive systems. Hoare’s claim has been 
taken as paradigmatic of this standpoint. According to him, “[c]omputer 
programming is an exact science in that all of the properties of a program and all 
of the consequences of executing it in any given environment can, in principle, be 
found out from the text of the program itself by means of purely deductive 
reasoning” (1969, p. 576).   
Verification acquires a foundational role within this formal view of computer 
programming. The algorithmic nature of computer programs and the logical 
execution of these programs on a physical computer are supposed to guarantee 
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the deductive character of the process i.e. its validity, in the classical sense. The 
notion of verification in computer programming is taken to account for the basic 
or foundational elements of the system. Computer programs would behave as 
axiomatic systems and verification would account precisely for the truth of those 
basic elements. In computational social science, because of the empirical 
character of the phenomena of interest, verification is meant to guarantee 
transformational accuracy between the conceptual and the computational model 
(Balci, 2003). If the different elements of the conceptual model are transformed 
into their computational counterparts accurately enough, the input-output 
connection in a simulation should have a level of necessity resembling that of an 
axiomatic system.   
While the extent to which this verificationist standpoint has influenced the 
practice of general computer science is not agreed upon (Colburn, 2004; Fetzer, 
2001), it is undeniable that the practice of verification has an important 
epistemological status in computer science. This superior status becomes 
evident by the role ascribed to verification in figure 1, where it stands as the sole 
process connecting the conceptual and the computational model. However, 
claiming that the relationship between the conceptual and the computational 
model is merely a formal transformational issue has two downsides: a) giving 
this privileged status to verification risks conflating the technical and 
epistemological aspects of evaluating a model’s adequacy and b) the formal 
aspects of verification are constantly undermined by the practice of simulation. 
Regarding the conflation of the technical and the epistemological, verification 
can have a very clear and distinct application when it is limited to technical 
concerns, such as making sure the simulation does not crash. This is clearly a 
technical requirement. Yet, contrary to the widespread idea that “[i]n 
verification, the association or relationship of the simulation to the real world is 
not an issue” (Oberkampf & Roy, 2010, p. 13), the most important connections 
between the conceptual and the computational models are representational. In 
the current practice of verification, these representational elements are 
neglected or conflated with the technical. Two common evaluation techniques 
used early during the simulation life cycle and taken as verification techniques in 
   21 
agent-based modelling are ‘corner testing’ and ‘running the simulation with 
known parameter values’ (Gilbert, 2008; Rand & Rust, 2011). On the first one, 
the simulation is run with extreme parameters e.g. no agents, in order to check 
for some evident errors. If a simulation with no agents produces some output 
associated with interaction, the technical aspects of the model are checked e.g. 
whether all the information for the previous run is cleared once the simulation 
starts. The conceptual model is not revised, for corner testing deals with 
parameter configurations that do not match any real life situation. Even though 
there is an external referent, representational issues about the target 
phenomenon can be solved in a straightforward manner.    
In using known parameter values the problem is different. An output mismatch 
identified by the application of this technique is corrected either by calibrating 
the parameters and/or revising the implementation. While in this second 
technique a technical issue might be the cause of the mismatch, reproducing 
known scenarios and corner testing have different epistemological status. The 
former has to deal with the risk of overfitting a model in a way the latter does 
not. While corner testing basically relies on the 2) relationship in figure 2 above, 
using known parameter values also involves 3) and 4). Decision about adequacy 
could lead to modification of both the conceptual and the computational model, 
based on an interpretation of the results of the simulation.  
Since running the simulation with known parameter values deals with a real life 
comparison, criteria to decide whether there is a mismatch between the output 
and the available data need to be developed. These criteria depend on several 
representational issues regarding the objects being represented, their properties 
and the way these properties are measured. This is a crucial element for agent-
based modelling in social science because there is not necessarily a numerical 
output that can be straightforwardly compared with data produced by other 
social methods. The verbal nature of social theory and the parametric plasticity 
of agent-based models require that a ‘domain of validity’ is established prior to 
any comparison (Axtell, Axelrod, Epstein, & Cohen, 1996). In turn, the bottom-up 
and numerical nature of agent-based models create a larger surface response, 
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which requires a revision of the criteria on which goodness-of-fit is usually 
judged (Louie & Carley, 2008).  
Verification in computational social science is not achieved by the application of 
different techniques in the early stages of the simulation life cycle. Not enough 
warrants for belief in the model’s adequacy are produced during the early stages 
of the evaluation process so to allow shifting to an evaluation of representational 
adequacy using a different set of validation techniques. Confidence on the 
computational model increases with the reiterative application of different 
verification and validation techniques throughout the simulation life cycle, aimed 
at evaluating different aspects of the simulation. The reason why corner testing 
or running the simulation with known parameter values are used early during 
the simulation life cycle is because they do not require an intricate and robust 
model of the phenomenon, not because they do not deal with representational 
issues at all. Different verification and validation techniques set particular 
representational requirements for the model of the phenomenon. The 
verification-validation distinction is better understood as a range in which 
different techniques can be ordered according to their representational 
requirement. Adequacy of representation is achieved by an entwined processual 
increment in confidence both on the simulation as an experimental instrument 
and its results. This entwined confidence is one of the key aspects to understand 
when the simulation’s results provide enough warrants so to end the 
experimental phase (Arabatzis, 2013; Galison, 1987).   
On the other hand, the alleged formality of the practice of verification is 
undermined by the everyday practice of computer simulation because it 
presupposes the existence of a well-delineated distinction between the 
computational and the conceptual model. Yet, verification can only be conceived 
as a formal translation process when the nature of the connection between both 
models is oversimplified and the character of the conceptual model is taken as 
unproblematic. The everyday practice of verification, however, undermines the 
notion of a simple transformational relationship between the conceptual and the 
computational model because: first, the notion of conceptual model is ill-defined 
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and, second, its robustness depends on a bidirectional relationship with the 
computational model.  
The conceptual model is a fundamental element of any simulation. It is the result 
of the initial abstraction process associated with the domain, scope and level of 
detail of the simulation. It has, therefore, important influence on the technical 
and epistemological goals set for the simulation. The conceptual model also 
determines the roadmap for the different stages of the simulation life cycle and 
provides the bases for communication, as well as means for control and 
evaluation (Balci, 2003; Robinson, 2004). In spite of its importance, the process 
of conceptual modelling is not well understood and, as a result, it is far from 
having an appropriate level of formalisation. The high degree of informality in 
conceptual modelling has even led to think of this process more as a craft than a 
science (Robinson, 2011; van der Zee, Tolk, Pidd, Kotiadis, & Tako, 2011).  
Conceptual models, in practice, can range from very general descriptions of 
simulation goals, along with some technical aspects such as input, output and 
mechanisms, to very detailed pseudo code that stands almost in a one-to-one 
relationship with the computer code (Robinson, 2011; Wang & Brooks, 2011; 
Willemain, 1994). The reason why a conceptual model can serve to evaluate a 
simulation is not that there is a formal syntactic and semantic transformation 
into the computational model. The conceptual model does not confer the process 
with axiomatic capabilities. It is, instead, that it serves as a constant external 
reference that is relatively simple and easily accessible. The practice of social 
simulation involves a more complex workflow than the sequential process 
depicted on figure 1. This workflow is characterised by complex iterative 
processes that significantly affect the practice of verification and validation 
(Balci, 2003; Mcnamara, Trucano, Backus, Mitchell, & Slepoy, 2008; Norling, 
Edmonds, & Meyer, 2013; Willemain, 1995). That is why, even for a simple 
technique such as using known parameter values, the relationship between the 
conceptual model and the computational model cannot be understood only by 
focussing on 2) in figure 2, but requires understanding about 3) and 4).      
   24 
Different stages of the process are continuously visited during the simulation ‘life 
cycle’, a notion that is rarely used in computational social science, but common in 
general simulation literature. The transformation of the content of the 
conceptual modelling into the computational model is not a one-off process, but 
might involve complex subsequent revisions and modifications. These 
modifications, however, can go both ways. A mismatch occurred when trying to 
reproduce known scenarios might lead to a modification of the conceptual 
model, leaving the computational model intact. The relationship between 
conceptual and computational model is bidirectional: it is one of syntactic and 
semantic translation, as much as one of informal, mutual sense-making 
(Mcnamara et al., 2008; Norling et al., 2013; Pool, 2011; Robinson, 2011). In 
practice, the initial conceptual model is so underdetermined that it does not 
provide sufficient foundational insights to assume there is a formal mapping into 
the computational model. This is particularly true for computational social 
science, where agent-based models are commonly used to understand micro to 
macro transitions on phenomena for which there might not be sufficient or 
reliable data for comparison, if any at all (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005; Squazzoni, 
2012).  
This section has focused on verification and validation in agent-based models as 
a particular instance of the wider philosophical problem of justification of 
knowledge. It was argued that, unlike mainstream empirical research, 
computational social science has maintained two different criteria to evaluate a 
simulation’s adequacy. This distinction between verification and validation 
reflects a traditional widespread belief that computer programming can be 
developed as an exact science. It was argued, however, that two main objections 
could be put forward against this belief. First, it implies the conflation of the 
technical and the epistemological aspects in the process of simulation 
verification, by neglecting the fact that the success of the computer model 
verification also depends on representational elements. Second, it erroneously 
implies that there is always a strong distinction between the conceptual and the 
computational model and that the process of conceptual modelling is well 
articulated and standardised. In practice, however, the connection between the 
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conceptual and the computational model is one of mutual sense-making, where 
the evaluation of the simulation and its output can lead to several reformulations 
of both models.  
Theory, models and representation in validation 
In the previous section it was claimed that empirical research poses important 
epistemological challenges for the justification of knowledge. Empirical science 
has coped with these challenges by making truth a problem of validation and by 
positing a strong connection between validation and theory. This section focuses 
on the connection between theory and validation, grounding the discussion on 
the context of agent-based modelling. The claim that there is a strong connection 
between validation and theory has important epistemological implications for 
the practice of agent-based modelling. One neglected topic in simulation 
literature is the interplay between computational models and theory. This is due, 
in part, to the relative novelty of simulation as a method, but also to the 
misunderstanding of the role of simulations in scientific endeavour (Winsberg, 
2010). In what follows two major approaches to the theory-model relationship 
will be analysed. By comparing the crucial features of both approaches, it will be 
shown that the problem of representation has been approached in a very 
ambiguous way, due to the lack to the role of theory in agent-based modelling. 
This, it will be argued, has important implications for the process of validation.    
Accounting for all the epistemological elements in the theory-model relationship 
goes beyond the scope of this text. To keep the argument within the context of 
verification and validation, in what follows, the discussion will focus on 
representation, for this is the aspect the process of validation allegedly focuses 
on. Representation is commonly conceived as a two-place relationship, in which 
the first object, the source of representation, is used to gain knowledge about the 
second object, the target of representation. In computational social science, 
different social phenomena such as institutions and processes take the role of 
target and computational models take the place of source. The reason for this 
indirect approach to knowledge production is due to the technical or moral 
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difficulties arising from the direct study of social phenomena (Epstein, 1999; 
Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005).    
In the philosophy of science there are two incompatible traditions accounting for 
the problem of representation in science. On one side, there is a traditional 
approach, according to which theories carry the entire representational burden; 
on the other side, there is a new approach, according to which models can also 
have important representational features (Contessa, 2011; Morrison, 1999; 
Suárez, 2010). Computational social science has neglected this distinction, what 
eventually leads to an ambiguous approach to the theory-model relationship and 
to the problem of representation. This neglect has been harder to notice because 
the diversity and verbal nature of theories in social science make the theory-
model relationship more complex and far-reaching than in other disciplines with 
analytical theoretical frameworks (Gordon, 1993; Sayer, 1992). In turn, the 
isolation of theoretical content is difficult, for verification and validation are 
iterative processes during the whole simulation life cycle. Representational 
issues can emerge in different stages, depending on the simulation goals, context 
and technical features. As a practice-oriented field, there is large divergence in 
the way relationship is depicted. Yet, most approaches can be idealy classified in 
two major groups: ‘the simulation as theory’ and the ‘simulation as independent 
from theory’  
The most common way to look at the theory-model relationship in agent-based 
modelling is to claim that ‘the model is the theory’. A key element underlying this 
conflation is the way the processual character of the simulation is understood. It 
implies a particular stance regarding the implications of executing the 
computational model. One aspect constantly highlighted in the methodological 
discussion of agent-based modelling is the data production features of the 
simulation (Axelrod, 1997b; Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005; 
Macy & Willer, 2002).  Executing the model produces macro patterns by the 
iteration of micro level rules of interaction. It accounts for the process of 
emergence. Because of the algorithmic nature of the program execution, 
emergence is allegedly accounted for in a formal way. In the generative approach 
that has dominated the practice of agent-based modelling, the ‘generative’ is 
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methodologically meant to imply deduction. The reason is that “for every 
computation there is a corresponding logical deduction” (Epstein, 1999, pp. 43–
44). 
Two different formulations of the model as theory approach can be identified: 
the ‘model as theory building’ and the ‘model as theory instantiation’. The first 
one focuses on the deductive character of the inference during the execution of 
the model. This formulation might simply suggest that simulation produces 
theory in the language of computer code, bypassing the problem of 
representation in the conceptual model (Ostrom, 1988). It could as well go 
further, pairing the deductive character of the simulation with the formal 
potential of the process of verification, discussed on the previous section. If the 
process of simulation is deductive, then it is also truth-preserving. The 
simulation would be an axiomatic theory itself, if the assumptions of the formal 
verification perspective of traditional computer science were accepted. As 
shown, the problem with the formal conception of the process of verification is 
the loose character of the connection between the conceptual and the 
computational model. Yet, some attempts have been made to develop the 
foundations of agency and interaction as logical systems (e.g. Alechina, Dastani, 
Khan, Logan, & Meyer, 2010; Shipworth, 2007). The basic idea behind these 
efforts is to dispense with the verbal nature of the conceptual model, using 
instead logical systems as external reference at the micro end. This allows for the 
automatisation of the process of verification and, at the same time, leads to think 
of the model as a proper axiomatic system.    
The second formulation of the simulation as theory is based on the distinctive 
nature of computer languages. From this perspective, the difference between 
natural, mathematical and computer languages is emphasised. Computer 
languages represent a middle ground between natural and mathematical 
languages, in terms of syntactic and semantic formalism (Gilbert, 2008). 
Historically, both natural and mathematical languages have been used to 
construct theories. This view of the model as theory approach suggests computer 
language can be also used to instantiate theories formulated in natural and 
mathematical languages. The issue of representation is dealt with differently 
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here. There are two alternatives: It could be suggested that the conceptual model 
is a model of the target phenomenon, with which the simulation has to comply 
representationally during the processes of verification and validation. The 
simulation would be taken as an instance of the conceptual model that is 
expressed in natural language (e.g. Edmonds & Hales, 2003). The other 
alternative is to assume a structuralist view of theories, on which theories are 
conceived as structures, usually mathematical, only syntactically defined (da 
Costa & French, 2003). The simulation would be in this case a semantic and 
syntactic instantiation of that structure for a particular case (e.g. Troitzsch, 
2004). 
The second approach to the theory-model relationship assumes some degree of 
representational autonomy of models because of the semantic and syntactic 
features of the instantiation. The instantiation, however, might also be justified 
by arguing that there are some theoretical requirements models cannot meet or 
that they are some important features of models that are not contemplated on 
the initial theory. It breaks the representational relationship on particular 
criteria that are considered decisive. Küppers and Lenhard (2005), for example, 
used the practical concept of performance to justify the epistemological 
independence of computer simulations. The claim of independence of the model  
is made under the assumption that a clear distinction can be made between 
behavioral accuracy and representational adequacy and that a theory calls only 
for the latter. According to them, the impossibility to translate in a 
straightforward manner a theoretical structure, particularly mathematical, into 
the computational model, makes the problem of validating the simulation’s 
outcome an empirical problem. This fact leads them to suggest that, in computer 
simulation, performance beats theoretical accuracy. “[S]imulations can achieve 
behavioural accuracy without being structurally accurate” (Küppers & Lenhard, 
2005).  
Hereafter, the representational connection depicted in the two approaches will 
be further explored, focusing on three interrelated problems: a) the 
representational dependence between the conceptual and computational 
models, b) the computational model-model of the phenomenon distinction and c) 
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the notion of theory. Regarding the first aspect, the strong formulation of the 
model as theory building faces insurmountable problems. Although the rich 
semantics of computer languages and the rigor of the execution of a computer 
program do provide important advantages compared to the stringent 
requirements of traditional formal languages, this is not equivalent to formal 
axiomatic reasoning. Formal systems (e.g. Euclidean geometry) are composed by 
both basic postulates (axioms) and predictions (theorems, corollaries) that are 
derived from those basic postulates. Yet, as mentioned before, adequacy in these 
systems is guaranteed by their closed nature and truth-preserving character.  
While an axiomatic system can be built to produce inferences regarding social 
phenomena, representation in empirical science has a target that is always an 
object in the real world. This comparison against an external reference beyond 
the formal representation cannot be eschewed. Using a logical system to replace 
the conceptual model in simulation can indeed provide means to use formal 
methods of verification. Yet, it just displaces the problem of representation from 
the computational model to the underlying formal system. Using increasing 
levels of formalisation during the verification process, as a mean to dispense 
with representation, just risks taking formalisation into an infinite regress. The 
system would still remain open and representational adequacy and accuracy 
would still need to be checked against an external reference at some point. This 
approach has the additional problem that it downplays the issues of 
representation associated with 2), 3) and 4) and puts the entire representational 
burden on 1) and 5). 1), however, is never accounted for during the process of 
validation. The target of representation ends up being split between 1) and 5).     
To a certain extent, the same criticism can be made against the weak 
formulation. Computer languages have a different syntactic and semantic  
domain to the other two languages usually used to produce theories and data in 
social science. Yet, the processes of verification and validation fail to account for 
the representational issues arising from the transformation between these 
different symbol systems. Transforming from natural language is different to 
transforming from mathematics. In the former, the syntactic and semantic space 
is reduced; in the latter, it is increased. This has a significant effect on 
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representation, but this effect is missed due to the emphasis on the formal 
character of verification. As mentioned, the representational problems arising 
from the connection between the conceptual and the computational model are 
displaced to the process of validation and the connection between the 
computational model and the target phenomenon. This is, however, a strategy 
that brings additional complications.  
The problem with assuming that there is a direct comparison between the 
computational model and the target phenomenon is that it neglects the fact that 
the features of the simulation as the source of representation are defined and 
clearly delimited by reiterative application of different verification and 
validation techniques. This reiterative process of evaluation is used to 
incrementally generate a robust and comprehensive narrative about the 
simulation and its results. It is this ‘model of the phenomenon’, a conceptual 
model derived from the operation of the simulation as a physical model, which 
really stands as the source of representation (David, 2009; Humphreys, 2002; 
Winsberg, 2010). It is just during 5) where the model is taken to provide 
conclusive insights about the target. By neglecting the intermediate roles of 2), 3) 
and 4), computational social science fails to account for the representational 
issues arising during different stages of the simulation.  
When the focus is put mostly on the computational model, the problem of 
representation is given in terms of portraying theoretical content adequately 
through computer code. In traditional equation-based simulations, the key 
concern is discretisation i.e. turning differential equations into difference 
equations so the system of equations can be simulated by a digital computer 
(Lenhard, 2007; Winsberg, 2010). While discretisation might pose some 
theoretical-methodological challenges, these are always restricted semantically 
and syntactically within the domain of the background mathematical framework 
on which the equations are produced. In social simulation using agent-based 
models, this underlying mathematical structure does not exist. Representation at 
the level of the computer program relies on a “translation” exercise. Modellers 
take elements from theory and/or observation of the target phenomena and put 
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them into computer code, which provides more syntactic and semantic 
alternatives and connections.  
While the linguistic probabilities are still limited within the algorithmic 
character of computer programming, the lack of a unified background 
framework allows for a multiplicity of ways to achieve representational 
adequacy. Sometimes a mathematical structure can underlie important features 
of the model. In models based on game theory, for example, a mathematical 
structure determines most aspects of the interaction dynamics. Yet, regardless of 
the level of mathematisation, researchers still make important decisions 
regarding representation outside that mathematical structure e.g. making the 
model geographically explicit.            
Translation is not much of an issue when the focus is on the model of the 
phenomenon. When dealing with the results, researchers focus on the data 
output by the model. When analysing results, the problem of representation 
changes from how to represent specific features of the target phenomena 
through computer code to how to represent underlying relations between 
variables through the selection of a specific method of analysis (Edmonds & 
Hales, 2003; Pool, 2011; Winsberg, 2010). A model’s output usually comes as a 
large collection of data with multiple variables for multiple runs. Depending on 
the model intricateness, the output could range from simple visualisations or 
descriptive statistics to big data. In some simple models, histograms and time 
sequences might be enough to unveil the mechanisms connecting micro 
behaviour with macro patterns; as the models get more complicated, these 
mechanisms can only be hypothesised by performing an upper level measuring 
that involves a selection of, usually, robust quantitative methods.  
Representational issues at the level of the computational model concern the 
structural and functional implementation in computer code of theoretical 
statements and/or observations; at the level of the model of the phenomenon, 
they concern the use of measuring tools that allow unveiling the mechanisms 
behind the micro-macro transition. Representation at this latter level has to be 
dealt with in terms of output’s interpretation. While the representational 
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challenges these two levels pose have different magnitude, it is not adequate to 
think their solution is provided sequentially, the way it is suggested on figure 1. 
As mentioned, it is a cumulative process on which different methods increase 
confidence on both the instrument and the results.    
During this process of cumulative increase in confidence, one of the key aspects 
has to do with understanding how the epistemological status of different 
verification and validation techniques is partially determined, according to 
representational requirements. Corner testing and using known parameter 
values have different epistemological status because, as said, the former focuses 
on 2), while the latter also requires of 3) and 4). The same can be said when 
comparing, for example, reproducing known scenarios with a traditional 
validation technique, such as empirical output validation i.e. a direct comparison 
of simulation results with data models or stylised facts (Rand & Rust, 2011; 
Suppes, 1962). The latter has a superior epistemological status because it is 
meant to test the representational adequacy of unknown data. It fits the 
traditional distinction in philosophy of science between accommodation and 
prediction (Hitchcock & Sober, 2004; Lipton, 2005; White, 2003; Worrall, 2014).  
This distinction between known and unknown data plays an important role in 
computational social science. Unlike the traditional idea of simulation, it does not 
assume the researcher has in mind a very detailed idea of what the result should 
be before running the simulation. Agent-based models are used to simulate 
complex phenomena that are non-linear, sensitive to initial conditions and path-
dependent. The popularity of concepts such as ‘emergence’ comes from the lack 
of clarity about the processes connecting the microfoundations and the macro 
patterns in agent-based model simulation (Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Gilbert, 1995). 
The distinction between the conceptual model and the simulation model is 
important because it focuses on this gap in knowledge that should be accounted 
for during the process of validation (David, 2009). 
Differentiating the computational model from the model of the phenomenon is 
important for it clarifies the way diverse representational needs emerge at 
different stages of the simulation life cycle. To fully account for the nature of 
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representation, it is also necessary to account better for the relationship between 
theory and model in terms of the source of representation. Both the notions of 
instantiation and representational autonomy of models derive from the 
ambiguity regarding this issue. The practice of agent-based modelling is closely 
connected to a notion of theory as an abstract and rigid body of knowledge, that 
is evaluated depending on its fit with empirical observations (Conte, Edmonds, 
Moss, & Sawyer, 2001; Küppers & Lenhard, 2005). Models, under this view, are 
derived or deduced from theory. This idea of the theory-model relationship as 
one of operationalisation, mapping or derivation, however, has been heavily 
questioned. It does not depicts scientific practices correctly (Craver, 2002; 
Humphreys, 2004; Mattingly, 2005; Portides, 2005b; Winsberg, 2010). This is 
especially true for the case of social science, where neither theories or models 
take necessarily an analytical form, nor are developed on the same symbol 
system (Giere, 2001; Mjøset, 2001). It is necessary to understand why, despite 
the claim of partial autonomy of models, theories still play a unificational and 
classificatory role that affects representation, especially in the social domain 
(Morgan & Grüne-Yanoff, 2013; Morrison, 2007; Winsberg, 2010).   
It is also important to understand the representational connection between 
model and theory in terms of experimentation. The suggested split between 
behavioral accuracy and representational adequacy that Küppers and Lenhard 
(2005) suggest is misleading. It depends on a very narrow interpretation of the 
model as a deduction of a theory and on a clear-cut distinction between 
simulations and experiments. But that is a matter of discussion in the philosophy 
of modelling and experimentation, particularly for social science (Dowling, 2008; 
Lenhard, 2007; Mäki, 2005; Morgan, 2005). Although important differences exist, 
the development of an experimental setting requires the articulation of a 
framework that includes technical, empirical and theoretical stipulations. This is 
exactly what is done during the process of conceptual modelling in a simulation 
life cycle. To correctly account for a simulation’s representational features, it is 
necessary to understand how all these elements are identified and differently 
prioritised in the design of the conceptual model. In turn, it is important to 
identify how different representational needs shape the theory-model 
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relationship during the simulation life cycle (Morrison, 2009; Parker, 2009; 
Winsberg, 2010).  
This section has analysed the connection between validation and theory in 
empirical research. It focused on the problem of representation in computational 
social science in terms of the connection between theory and model. By 
analysing the two most common approaches to this relationship, it was argued 
that the field has neglected important issues surrounding representation. The 
first one is associated with the representational elements in the connection 
between the conceptual and the computational model. It was argued that, 
regardless of the level of formalisation of the conceptual model, representational 
issues always surround the translation from one model to the other. The second 
misconceptualisation derives for the fact that practitioners usually do not make a 
distinction between the computational model and the model of the phenomenon, 
conflating in this way the representational challenges for both models. Finally, it 
was argued that computational social science has adopted a notion of theory that 
does not fit scientific practices, especially in social science, which leads to 
distorting the problem of representation in the theory-model connection. 
Computational social science has to redefine the role of theory in simulation, as 
well as the experimental character of the method so to address the problem of 
validation in agent-based modelling.    
The social epistemology challenges for validation 
This section focuses on the problem of interpretation and commensuration in 
computational social science. The processes of verification and validation have 
traditionally focused on the problems of transformational and representational 
adequacy of computer simulation, respectively. One factor that is crucial for both, 
but has been not received enough attention, is the connection between the model 
of the phenomenon and the target phenomenon. This section will focus on the 
processes of interpretation and commensuration. The first one is understood as 
the process of developing a narrative that provides meaning to the simulation 
and its results; the second, as the process of comparing those narratives for 
different models, according to common metrics. It will be argued that 
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interpretation and commensuration are not only important for understanding 
how a particular simulation works, but are also fundamental for the 
normalisation of epistemological criteria for verification and validation i.e. the 
social regulation of norms and expectations about the aims, procedures and 
goals of the evaluation process. For this, the section will discuss how protocols 
and frameworks have been developed in order to achieve this normalisation. It 
will be later shown how commensuration and interpretation present 
insurmountable challenges for both protocols and frameworks. The role of 
community-based criteria of validation is discussed last.    
Interpretation is an element traditionally associated with the corroboration of 
hypotheses by experimental results (Arabatzis, 2013; Kuhn, 2000; Putnam, 
1991; Sismondo, 1996). It pertains to the conclusions that can be drawn from 
experimental results. In contemporary science, interpretation is usually 
discussed in the context of the constructivist and realist debate. As with other 
dualisms in science, this has led to misrepresent the discussion to a certain 
extent. Several constructivist approaches to interpretation, for example, lead to 
relativism. In spite of this, important insights regarding the processes of 
verifying and validating simulations had been linked to this dualism. Oreskes et 
al. (1994) put forward one of the most popular arguments advancing a 
constructivist view. Their position is mainly known for their rejection of the 
plausibility of verification in computer simulation, due to the open nature of 
these systems. Yet, they present an overall interesting discussion regarding the 
nature of representation both in analytical and numerical models.  
Although some of the elements the constructivist view emphasises, such as 
underdetermination, should be taken into consideration when discussing 
verification and validation, constructivism as a programme is unlikely to provide 
a useful foundational account for computational social science (Kleindorfer, 
O’Neill, & Ganeshan, 1998). Most practitioners in the field approach modelling 
from a realist perspective. It is believed agent-based models can provide 
accurate knowledge within a range of approximate truth, which depends on the 
particular features of the modelling practice e.g. how realistic is the 
representation of the target phenomenon. Therefore the importance given to the 
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process of validation. However, even from a realist perspective, the problem of 
interpretation poses an important challenge. The use of experimental results to 
corroborate scientific hypotheses can never be approached as a first-order 
analysis. The model alone does not provide all the relevant criteria regarding the 
way simulation’s output should be processed, read and understood (Goodman, 
1983; Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948; Kuhn, 1970). The algorithmic nature of 
agent-based models and the logical character of the execution of computer 
programs facilitate the developments of criteria for judgments about 
representational adequacy. Yet, these judgments also depend on empirical and 
intentional elements associated with the way researchers develop and operate 
the model during the simulation life cycle, as well as the way its results are 
communicated and used by others (David, Simão, & Coelho, 2007; Pool, 2011).  
These judgements are important because they also determine what exactly can 
be learned from the target phenomenon by using a computer model. In 
simulation studies, it is usually suggested, as pointed out by figure 1, that there is 
a direct relationship between the computational model/simulation with the 
target phenomenon (Edmonds & Hales, 2003). This relationship, however, is not 
direct and depends to a great extent on the particular philosophical stance 
regarding the role of models in scientific discovery, for these assumptions will 
have significant effect on the notion of representation (Frigg, 2006; Morgan & 
Morrison, 1999; Winsberg, 2010). It is not the same, for example, to assume that 
the model and the target phenomenon are isomorphic (e.g. van Fraassen, 1980) 
than to assume the former is a fiction that distorts important features of the 
latter (e.g. Suárez, 2009a). While the first interpretation can partially fit the idea 
of a direct representation of the target phenomenon, the second interpretation 
radically differs from it.             
The different problems arising from interpretation have been downplayed in 
computational social science. The implications of this process have been tackled 
by the development and implementation of protocols and frameworks (Becker, 
Niehaves, & Klose, 2005; Grimm et al., 2006; Janssen, Alessa, Barton, Bergin, & 
Lee, 2008; Richiardi, Leombruni, Saam, & Sonnessa, 2006; Wang & Lehmann, 
2007). Although the focus is different, both have the goal of improving the 
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research practices. Frameworks are aimed at improving practices through 
generalisation. They are based on the assumption that widespread 
categorisation can lead to better science, for example, by the implementation of 
meta-models, code repositories and the articulation of schemes and rules for 
defensive programming. Protocols, on the other hand, seek to improve practices 
by providing detailed descriptions of particular models. They work under the 
assumption that adding rigour, clarity and transparency to the model 
presentation can facilitate evaluation and replication. Protocols include 
specialised sections for every aspect of the modelling process, starting from the 
explicit statement of model purpose and ending with the socialisation of results 
in the academic, public or private domain.   
Replication and docking, or model-to-model comparison, have received 
significant attention both in protocols and frameworks. The possibility of 
replicating experiments or comparing the results with those of other 
experiments is considered one of the most important and conclusive ways to 
provide support for experimental results (Burman, Reed, & Alm, 2010; Resnick, 
2013; Shadish et al., 2002). In computational social science, it is suggested 
replication can overcome some of the traditional interpretational problems in 
social science, for comparison is made within the same language (Edmonds & 
Hales, 2003; Wilensky & Rand, 2007). So far, the loose semantic and syntactic 
way in which models results are interpreted has been one of the major 
limitations for the validation of knowledge produced with computer simulation.  
The main difficulty with replication and docking is the lack of an underlying well-
defined structure of operation. In traditional experiments in natural and applied 
sciences, replication relies on a numerical output that can be strongly linked to 
the different features and operation of the experimental setting. In agent-based 
modelling these points of reference have to be discussed and agreed upon, for 
the semantic and syntactic flexibility of these simulations rarely allows for 
straightforward comparison of two similar models. Axtell et al. (1996) suggest 
docking requires adding two alternative dimensions of comparison: 
distributional equivalence and relational alignment, to the typical comparison in 
terms of numerical identity.  
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The challenges researchers face when engaging on replication or docking in 
computational social science have been well documented. The more interesting 
cases are naturally those where the process produces conflicting results. The 
exercise of replicating or docking models has proven to be important for it has 
shown that sometimes there is high sensitivity to changes of numerical 
simulations. Simple arithmetic modifications, for example, can make a difference 
to the resultant macro pattern (e.g. Edmonds & Hales, 2003). In turn, modifying 
apparently innocuous assumptions can sometimes also radically change the 
results (e.g. Galán & Izquierdo, 2005). It has also shown how the need to decide 
between conflicting results might require a socialisation of behavioural or 
structural assumptions implicitly built into the model (e.g. Rouchier, 2003). This 
task is not always easy, however, for the lack of data about the target phenomena 
sometimes makes it difficult to judge the adequacy of the assumptions for two 
simulations with contradictory output (Edmonds & Hales, 2003).  
Although expectations about the prospective role of protocols and frameworks is 
high within computational social science (Janssen et al., 2008; Polhill, Parker, 
Brown, & Grimm, 2008; Richiardi et al., 2006), the support they provide for the 
processes of validation can be partially limited by their focus on standardising 
practices that display important differences in their philosophical foundations. In 
a review about the implications of the use of their ODD protocol, Grimm et al. 
(2010) claim its increasing use has allowed for more rigorous formulation of  
models. This has produced an increased awareness about theoretical 
motivations, which has led, among other things, to facilitating practices such as 
replication. To build on these results, they decided to add a ‘Basic principles’ 
paragraph on the ‘Design concepts’ section, so modellers could be specific about 
the theoretical principles of the model. The motivation behind the addition is the 
belief that the theoretical fragmentation of some areas of research employing 
computational simulation is high and adding this paragraph could help 
developing more comprehensive theoretical-methodological accounts.  
The problem with these tools is that, regardless of the level of specification that 
frameworks and protocols can achieve, they do not provide a normative account 
for deciding on issues of representation during the processes of verification and 
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validation. In Rouchier’s (2003) exercise of replication, the inconsistency in the 
output was due to a difference in the modelling of cognitive processes that 
control agents’ decision-making. While she claims that the decision heuristic of 
the original model is not realistic, she acknowledges that it might have been 
purposely designed that way. In that case, the goal was to reproduce empirical 
results using a computer simulation. While a more realistic decision heuristics 
could be desirable, that does not mean it should be required. As mentioned, 
representation is dealt with in different ways, according to the particular 
philosophical stance on the scientific role of models. This means that, in practice, 
interests, ideologies or values also play a role in the process of modelling. 
Different aspects of the target phenomena could be represented and highlighted, 
depending on the rationale behind the model construction. Representation 
depends on the type of knowledge the model is meant to provide (Contessa, 
2007; Frigg, 2006; Morgan & Morrison, 1999; Suárez, 2003; Winsberg, 2010)   
This diversity in the approach to knowledge production through computer 
modelling is one of the reasons behind popular distinctions in computational 
social science, such as KISS and KIDS or models as thought experiments, research 
tools or aids for policy making (Axelrod, 1997a; David et al., 2004; Edmonds & 
Moss, 2005; Heath et al., 2009). The reason why all potential differences 
emerging from this diversity of interest, ideologies or values can be eventually 
dealt within the framework of science is because the community of practitioners, 
both explicitly and implicitly, articulate particular validation criteria to evaluate 
and reach a consensus on these non-scientific issues (Ahrweiler & Gilbert, 2005; 
Boghossian, 2006; Goldman, 1999). One of the most important areas of research 
in the study about the production of knowledge focuses on the way the 
community of practitioners sets the criteria, scientific or social, used to judged 
experimental results, the procedures by which these criteria are applied and also 
the future agenda (Fuller & Collier, 2004; Goldman, 1999; Kitcher, 1993, 2011).  
Protocols can enhance communication of theoretical orientations and 
production, but they are not enough to understand the community-based 
character of validation for they only provide basis for standardisation, but not 
for interpretation and commensuration. These two processes are crucial aspects 
   40 
for the understanding of scientific practice, but coping with the challenges they 
present does not depend only on the application of the scientific method (Kuhn, 
2000; Nelson & Stevens, 1998). Interpretation and commensuration are social 
processes, not necessarily in a traditional constructivist view i.e. assuming that 
scientific endeavour is socially determined, but in the sense that different 
organisational features can have important effects on the accuracy and adequacy 
of the knowledge produced within the field (Boghossian, 2006; Fuller & Collier, 
2004; Goldman, 1999; Kitcher, 1993). This becomes evident in computational 
social science during the replication and docking dynamics. Articles describing 
these activities in computational social science are interesting for they are 
usually full of narrative and anecdotal information. This narrative provides 
insights into the ways scientific and extra scientific elements are dealt with in 
regular scientific practices.  
Two cases can be taken as examples of these dynamics of commensuration: 
Axtell et al.’s (1996) exercise on docking, and the discussion about the 
replication of Macy and Sato’s trust model (Macy & Sato, 2002, 2008, 2010; Will 
& Hegselmann, 2008a, 2008b; Will, 2009). The former describes the process of 
comparing two different models of cultural transmission, carried out through a 
collaborative effort involving the authors of both models. The case is interesting 
for it describes how the models’ differences can be traced back to different 
research interests and how a new research agenda had to be set in order to 
render the comparison possible. This agenda included changes to models, the 
development of comparison criteria, a timetable for the collaborative work, etc. 
The article not only touches on the elements related with the comparison 
exercise, but also the way simulation works as a scientific practice. It suggests, 
for example, that scientific publications and funding bodies should encourage 
docking. That, it is claimed, would not only help testing the robustness of the 
result, but will stress the importance of these processes in scientific inquiry. The 
article also criticises the practices of communication of scientific knowledge. It is 
argued that the low level of detail found in scientific publications could have 
made the comparison impossible without the collaboration.   
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The low level of detail regarding a simulation’s assumptions in the current 
communication practices is a problem that becomes manifest in the second case. 
Unlike Axtell et al.’s docking attempt, the second case involves the replication of 
a simulation performed by the replicators as a separate independent effort. The 
dynamics are significantly different. The first obvious difference is that the 
process had a longer time span. The original model was published in 2002, the 
replication attempt was initially carried out in 2008 and the last publication on 
the issue dates from 2010. In this case, the commensuration issues became 
manifest in the interpretation of the model’s assumptions and results. It was the 
generation of mutual understanding about these issues that required multiple 
publications and the need for two different replications.  
Just as in the docking attempt, other aspects of the general process of research 
using simulation were also discussed during the replication process. Because of 
the nature of the replication as an independent effort, communication is one 
factor worth highlighting. In most occasions, replication and docking require 
contacting the original author directly (Wilensky & Rand, 2007). This second 
case is interesting because it allows understanding how the process of 
commensuration heavily depends on the possibility to establish communication 
and agree on the basic philosophical and empirical issues regarding the 
computational modelling of the target phenomenon. Recurrent communication 
between researchers has been shown to be fundamental for replication, because 
it allows for the transmission of tacit knowledge i.e. the aspects of scientific 
explanations that are not explicitly explicated (Collins, 2010).  
Protocols and frameworks are good for avoiding problems of contingency e.g. 
availability or cooperation by the original author. Yet, their success relies on the 
assumption that providing more and clearer information about the simulation’s 
aim can provide the necessary criteria for verification and validation. While in 
some cases replication and docking have proven useful in unveiling clear 
representational and technical difficulties, in cases like Macy and Sato’s there 
seems to be important representational and operational aspects that have not 
even been agreed upon (Macy & Sato, 2010). The success of protocols and 
frameworks can only go so far in providing criteria for commensuration, for they 
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have limitations in terms of dealing with tacit knowledge. While they aim at 
making the model’s assumptions more explicit, tacit knowledge goes beyond the 
mere development of the model. It is more related with the practice of science in 
a broader sense (Collins, 2010; Goldman, 1999).  
The social nature of the problem of interpretation affects verification and 
validation in a different way to that of commensuration. In an article arguing 
why sociologists should use ABM, Chattoe-Brown (2013) claims that Schelling’s 
model “certainly shows a bi-directional interaction process between individuals 
and social entities ('neighbourhoods')” (para. 5.4), making a loose reference to 
Gidden’s (1984) structuration theory. The alleged bidirectionality and the 
connection with structuration theory are a matter of interpretation, for this 
connection depends on Giddens’ ‘duality of structure’, a particular approach to 
the reproductive character of social life that is grounded on the notion of 
practice. Some other sociologists could feel more persuaded if, instead of 
Giddens, Chattoe-Brown had referred, for example, to Merton’s (1936) idea of 
the unanticipated consequences of action. Merton’s approach, unlike 
structuration theory, emphasises the bottom-up character of social phenomena 
and can dispense with any form of downward causation, an interpretation that 
could be thought of as having a better reception in computational social science, 
a field closer to the principles of methodological individualism because of its 
emphasis on individual action (Epstein, 2006; Macy & Flache, 2009; Neumann, 
2008).  
While some mainstream sociologists might consider Chattoe-Brown’s 
interpretation compelling, some other will find Merton’s better. There might 
even be others that can come up with a synthesis of the two. What is interesting 
is that Schelling’s model works at such a high level of abstraction that, in 
principle, several interpretations are possible. The model does not operate in a 
way that necessarily leads to admitting or refuting certain elements on which 
social theory clearly diverges, such as the role of intentionality in human action 
(Gross, 2009; Joas, 1996). Since there is no attempt to represent in a realistic way 
the reasons why individuals might decide to move in real life, the model can 
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accommodate intentional as well as non-intentional accounts of action. Because 
of this simple cognitive representation, and the particular iterative character of 
the simulation, it is equally possible to assume, for example, that the model 
provides evidence for and against downward causation. The side chosen 
depends on the way the model of the phenomenon conceptualises certain 
aspects of individual action, such as memory and perception, as well as the 
physical aspects of time and processes (Gilbert, 2003; Hedström, 2005). Not 
everyone will approach Schelling’s model from the same perspective, nor will 
consider it valuable for the same reasons. Yet, without accounting for 
interpretation as a relationship between the model, theory and scientific values 
and practices, the question about why it is a hallmark of computational social 
science could never be answered. Schelling’s model, due to its abstract nature 
and its lack of a clear reference for empirical validation, represents a 
paradigmatic case of community–based validation (Ahrweiler & Gilbert, 2005).      
Community validation operates by normalising or modifying interest, values and 
ideologies. To understand how the community provides criteria for 
commensuration and interpretation, the fundamentals for the processes of 
verification and validation should be analysed from an historical perspective. 
Interest, values and ideologies can increase or decrease the incidence of certain 
practices. One of the challenges for replication, for example, is that it is viewed at 
the same time as a difficult task of significant importance and as a futile task only 
new entrants should focus on (Rouchier, Cioffi-Revilla, Polhill, & Takadama, 
2008). Those considering replication a fundamental practice would try to 
promote it, while those considering it an activity for new entrants would instead 
look for different ways to guarantee adequacy in the processes of verification 
and validation.  
The social underpinnings of community validation can also be heavily influenced 
by external elements. The epistemological status of computational modelling has 
been significantly affected by the technical possibilities and also by a natural 
process of maturation of the field (Meyer et al., 2009). The emergence of the KISS 
vs. KIDS debate is an indication of particular interest, values or ideologies of the 
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practitioners within the field, but it is also result of a particular historical 
contingency: the increase in processing capacities and the empirical turn in 
computational social science. Whereas at the beginning the explanatory-based 
character was highlighted as the key and distinctive feature of Agent-based 
modelling (Axelrod, 1997b; Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005), 
the new changes in modelling orientations have led to bringing into the 
discussion the possibility of using these models to predict (Edmonds & Moss, 
2005; Hassan, Arroyo, Galán, Antunes, & Pavón, 2013). This could eventually lead 
to challenging the relevance of the principle of explanation based on simple 
models. The question of ‘what is a good simulation’, and, with it, the question of 
‘how to measure this quality’, has started to receive multiple answers over the 
last few years (Heath et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 2009).   
The section has argued community-based criteria for validation are needed, in 
order to improve the practice of verification and validation in computational 
social science. It was shown that the practical and epistemological problems of 
representation have been currently addressed by the implementation of 
protocols and frameworks, which intend to make the modelling practices more 
rigorous, transparent and generalisable. While these tools allow advances in 
areas such as docking and replication, they cannot provide a comprehensive 
philosophical foundation for the processes of verification and validation. They 
provide criteria for standardisation, but not for normalisation. Even if social 
epistemological aspects are accounted for, frameworks and protocols do not 
provide any indications on how to decide about them. These social epistemology 
factors, it was argued, affect judgements about adequacy by providing the basic 
foundations for the processes of commensuration and interpretation. To 
understand how these processes work, the scientific production of the field has 
to be contextualised. This contextualisation could prove useful not only in 
understanding the social epistemology factors that determined validity under 
the current standards, but also the areas on which further work is needed.        
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Conclusion 
The chapter has explored the problem of verification and validation in 
computational social science. The first section briefly discussed the main 
elements associated with the practice of agent-based modelling in social science. 
It was suggested that there is great diversity within the field because of the 
practical underpinnings of verification and validation. Yet, it was claimed, some 
underlying philosophical elements have contributed to this diversity and 
prevented the development of better verification and validation practices in the 
field. The following sections presented three different arguments to justify this 
claim. The second section argued that computational social science inherits from 
computer programming a strong commitment to a formal notion of verification 
that is not plausible. The connection between the conceptual and the 
computational model is both formal and informal. It involves a technical issue of 
translation, as well as an empirical issue of representation. Because of the ill-
defined character of the conceptual model, it was claimed, representation 
becomes an aspect of major relevance in the connection between conceptual and 
computational model.        
The third section focused on validation and its theoretical underpinnings in 
empirical research. It was argued that accounting for the representational 
character of validation is difficult because the interplay between theory and 
practice has been inadequately approached. There are three factors that impede 
a correct conceptualisation of the representational aspects in agent-based 
modelling: The first one is the lack of awareness regarding the representational 
dependence between the conceptual and computational model, which also has to 
be accounted for when validating the model. The second one is the conflation of 
the computational model and the model of the phenomenon, which leads to the 
neglect of different representational challenges. The third is the 
misrepresentation of theory. Computational social science has adopted a notion 
of theory that is not consistent with its research practices.     
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Finally, the fourth section addressed the effect of social factors, which need to be 
decided upon by the community of practitioners, in the practice of verification 
and validation. It was claimed that, while protocols and frameworks can help to 
improve everyday practices within computational social science, they cannot 
provide comprehensive criteria for the normalisation of social factors that 
influence the processes of verification and validation, such as interests, values 
and ideologies. These social elements are crucial for the processes of 
commensuration and interpretation, which determine in significant ways the 
robustness and scope of the model of the phenomenon in computational 
simulation. 
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Prologue to Modelling and Theorising 
An account of modelling and theory building in computational social science has 
to be built on the premise that practitioners in the field use computational 
models of social phenomena in an experimental fashion. Understanding the 
implications of such an account requires bringing together several developments 
in different areas of inquiry in philosophy and social, natural and applied 
sciences. This prologue to the second chapter: “Modelling and Theorising”, 
presents a brief review of the relevant aspects of the literature on theorisation, 
modelling, experimentation and computational simulation in contemporary 
science. It is meant to contextualise the discussion of the next chapter by listing 
some of the major developments that influence the view of modelling and 
theorisation advanced in this text.   
Theory 
The discussion about theory in the philosophy of science has significantly 
overemphasised theory testing over theory building. The field has generally 
focused on the distinction between the syntactic or received view of theories and 
the semantic or model-theoretic view of theories. Yet, neither the syntactic nor 
the semantic view of theories paid enough attention to the process of theory 
building as such. This is due in part to the widespread belief spread by logical 
positivism that the process of theory building is not a problem for the philosophy 
of science (Hempel, 1965). This longstanding assumption in the traditional 
literature on theory in the philosophy of science, it will be shown later, was not 
challenged until the last two decades of the twentieth century. It is, however, still 
widespread in many areas of scientific research.   
The foundations for the syntactic view can be traced back to the work of Duhem 
(1974) in the early twentieth century, although the most robust exposition of the 
syntactic view of theories was articulated a few decades later by logical 
positivism (Craver, 2002; Giere, 2001). This view is the result of the 
reorientation of philosophical endeavour within the movement, in order to 
comply with the basic principle of removing metaphysics from the practice of 
science. Philosophy, according to Carnap, was “[…] to be replaced by the logic of 
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science – that is to say, by the logical analysis of the concepts and sentences of the 
sciences, for the logic of science is nothing other than the logical syntax of the 
language of science” (2001, p. xiii Emphasis in the original). In the syntactic view, 
theories are linguistic structures composed by an uninterpreted deductive 
system and a set of correspondence rules (Hempel, 2001). Theories are 
formulated using logical and non-logical terms. The former are elements of first-
order predicate calculus used to give the formal structure of the axiomatic 
system; the latter are descriptive terms that provide empirical content to the 
theory, through the use of the correspondence rules.  
The syntactic view of theories has been heavily criticised, along with the whole 
project of logical positivism. The reason is that it set very stringent requirements 
that in many cases cannot be fulfilled e.g. the postulation of laws working as 
axioms in the theories, and, most importantly, also misrepresents scientific 
practice e.g. theories are usually formulated using natural and/or mathematical 
language that cannot be reduced to a formal calculus in the way suggested 
(Craver, 2002; da Costa & French, 2000). The alternative, the semantic view, is 
better understood as an umbrella or cluster concept, grouping several different 
views that offer a less restrictive view on the role of theory in science. What 
groups these views together is an approach to theorisation that does not focus 
on the possibility of formal inference.  
The word ‘semantic’ is used in a narrow sense, not to imply particular 
relationships of meaning but merely of satisfaction. Take the following set of 
axioms (van Fraassen, 1989): 1) For any two lines, at most one point lies on both, 
2) for any two points, exactly one line lies on both and 3) on every line there are 
at least two points. This set of axioms can be satisfied by a model constituted by a 
single line with only two points in it, but also by a Fano plane (Figure 1), a 
geometrical structure built in a non-euclidean plane, where the circle represents 
lines. In the semantic view, for any given set of axioms, the approach does not 
focus on the formal reconstruction and subsequent empirical inference, with the 
help of correspondence rules, but on the objects, as non-linguistic entities, that 
satisfy those axioms. The line with two points and the Fano plane are taken to be 
models of the axioms. The emphasis on the non-linguistic character of models is 
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because these two objects equally satisfy the axioms if there are drawn with a 
pen on a paper or using threads and nails. Theories are then simply taken as 
classes of models (Suppe, 1977; van Fraassen, 1980). The approaches grouped 
within the semantic view differ in terms of the formalism used for the 
formulation of theories (Portides, 2005b) and the way the relation between 
axioms and models is satisfied (Frigg, 2006).   
In contrast to the philosophy of science, social science has put forward 
discussions about both theory testing and building. There are, however, 
important contextual differences. In literature about social methods, especially at 
textbook level, the discussion about theory is kept really simple and the concept 
is sometimes even omitted entirely (Harley, 2008). Because of the empirical 
orientation of this literature, theory is conceived in terms of a set of assumptions 
that can be tested or derived empirically, following a longstanding positivist 
orthodoxy in social science research (Dubin, 1978; Heinen, 1985; Merton, 1968). 
This positivist approach to theory maintains a strong connection to the empirical 
regarding both theory building and testing. Because of the way these topics has 
been traditionally approached in the philosophical positivist tradition, the 
connection between theory and practice in social research literature has been 
described more in terms of theory testing. The link with positivism has also sets 
particular requirements for the epistemology of social science, for example, 
regarding objectivism and the role of the observer, highlighting the former and 
downplaying the latter (Huges & Sharrock, 1997).  Criteria of adequacy are 
generally formulated neglecting the pragmatic aspects of scientific research. 
Possible failures in the application of the scientific method are accounted for 
Figure 1 
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using non-pragmatic approaches of explanation, such as Popper’s (2002) 
falsificationism.  
A different approach is adopted by theoretically oriented literature. In this case, 
theory building takes a historical turn and focuses significantly on theory 
building, while downplaying theory testing (Baehr, 2002; Connell, 1997). The 
account of theory building, however, follows a historiographical account that 
focuses more on the reconstruction of the contextual and meta-theoretical 
conditions from which a given theory is conceived (Mouzelis, 1995; Ritzer & 
Smart, 2003). Theory is approached from this perspective as a complex narrative 
that includes a combination of theoretical-methodological and pragmatic 
elements. For example, it addresses, on the one side, the way sociological theory 
is closely linked to the concern about the combined effects of modern 
institutions, such as the expansion of formal education systems, democracy and 
urbanisation, and, on the other side, how Weber’s antipositivist sociology was 
deeply influenced by German idealism and historiographical methods, whereas 
Durkheim’s positivist sociology was more influenced by Comte’s positivist 
epistemology.  
The divergence in the approach to the notion of theory in the literature about 
social science is partly due to the fact that, in general, in social theory the concept 
does not have overarching character or the same level of formalisation it has in 
natural and exact sciences. Theories are usually linguistic formulation in natural 
language, with a few mathematical elements. The generality and level of 
formalisation with which the notion of theory is approached depends on 
whether the concept is discussed as an abstract conceptualisation, as a 
framework that allows for empirical explanation and prediction or as a local way 
of hypothesising (Giddens, 1984; Joas & Knöbl, 2009; Sayer, 1992). It is difficult 
to propose an all-encompassing classification the includes all the different 
approaches to theory building and testing in social science (DiMaggio, 1995; 
Sutton & Staw, 1995; Torraco, 2002). It is nonetheless worth highlighting that 
differences are closely associated to the philosophical assumptions regarding 
scientific endeavour.  
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In social science there are approaches to theorisation that work in an analogous 
way to the syntactic view, either in full nomological (e.g. Heinen, 1985) or 
idealised formulations (e.g. Boudon, 1986), although never reaching the same 
level of formalisation. These are objectivist and empiricist accounts, in which 
theory testing is emphasised. The difference between the full nomological and 
the idealised formulation has to do with the epistemological status of scientific 
law-like statements. In social science, these statements usually take the form of 
probabilistic generalisations, typically in the form of implications e.g. the level of 
education has an important effect on income, or idealised principles e.g. human 
decision-making is based on rational heuristics (Little, 1998; Turner, 1986). The 
scope and generality of law-like statements are an important factor for a 
secondary distinction in terms of grand and middle-range theory (Calhoun, 
1992). The former aims at explaining the totality of the social world, whereas the 
latter focuses on particular segments of reality (Merton, 1968). The 
dissatisfaction with grand theory has led social scientists to focus on projects of 
limited scope with local principles and postulates. The difference in scope does 
not determine the strength of the law-like statements. For some, these local 
principles still have nomological strength within their ambit of application 
(Elster, 2007; Hindess, 1977; Sayer, 1992).        
In the other two accounts of theory, social science heavily deviates from the 
nomological principle that dominates the syntactic view. These accounts are not 
close to the philosophical principles of the semantic view, either. They are 
distinctive of social science. These accounts are known as the 
constructivist/relativist and critical. Both ‘constructivism’ and ‘critical theory’ 
serve as umbrella concepts, so theorisation under these two labels is quite 
diverse. In general terms, in the former, the influence of social aspects in the 
construction of science is stressed. Constructivism as a form of theorisation takes 
insights both from developments in philosophy (e.g. Kuhn, 1970; Latour & 
Woolgar, 1986) and social science (Berger & Luckmann, 1991; e.g. Garfinkel, 
1967; Schütz, 1967). It questions the principles and status of norms and values of 
scientific practices, as well as the foundations, scope and limit of the scientific 
method. From this perspective, it is considered that theories do not have nor 
need the level of formalism required by the views in philosophy of science. It 
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might also be argued that they do not provide any significant advantage in the 
production or systematisation of knowledge. The role and plausibility of law-like 
statements is clearly challenged (Goldman, 1999; Hacking, 1999). Social 
epistemological factors are emphasised in the discussion about both theory 
building and testing and the objectivist principles of the previous accounts are 
rejected.      
Critical theory, on the other hand, is usually divided into two strands or 
generations. The first generation, rooted in the Marxist tradition, focuses on 
theory not only as an tool for understanding, but also for criticism and change 
(e.g. Horkheimer, 1982).  The second generation of critical theory emerges a 
response to the relativism of some radical constructivist approaches. It sets the 
foundation of social theory on diverse ethical aspects (e.g. Habermas, 1991). 
While critical theory can be formulated using law-like statements, these are not 
assumed to have the universality and self-evident character they have in 
nomological formulations. Its role is always associated with the ethical 
foundation of the theory, which, at the same time, depends on the kind of 
knowledge about the phenomenon of interest the theory is meant to provide 
(Ashcroft, 2003; Mjøset, 2001). Like constructivist accounts, the need for 
formalisation required by nomological formulations is dropped and theory 
testing and building have more to do with the discussion about the moral 
foundations of the theory. In constructivist and critical theories, because of the 
strong contextualism, theories have a smaller domain of application(Abell, 2004; 
DiMaggio, 1995).   
Models 
The literature on scientific modelling, as in the case of theory, has developed in 
different ways in general philosophy of science and social science. In the former, 
the development of the semantic view of theories led to an increase in the 
literature about modelling. Under the syntactic view, models were thought to be 
useful for presenting different interpretation of the abstract calculus that 
composes the theory, in terms of familiar conceptual and visual elements (Nagel, 
1961). As such, their role in scientific endeavour was considered to be heuristic 
or didactic, grounded on psychological needs that, for logical positivists, were 
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not a topic for the philosophy of science (Bailer-Jones, 1999; Hempel, 2001). The 
development of the semantic view of theories, because of its view of theories as 
classes of models, produced a change in the way models are perceived.  
In the original formulations of the semantic view, models were taken as 
structures (da Costa & French, 2003; Portides, 2005b). The approach was clearly 
focused on natural sciences, which usually have both formal theories and 
models.  As mentioned, the problem of modelling was initially approached in 
terms of the strategy for formalisation e.g. set-theoretic or state-space 
structures, and the criteria on which the theory instantiation is judged e.g. 
isomorphism, partial isomorphism, similarity (Frigg, 2006). The discussion 
about the implications of the semantic view in general science, however, 
produced a large amount of literature that diverges from the original formulation 
in significant ways. There is a multiplicity of approaches discussing different 
accounts of ‘models as’. Although the usual concepts to describe the practice of 
modelling such as analogy, abstraction and idealisation are still used (Suárez, 
2009b; Weisberg, 2007), the most interesting developments have come from 
new approaches to modelling that describe models as: mediators (e.g. Morrison 
& Morgan, 1999b), autonomous agents (e.g. Morrison, 1999), fictions (e.g. 
Suárez, 2009b), fables and parables (e.g. Cartwright, 2010), missing system (e.g. 
Thomson-Jones, 2009), make-believe (e.g. Toon, 2010), credible worlds (e.g. 
Sugden, 2009) and surrogates (e.g. Contessa, 2007), among others. 
All these concepts are not exclusive and in many cases overlap. The diversity 
reflects the different aspects of the practice of modelling that are highlighted. 
The notions ‘mediator’ or ‘autonomous agent’, for example, focus on the 
relationship between models, theory and the world. Under the syntactic view, 
theories were connected to the world and models were considered to have a 
secondary pedagogic or clarificatory role, if any at all. The current literature, 
however, acknowledges that, in many cases, models serve as theoretical-
methodological bridges between theory and reality (Suárez, 2009b). It 
acknowledges as well that many of these models are not simply an interpretation 
or derivation of a theory, but an independent or semi-independent entity, with 
distinctive technical and theoretical-methodological features (Morrison, 1999; 
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Winsberg, 2010). A concept such as ‘surrogate’, on the other hand, focuses on the 
role of models in scientific endeavour, on the kind of knowledge they produce. 
Given the fact that models are not taken as mere interpretations or derivations, 
and that they can have an important level of autonomy with respect to theory, 
one of the problems is defining what kind of knowledge models produce and 
how this knowledge is obtained (Contessa, 2007; Morgan, 1999).  
The focus on the autonomous, pedagogic and mediating role of models has made 
representation one of the key topics in the current literature about modelling. 
Representation is taken as a two- or three-place relationship. The first object, the 
source, represents the second one, the target. In a three-place formulation, the 
third object is the actor for which that relation of representation holds. A 
relationship of representation might be instantiated by different elements for the 
first two objects. In scientific inquiry, models are regularly used as the first: the 
source of representation. In contemporary philosophical literature, the focus is 
put on the type of relationship that holds between the source and the target and 
the criteria that make a representation a successful one (Bailer-Jones, 2003; 
Chakravartty, 2010b; Frigg, 2006; Suárez, 2010).               
In social science, the problem of scientific modelling has not been addressed in 
the same way. Only in highly formalised subdisciplines, especially in economics, 
where mathematical or statistical models are common, has the concept been 
discussed in similar way to that of philosophy of science (Morrison & Morgan, 
1999a). In the mainstream, however, the connection between theory and model 
has not historically produced the same interest and level of theorisation. Both 
models and theories are usually formulated in natural language and there is not a 
high level of abstraction and generalisation. The concepts are sometimes 
conflated or used interchangeably. Additionally, the meaning associated with 
both concepts differs significantly due to the large theoretical-methodological 
diversity in social research (Byrne, 2002; Klein & Stockley, 2009).  
The prospects and limitations derived from using any given theoretical-
methodological approach shape the way theory and model are to be understood 
within that context. The claim that models are derived from theory, for example, 
would not fit the paradigm of grounded theory. Under this approach, the process 
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of data collection is loosely constrained theoretically (Glaser & Strauss, 1999). 
Likewise, in those areas of social science with a lower level of formalisation, 
where grounded theory and many other qualitative approaches are employed, 
models serve a conceptual as well as taxonomical goal, not one of instantiation 
(della Porta & Keating, 2008; Morgan & Grüne-Yanoff, 2013). In those more 
formalised areas, models are not necessarily simple operational derivations of 
theory, but also have an important learning component. Because of the local and 
non-formal nature of most social theories, models are regularly used as a 
pedagogical tool that allows unveiling those aspects of the phenomenon of 
interest that are not contemplated or well covered by theory (Jaccard & Jacoby, 
2010; Morgan, 1999).  
The philosophical and the social science accounts of modelling also diverge 
significantly in the approach to measuring. Natural sciences and philosophy of 
science have traditionally focused on those aspects of the theory of measurement 
related with the operationalisation of qualities and representation and quantities 
(Kuhn, 1977; Mari, 2005; Tal, 2013). Social science, on the contrary, has focused 
more on the issues of the epistemology of measurement emerging from the 
interaction between the measuring instrument, the object being measured and 
the environment. The very notion of empirical as such has always been 
approached critically in two ways: First, in terms of the relationship with the 
object of study, as it is done in the interpretivist paradigm, which developed a 
particular methodological stance, based on the empirical difficulty of measuring 
the subjective states that motivate individual action (Weber, 1949); second, in 
terms of the goal of social empirical disciplines, which is manifest in the 
development of different strands of critical theory, particularly after the mid-
twentieth century  (Adkins & Lury, 2009).   
This critical development of methodology and epistemology in social science has 
led to an important acknowledgement of the problems that affect the practice of 
modelling and theorisation, such as reflexivity (e.g. Garfinkel, 1967; Thomas & 
Thomas, 1928), the role of the observer (e.g. Giddens, 1984; Luhmann, 1995), the 
theory-ladenness of observation (e.g. Maas & Morgan, 2013). In turn, the notion 
of ‘stylised facts’ or ‘representative agent’ in highly formalised areas of social 
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science, for example, is clearly underlain by a more critical approach to 
representation through scientific models, defined by abstraction and idealisation 
(Morgan, 1999). These measurement problems have gained major importance in 
the recent literature on modelling in philosophy of science. First, because they 
are fundamental for the understanding of the practice of modelling, for example, 
with regard to representation; second, because these measuring problems have 
further effect on crucial philosophical discussions in contemporary science, such 
as the instrumentalism-realism debate (Chakravartty, 2001; Suárez, 2009b).    
Experiments 
Due to the attention paid to methodological issues in social science, theory, 
model, and experiment have always been addressed jointly. The 
acknowledgement of the problems with measurement has been regularly 
complemented by a concern about the technical and ethical problems 
surrounding experimentation in social science (Michell, 2007; Shadish et al., 
2002). Awareness about these two issues, however, has not led to the 
development of a philosophy of experimentation in social science. This, on the 
other hand, has been an important goal in philosophy of science since the last 
decades of the twentieth century. A key concept in the contemporary discussion 
on modelling is that of experiment.  
Despite the importance of experimentation in scientific endeavour, experiments 
have been historically neglected in philosophy of science. In the twentieth 
century, logical positivism downplayed the role of experimentation in the same 
way that it did with modelling. Experiments were taken serve as tests for 
theoretical predictions (Hempel, 2001; Popper, 2002).  The increasing attention 
experiments have gained in the last few decades comes from two different sides: 
On one side, there is the new experimentalism within philosophy of science, 
which was concerned with the way the excessive focus on theorisation in 
philosophy of science misrepresented scientific practice and neglected important 
dimensions of the production of scientific knowledge (Franklin, 1989; Galison, 
1987; Hacking, 1983). On the other side, there is the area of social and historical 
studies of science of technology, which focused in the everyday practice and 
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culture of science (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Knorr-Cetina, 1981b; Latour & 
Woolgar, 1986).  
The increasing attention paid to the philosophical features of experimentation 
had two important consequences for the current discussion: First, it raised 
awareness of the way the measuring problems mentioned before generate 
important challenges for the validation of experimental results. While traditional 
philosophy of science paid attention mostly to observation, this turn to 
experimentation highlighted the importance of the experimental design, 
construction and operation (Arabatzis, 2013; Harré, 2003). It stressed issues 
such as the materiality of the experimental setting, as well as the manipulative 
character of the experiment i.e. the possibility of performing controlled 
structural or parametric modifications, so to produce relevant information 
regarding the object of study. This allowed tracing better the connection 
between the experimental practice and some more general philosophical issues, 
such as causation and explanation (Pickering, 1995; Woodward, 2003a). It also 
led to the conceptualisation of experiments as a two-place relationship: between 
the object of experimentation and the target of experimentation (Gremmen, 
2009; Hacking, 1983). Most importantly, it showed that experiment and theory 
are sufficiently detached as to make the role of the former something more than 
a test for the latter. The validity of experimental results is not entirely linked to 
the validity of the theory they rely upon. The reason is that experiments are built 
and used in a multiplicity of contexts and following a diversity of goals, which 
provides them with a relatively autonomous philosophical character (Hacking, 
1992; Steinle, 2002).   
The similarity between the philosophical approach to experimentation and 
modelling is clear. The literature on experiments has had an important influence 
on the literature on modelling and has provided several insights. Hacking’s 
(1983) idea of experimentation having a life ‘of its own’ served as an important 
reference for Morrison’s (1999) view of models as autonomous agents. Beyond 
the parallels between both literatures, however, there has not been a robust 
philosophical exploration of the similarities and differences between models and 
experiments. The literature on both sides has focused either on the model-theory 
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or the experiment-theory connection. The relationship between models and 
experiments is not clearly articulated, especially due to the diversity in the 
literature about modelling. It is not clear, for example, whether: a) one is a subset 
of the other or they just constitute two different ways of doing empirical science, 
b) they both have the same ontological and epistemological requirements or c) 
they have the same epistemological status in terms of the knowledge they 
produce (Mäki, 2005; Morgan, 2005; Parker, 2009). This connection between 
models and experiments, however, has become fundamental in the philosophy of 
computer simulation (Guala, 2002; Parker, 2013; Winsberg, 2009).   
Computer simulation 
The field of computer simulation studies adds another dimension to the 
discussion about modelling, theorisation and experimentation. Computer 
simulation has a dual character: It can be approached from a pure 
methodological perspective i.e. what the computer simulation does within the 
context of empirical research, or from a disciplinary perspective i.e. how 
simulation is understood as a subfield in the discipline of computer science. This 
latter view implies discussing important philosophical issues surrounding the 
understanding of simulation within its disciplinary framework, prior to its 
introduction in empirical research in the natural, biological and social sciences. 
Within the field of computer science, there has been an extended discussion 
about the nature of the practice of computer simulation and its relationship with 
the concepts mentioned above (Colburn, 2000; Fetzer, 2001; Keller, 2003; Tedre 
& Moisseinen, 2014; Winsberg, 2010). The concepts of theory and 
experimentation have the most important role in computational social science, 
for the two most popular approaches to computer simulation in the field 
highlight its role in theory building or as an experimental method (Sawyer, 
2013).   
The first approach suggests computer simulation can be a great aid for theory 
building due to the possibility of producing axiomatic inference, based on formal 
computer programming languages (Ostrom, 1988; Smith & Conrey, 2007). This 
view is strongly linked to an influential perspective within field of computer 
science, which suggests the field can be considered an extension of exact science 
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(Hoare, 1969). The assumption of formality in the practice of computer 
programming has led to the neglect of the experimental dimension of computer 
programming (Colburn, 2000; Fetzer, 2001). There are two formulations of this 
approach. A weak formulation simply emphasises the formal inferential 
character of computer simulation (e.g. Epstein, 1999). A strong formulation, on 
the other hand, suggests that a computer simulation as such can be interpreted 
as an axiomatic system (e.g. Alechina et al., 2010) or as an instance of a theory 
(Edmonds & Hales, 2003; Troitzsch, 2004).  
The second approach to computer simulation, which focuses on its experimental 
character, also has two formulations. On the narrow formulation, computer 
simulation is taken as nothing more than an aid for computation. Simulation 
helps finding approximate results for analytical problems without a closed-form 
solution or for problems that need to be solved in a step-by-step fashion 
(Winsberg, 2010). The broad formulation focuses on the experimental character 
of computer simulation as a fully-fledged methodology. The methodological 
understanding of computer simulation varies, for there is not a consensual 
definition of the notions of empirical and experimental. The broad formulation of 
the experimental approach to computer simulation is influenced by three 
different traditions: the philosophical literature on modelling and experiments, 
the philosophical literature on methodology and epistemology in computer 
science, and the new developments in the empirical sciences employing 
simulation (Colburn, 2000; Parker, 2013; Tedre & Moisseinen, 2014). This 
approach takes into account how simulation sits within the wider frame of the 
practice of science, in terms of its epistemological and methodological features. 
The epistemology of measurement has been an important topic, but it has been 
naturally framed within the context of the technical requirements typical of 
computer simulation (Parker, 2013; Winsberg, 2009).   
The process of modelling as such has only been approached tangentially. The 
literature has mostly focused on aspects such as the material features of 
computer simulations and the epistemological warrants this method can provide 
(Parker, 2009). The representational character of modelling has been just 
partially addressed in the discussion about what it means to ‘simulate’ using a 
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computer program. The discussion has never reached the level of complexity 
discussed in the section on modelling above, for the approach to simulation has 
been historically dominated by the narrow view of simulation as 
experimentation: as a method for obtaining results ‘by brute force’ (Winsberg, 
2010). The problems arising from modelling as an activity have been taken as 
prior to the simulation as such. In the recent years, however, there has been a 
growing interest on the methodological and epistemological issues of modelling. 
This interest has been driven by the increasing awareness of the importance of 
conceptual modelling, by the popularisation of simulation in areas with less 
formal theories and models, such as biology and social science, and by the 
popularisation of computer simulation in the study of complex systems (Parker, 
2013; Robinson, 2011; Varenne, 2009). 
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Modelling and Theorising  
Computational social science is a practice-oriented field with a strong 
methodological reliance on the use of computer simulation with agent-based 
models. While modelling is meant to be a core activity in the field, no systematic 
account of the philosophical issues underlying this practice has been developed. 
The concept of model has been usually used in a vague and ambiguous way and 
references to the philosophy of science or social science is rare. These few 
references do not capture the complexity of the literature surrounding the 
concept, as well as the clearly distinct paths this discussion has taken in the 
philosophy of science and social science.     
An adequate conceptualisation of modelling in computational social science 
requires tracing its connection with two other major concepts: theory and 
experiment. The understanding of important elements of the practice of 
modelling, such as representation or manipulation, depends on the way theory, 
models and experiments are thought to stand in relation with each other. It also 
requires grounding the discussion within the context of computer simulation, for 
the field of inquiry shapes the activity of modelling in different ways, by defining 
material, as well as syntactic and semantic requirements, advantages and 
limitations.          
The following text is meant to set the foundations for such an account. It builds 
on the review presented on the prologue and advances a particular view of 
modelling and theory building in computational social science. For the former, 
three basic issues are discussed: manipulation, representation and validation; for 
the later, the discussion focuses on how theory building has been constrained by 
a particular approach in which the activity of modelling is decontextualised and 
grounded on stringent requirements, derived from a particular philosophical 
interpretation of social phenomena.        
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Modelling  
There has not been a robust discussion about modelling in the field of computer 
simulation studies, for it has been traditionally dominated by the narrow view of 
simulation as experimentation. ‘Model’ has usually been defined in a very general 
way, in terms of  “[…] a representation or abstraction of something such as an 
entity, a system or an idea” (Balci, 2003, p. 150). The concept of abstraction has 
been usually taken in a limited sense, as to mean a formal way of representation, 
typical of the system of equations that are used in most computer simulations. 
While this restricted approach to abstraction still captures the simplifying 
character that is common to all scientific models, it falls short in grasping the 
multiplicity of ways in which this simplification can be realised. In the case of 
computational social science, it fails to capture the epistemological assumptions 
behind the notion of artificial societies, which has played an important role in the 
use of agent-based models in social science.  
Agent-based modelling takes advantage of the flexibility of object-oriented 
programming in order to develop models in which objects in the model stand in 
a one-to-one ontological correspondence with objects of the real world. It is 
possible to model individuals, material objects and the environment as 
independent entities, with different characteristics and interaction rules. 
Traditional equation-based models simply depict relationships among variables 
using system level or individual variables. Agent-based modelling goes further, 
allowing for the creation of a virtual world. The concepts ‘artificial societies’,  
‘virtual world’ or ‘in silico experiments’ have been used in a weak sense, 
suggesting a transition in the form of representation from variables to artificial 
entities (Macy & Willer, 2002; Manzo, 2007b; Squazzoni, 2010), and in a strong 
sense, suggesting a transition in the object of study from the real to the virtual 
object (Casti, 1997; Conte & Gilbert, 1995; Epstein & Axtell, 1996). The gap 
between these two views of computer simulation using agent-based models sets 
the most important challenges for the understanding of modelling in 
computational social science, in terms of manipulation, representation and 
validation.      
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Manipulation 
The manipulative character of computer simulation i.e. the fact that a computer 
model can be used experimentally through the exploration and variation of the 
parameter space and the functional structure of the model, has been significantly 
downplayed in the practical domain. The reason is that, in simulation studies in 
general, the narrow view of simulation as experiments has dominated; while, in 
computational social science in particular, the weak view of simulations as an aid 
for theory has dominated. Both neglect the manipulative character by focusing 
on different ends of the simulation study. The former downplays the 
manipulative role by emphasising the input, the latter by emphasising the 
output. In the narrow view, because simulation is viewed just as an aid for 
computation, the concern is with the model that is being simulated. The 
manipulative aspect of the simulation is replaced by a technical concern about 
discretisation and the verification of the general implementation of the aspects 
of the prior conceptual model. In the second case, the concern about 
manipulation is replaced by a concern on with inference. That is why agent-
based modelling is usually compared to formal theory, instead of experiments 
(David et al., 2007; Edmonds & Hales, 2005; Klüver, Stoica, & Schmidt, 2003).  
Formal theory focuses on providing deductive analytical solutions within closed 
formalised systems (Jasso, 2006; Löwe, 2002). When computer simulation is 
viewed from this perspective, the emphasis shifts from the empirical character of 
computer models to the closed algorithmic character of the execution of the 
computer simulation. Modelling is approached in terms of the abstraction 
produced by the use of a formal language to build the model and the processual 
character of the simulation is viewed as a step-by-step algorithmic procedure 
that produces a deduction. This latter aspect is the one commonly emphasised in 
computational social science (Axelrod, 1997a; Epstein, 1999). The idea of formal 
inference is significantly appealing for social scientists, for it is usually 
acknowledged that the semantic and syntactic flexibility of natural language, on 
which most social theories and models are built, is an important obstacle for 
formalisation and knowledge production in the social disciplines. Yet, while 
inference is commonly emphasised as the crucial aspect of computer simulation 
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in social science, the formal algorithmic nature of computer programming is not 
by itself the reason why the results of a simulation can be eventually taken as 
epistemologically significant.  
One of the most important distinctions in the epistemology of computer 
simulation is the distinction between static and dynamic models (Casti, 1997; 
Guala, 2002; Hartmann, 1996). Some models represent the phenomenon of 
interest in a static way, either because the interest is on relative stable 
properties e.g. a map, or because it increases tractability e.g. describing a system 
of relations using networks. Some other models, including computer simulations, 
have a representation of the time-evolution of the system. The algorithmic 
features of computer programming account for the temporal evolution of the 
model. Yet, the process is epistemically opaque (Humphreys, 2004). Although a 
simulation is the result of a formal procedure, the link between inputs and 
outputs, in practice, can be backtracked only with great difficulty. Practitioners 
do not engage in such activity when trying to understand the outcome of a 
simulation (Casti, 2001; David et al., 2007). There is no derivation in the same 
way as traditional analytical models. The epistemic opacity is partly what made 
the concept of emergence appealing in agent-based modelling (Gilbert, 1995). It 
is also one of the reasons why agent-based modelling struggles to gain 
recognition as a robust social method (Lehtinen & Kuorikoski, 2007). In 
computational social science, it is not the reduction in the semantic and syntactic 
space that computer languages provide that is important. It is, instead, that a 
computer simulation is an experimental setting in which controlled 
manipulation can be performed (Morrison, 2009; Winsberg, 2010).  
The problem with the view of simulation as theory in computational social 
science is that is focuses too much in the output of the simulation as end product, 
but neglects the way in which different manipulations during the simulation life 
cycle affect the epistemic status of those results (Winsberg, 1999). In the 
philosophy of science, the increased awareness of the manipulative character of 
the practice of computer simulation has led to enquiries about the connection 
between computer simulations and experiments, for manipulation has always 
been the distinctive feature of experimentation, both in natural and human 
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sciences (Hacking, 1983; Morgan, 2013; Shadish et al., 2002; Woodward, 2003a). 
The link between computer simulation and experiments has changed over time 
and varies between different disciplines (Keller, 2003). The literature on the 
epistemology of computer simulation, however, emphasises the fact that the 
inference produced by computer simulation is a combination of downward, 
motley and autonomous features (Winsberg, 2001). ‘Downward’ accounts for the 
elements of the simulation that are derived from theory. ‘Motley’ accounts for the 
technical and practical elements of the simulation that are non-theoretical. 
‘Autonomous’ accounts for the fact that the knowledge produced by computer 
simulation cannot only be evaluated through comparison with observational 
data. Simulation is used in most cases to replace observation and 
experimentation. The motley and autonomous features cover different aspects 
and principles of the process of manipulating a simulation.  
While the literature acknowledges that computer simulation and experiments 
are not exactly the same, it does recognise there are significant similarities 
between the two (Parker, 2008; Winsberg, 2010). How closely connected they 
are considered to be, depends on the particular approach to two interconnected 
aspects: the target of the manipulation and the material character of the 
manipulation. The target of the manipulation has been one of the key elements in 
the analysis of the connection between computer simulation and 
experimentation. A popular view in computational social science suggests one 
key difference between computer simulations and experiments is that, in the 
former, the researcher is manipulating a model and not the phenomenon itself 
(Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005). This view has been criticised on two fronts. The first 
one claims that this view oversimplifies the notion of experiment, for 
experimentation needs not always be performed on the phenomenon of interest 
itself (Winsberg, 2010). While this criticism is accurate if it is meant as an 
approach to simulation in general, it does not necessarily apply in the case of 
social science, where experimentation traditionally relies on the use of human 
subjects (Greenberg & Shroder, 2004).   
The second criticism regards the object being manipulated. Gilbert and Troitzsch 
(2005)  are not explicit about the features of the model being manipulated. The 
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claim that simulations manipulate a different object than experiments has been 
articulated explicitly in two ways: the first one suggests computer simulations 
are non-material experiments (Morgan, 2003); the second, that they are not 
experiments, but material (Guala, 2002). The former suggest they are non-
material because they manipulate mathematical objects. The latter suggests 
simulation deals with a physical object that has formal, but not material 
correspondence with the target. The lack of material correspondence is why they 
are qualified as non-experiments.  
The way the object of manipulation and its materiality are addressed has 
important implications on the epistemological status given to simulation. When 
simulations are considered material non-experiments, it is assumed different 
validation processes are required for simulations and experiments. Unlike 
experiments, it is argued, simulations have to solve a problem of representation. 
The view assuming simulations are non-material experiments goes even further, 
claiming that differences in materiality imply simulation´s results have less 
epistemological power. Both positions have been accused of misplacing the 
connection between representation, materiality and validity (Parker, 2009). 
Experimentation is mediated by a representation relationship that strongly 
depends on the material features of the experimental setting, both in the 
instrumental design and the object and target of experimentation (Boon, 2009; 
Harré, 2003).  
Computer simulation constitutes a clear example of the importance of the 
materiality of the object. Computer simulations are implementations in physical 
machines. The relationship, for example, between low- and high-level 
programming languages, the syntactic and semantic features of programming 
languages and the technical specifications of the components of the physical 
machine all have important effects on the simulation results. Animal 
experimentation is considered a plausible form of experimentation, not because 
humans and animals share the same biological composition, but because the 
functional features of the physiological pathways explored during the 
experiment are similar. Likewise, by focussing on contextualised individual 
decision-making, for example, traditional experimentation in social science can 
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only be considered valid under the assumption that all the materiality of social 
structures can be reduced to cognitive states of the agents. The assumptions 
underlying these experimental settings do not necessarily make the results more 
valid than those of a simulation. The way the effects of the material character of 
simulation are identified and accounted for constitutes an important aspects of 
the epistemology of computer simulation (Colburn, 2000; Fetzer, 2001; 
Winsberg, 2010).  
While experimenting on another organism guarantees some ontological ceteris 
paribus for the manipulation, it is both the functional and structural character of 
the relationship between the target and the object that provide warrants for 
belief in the experimental results (Barberousse, Franceschelli, & Imbert, 2008; 
Parker, 2009). This two-placed relationship in experimentation has been 
subordinated in computational social science to the representational 
relationship of the model as an abstract entity and the world. This relationship, 
as will be shown in what follows, provides additional challenges on its own.      
Representation 
In computational social science, as with simulation studies in general, neither the 
semantic view on theories nor the contemporary literature on modelling have 
received significant attention. Additionally, unlike theories in the natural 
domain, both theories and models have representational features in social 
science. Yet, there is a tendency to depict the practice of agent-based modelling 
in social science following, either implicitly or explicitly, Morrison and Morgan’s 
(1999b; 1999) notion of models as autonomous and mediating agents. While this 
approach sits well with the practice-oriented nature of computational social 
science as a field of inquiry, it generates some confusion about the way 
representation is meant to mediate between theory, model and target 
phenomenon. 
This confusion about the theory-model-world relationship becomes manifest 
when, for example, the connection between theory and models is analysed. Both 
Edmonds and Hales (2003) and Troitzsch (2004) consider models are cases of 
theory instantiation. The former suggest the relationship is Simulation  
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Conceptual model  Target phenomenon, where the conceptual model is an 
abstract representation of a social process, generally expressed in natural 
language. “This conceptual model mediates between the simulation and the 
phenomena, the purpose of the simulation is to inform the conceptual model, but 
it is only the conceptual model which directly represents the phenomena” 
(Edmonds & Hales, 2003 Emphasis in the original). Troitzsch, on the other hand, 
has an interpretation conforming to philosophical structuralism, an account 
closely connected with the semantic view of theories (Giere, 2001). According to 
him, “a simulation model “of a theory” is “analogous to a structuralist 
reconstruction of this theory” (Troitzsch, 2004, p. 269). The relationship in this 
case is Theory  Simulation  Target phenomenon and it is the simulation that 
carries the representational burden.   
Part of the difficulty with the issue of representation in computational social 
science is that it is not clear what exactly are the source and target of 
representation. The ambiguity partly depends on the level of commitment to the 
notion of artificial societies. Taken in a weak sense, a computational model 
would be a model of a real world phenomenon. In the strong sense, the 
implications of the notion of artificial societies are more difficult to appraise. 
Casti (1997), for example, suggests that the simulation is not a model of 
something else, but the very target of inquiry. Computer simulation would then 
be a direct form of experimentation. Epstein and Axtell (1996) and Conte and 
Gilbert (1995) suggests computer simulations are models that allow inquiring 
into social processes by the exploration of possible worlds. Grüne-Yanoff (2013), 
on the other hand, denies that computational models provide answers about 
possible worlds for there is not a commitment with the realism of the solution. 
He claims models are tools for thinking that allow answering how-possibly 
questions about the real world.   
Both in the weak and the strong sense, the tenability of the representation 
depends on the philosophical assumptions underlying the selection of the source 
and the target. The distinctive features of agent-based models as source of 
representation are the bottom-up focus on entities and interactions and the fact 
that they are dynamic models, with information processing capabilities (Grüne-
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Yanoff & Weirich, 2010; Macy & Willer, 2002). Regarding the former, agent-
based models assume a principle of non-redundancy and an ontology of levels 
(Conte et al., 2001; Epstein, 2011). The first one aims at avoiding unnecessary 
entities and principles for explanation; the second one places a distinction 
between the level of individual action and the level of social properties, satisfied 
by supervenience relationships. There is not agreement, however, whether the 
nature of this supervenience is causal, mereological, epiphenomenal, etc. This 
leads on one hand, to localising non-local properties of individuals. Formal roles, 
for example, are not properties of the individuals holding those roles, but of the 
relational context for which those roles are devised. Many properties of this type 
are modelled as individual properties in agent-based models. On the other hand, 
the principle of non-redundancy and supervenience have also led to the 
endogenisation of social structures e.g. turn taking in game theory. While this has 
been taken as methodologically crucial, for the method is meant to show the 
microfoundations of macropatterns, it assumes a very particular ontology and 
epistemology. Representation between the model and the target phenomenon 
depends significantly on the tenability of the reduction that obtains by 
implementing the principles of ontological levels and non-redundancy.  
The information processing capabilities of computer simulations are also 
important for representation in computational social science. Not all simulations 
are devised to represent spatiotemporal phenomena by the iterative character of 
the execution of a computer program. Some simulations represent changes in 
structural properties, while others assume changes in time, but do not commit to 
a realistic representation of the process e.g. Monte Carlo simulations (Grüne-
Yanoff & Weirich, 2010; Humphreys, 2004; Winsberg, 2010). Agent-based 
models, however, are used in most cases as a way to represent spatiotemporal 
dynamics. This requires a commitment with the realism of the spatiotemporal 
representation during the simulation. The spatial structure of the models has 
been widely explored, for example, using cellular automata, random walk models 
or networks (O’Sullivan & Perry, 2013). The same has not happened with time. 
This is, probably, because of the levels ontology that is adopted when using 
agent-based models. By assuming macropatterns supervene on the individual 
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basis, a view of the micro-macro link resembling Coleman’s boat (1990) (in 
Figure 1 below) is used (Hassan et al., 2013; Manzo, 2007b; Squazzoni, 2010). It 
is a very static view of process. At any moment, the specific values or states of the 
micro entities can account for the given macropattern. Arrows 1) and 3) are 
meant to be temporally separated by arrow 2), which can be instantaneous or 
spatiotemporally extended. Analysis of social phenomena using Coleman’s boat 
work on the assumption that 1), 2) and 3) are spatiotemporally individuated. 
While 4) is spatiotemporally extended throughout, it is considered causally 
inefficacious. As with the bottom-up nature, this approach to the iterative 
character of the simulation has important implications for representation. 
 
Figure 1 
The target of representation presents further challenges in computational social 
science. Because of the relative representational independence of computational 
models and the underspecified connection with theoretical content, the target of 
representation cannot be easily identified. An additional difficulty for the 
identification is that, in computational social science, the relationship of 
representation is usually discussed as if there were a direct comparison to the 
target phenomenon (Bankes et al., 2002; Edmonds, 2000). This cannot be taken 
as more than a shorthand for a complex representation of entities, processes, 
events, variables, etc. ‘Phenomenon’ is an umbrella term and usually refers to a 
multiplicity of things. Because of the dynamic character of computational 
simulation, social processes or mechanisms are usually recognised as the target. 
This claim also has important philosophical implications. If social processes, or 
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the mechanisms that guide these processes, are the target of representation, it is 
necessary to decide about their philosophical status. These social processes or 
mechanisms can, for example, be considered real and observable, real and 
unobservable, abstract conceptualisations based on observation, etc.  
The answer to what these processes and mechanisms are is far from consensual. 
It is, in part, linked to the level of commitment to the notion of artificial societies. 
In Casti’s (1997) view, for example, mechanisms and levels necessarily have to 
be abstract conceptualisations. It is also linked to particular philosophical 
stances. Using evolutionary algorithms requires the assumption that the 
principle of selection can operate uniformly across nature. Yet, some might 
consider this an unrealistic representation of social dynamics (Chattoe, 1998). 
Finally, it also depends on particular stances regarding the practice of agent-
based modelling in social science, e.g. the KISS vs. KIDS or models as 
understanding vs. models as prediction debate (David et al., 2004; Heath et al., 
2009).         
In general, however, computational social science has mostly adopted a 
reductionist approach to processes and mechanisms, supported by the principles 
of non-redundancy and levels of reality. This reductionist view is partly due to 
the fact that the philosophical characteristics of processes and mechanisms as 
targets of representations have usually been explored in computational social 
science following the theoretical-methodological framework of the micro-
macro/structure-agency dichotomies in social science. Yet, dichotomies in social 
science are not the right framework for the explorations of the features and 
implications of the dynamics of social life, for they provide a synchronic 
approach to the explanation of social phenomena (Abbott, 2001b; Bash, 2000; 
Elias, 1993). The success of an explanation using Coleman’s boat, as seen from 
Figure 1, depends on the possibility to isolate inter-level relationships 
temporally. This reliance on the traditional conceptualisations of the micro-
macro link in social theory might be one of the reasons why the initial interest in 
notions such as emergence has significantly decreased over time in 
computational social science (Baker, 2012; Epstein, 2006). Instead of focusing on 
the spatiotemporal dynamics of emergent process, the view of emergence 
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through social dualism shifted the attention to the philosophical foundations of 
inter-level relationships (Corning, 2002; van Bouwel, 2004; Wimsatt, 2007).    
There is, under this reductionist approach, nothing that justifies philosophically 
the representational independence of processes, mechanisms or macropatterns. 
The method, however, avoids becoming a reflection on micro entities alone, by 
incorporating macro elements methodologically, with the help of visualisations 
of the simulated world and dynamic statistical representations, such as time 
sequences. Visualisation is one of the most important experimental features in 
science and has taken a fundamental role in the study of complex phenomena 
(Gooding, 2004; Kitcher, 1993; Wimsatt, 2007). In computer simulation, 
visualisation has taken a crucial role in the interpretation of the results; in 
computational social science, this interpretation focuses on the understanding of 
the bottom-up transition between levels (Barberousse et al., 2008; Bedau, 2011; 
Macy & Willer, 2002). One of the reasons why Schelling’s (1971) model is so 
appealing is because of the strong resulting clustering can be followed visually in 
a step-by-step fashion.      
The way the philosophical foundations for the source and target of 
representation are dealt with can have important implications for the evaluation 
of an agent-based simulation and the identification of the scope and generality of 
the results. Yet, this divergence in approaches to representation has been 
neglected in the discussion about how to evaluate models in computational 
social science.        
Validation 
Computational social science has not developed an articulated account of the 
way the manipulational and representational features of the simulation affect the 
warrants for belief in the adequacy of the simulation. Agent-based models in 
computational social science are evaluated using verification and validation 
procedures, introduced in the field from the wider area of computer 
programming and software testing (Colburn, 2000). While there is no consensual 
definition, verification is meant to focus on whether the conceptual model has 
been correctly transformed into a computational model, while validation is 
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meant to focus on whether the computational model correctly represents the 
target. These concepts have been widely applied to evaluate the practice of 
agent-based modelling in computational social science. Yet, they are linked with 
philosophical assumptions that can lead to important misconceptions. Some of 
these misconceptions are about the manipulative and the representational 
character of simulation.    
The use of verification and validation for the evaluation of simulations does not 
deny the existence of the manipulative and representational features of 
simulation, but it frames them within a particular concept that fails to account 
for their complexity. An initial difficulty with the way verification and validation 
have been conceptualised has to do with the very concept of experiment. 
Computer programming was initially thought of as an exact science. The 
abandonment of that idea, however, has not been accompanied by an 
identification of its empirical features. In wide areas of computer science, 
experimental has simply been taken as synonymous with empirical (Tedre & 
Moisseinen, 2014). Yet the two have distinctive implications. The notion of 
empirical is connected with the practice of computer science as an empirical 
discipline. It leads, initially, to conceptualise the implications of computer 
programming through a distinction between virtual and physical machines 
(Fetzer, 2001). The Turing machine, for example, is a problem of computation 
devised for a virtual machine. It emphasises the formal and syntactic aspect of 
computation. Computer science, however, requires the conceptualisation of 
aspects associated with the physicality of a particular implementation. As 
mentioned, the connection, for example, between low and high-level 
programming languages can have important implications in the simulation 
results. The empirical character of the practice of computer simulation generates 
additional epistemological questions. The strong methodological reliance on 
computational infrastructure, along with the strong theoretical reliance on social 
theory, put computational social science outside the boundaries of traditional 
scientific inquiry both of traditional social and computational science. The 
divergence, for example, with relation to the notion of artificial society points to 
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a more profound difference regarding the empirical in computational social 
science.       
The experimental features of computer programming generate a different set of 
problems. The most important one is about the delimitation of the object and 
target of experimentation. Because the notions of virtual and physical machines 
have not been adequately differentiated, some conceptualisation proposed 
differs in significant regards. Algorithms, programs and simulations have been 
taken in different combinations either as object and target of experimentation in 
computer science’s literature (Colburn, 2000). It all depends on whether the 
notion of experimental is attached to the practice of computer science as a whole, 
to the execution of a particular program or on particular stages of the execution 
e.g. debugging (Tedre & Moisseinen, 2014). In the first case, the emphasis is put 
on the comparison of different programs executing the same task. In the second 
case, it is on the connection between algorithms and programs. Finally, in the 
third case, it is about the performance of the program. The distinctive feature of 
experiments, in comparison to formal theory, where the focus is analytical or 
axiomatic deduction, is that manipulations account for variations in possible 
outcomes (Harré, 2003; Woodward, 2003a). The approach to verification and 
validation of computer simulations has poorly accounted for this feature due, in 
part, to the difficulty in conceptualising the empirical and the experimental.       
An additional problem derived from the failure to define the empirical content of 
computer simulations is that verification and validation are usually thought of as 
two different problems, with well-defined areas of application: the former 
dealing with a problem of formal translation from the conceptual to the 
computational model; the latter with a problem of representation between the 
computational model and the target. This apparent division distorts the process 
of evaluating a simulation model and also fails to account properly for the 
epistemology of computer simulation. It distorts the process for it neglects the 
fact that the process is not sequential. There is no formal verification of the 
computational model that serves as epistemological foundation for posterior 
empirical comparison. While some verification techniques e.g. corner testing, can 
help identifying bugs at an early stage, it is the iterative application of different 
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verification and validation techniques across the simulation life cycle that builds 
up confidence about the results (Mcnamara et al., 2008; Winsberg, 2010).  
Most importantly, this division between verification and validation mismatches 
the source of representation and the object of experimentation. The object of 
experimentation, as mentioned, is a computational model, implemented on a 
physical computer. The idea of verification as a matter of translation or 
transformation from one model to the other, whether as a one-off process or as 
an iterative first stage in the simulation life cycle, however, leads to take the 
conceptual model as the source of representation. This view of verification 
hinders the fact that the relationship between the conceptual and the 
computational model is not just of translation, but, most importantly, of mutual 
sense-making. Important representational and interpretational elements 
mediate this relationship (Pool, 2011; Robinson, 2011). Only by taking 
verification and validation as complex entwining procedures can the features of 
the source of representation be defined and ascribed.      
The computational model itself should not be taken as carrying the 
representational burden either. One problem derived from the idea that 
computational models have a direct representational relationship with the target 
phenomenon is that the process of interpretation is neglected. A distinction 
needs to be made between the computational model and the model of the 
phenomenon. The first one refers to the computer implementation and the 
results produced by the simulation, while the latter refers to a conceptual post-
computational model that aims at making sense of these results. It creates a 
narrative around the phenomenon of interest, based on all the elements 
provided by the simulation, along with observation, theory, etc. (David et al., 
2007; Winsberg, 2010).  
Taking the model of the phenomenon as the simulation’s outcome not only 
accounts for the fact that results of an experiment cannot be interpreted using a 
first-order analysis, but also allows for epistemologically justifying the basic 
assumption behind generative social science. If simulation is supposed to unveil 
the emergent character of macropatterns, the processes of abstraction and 
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idealisation can only be made sense of once the simulation is finished and the 
model of the phenomenon is developed. This is especially important for highly 
abstract models that simulate the target only at the conceptual level, such as 
Schelling’s (1971) segregation model. The model is taken as addressing the 
problem of segregation because it matches the outcome of the result in terms of 
clusters in the total population. This in spite of the fact that the model does not 
include any kind of cognitive assumption regarding real motivations for 
segregation.        
The development of the model of the phenomenon can show significant 
differences in computational social science. Participatory modelling (Barreteau 
et al., 2013), for example, takes a strong constructivist approach to model 
development and interpretation. It is usually a practical approach to modelling, 
where diverse stakeholders are involved in the process. The problem-solving 
nature of the development and evaluation of the model leads to understanding 
representation as a three-place relationship. Both source and target of 
representation are consensually agreed, but also constantly redefined 
throughout the simulation life cycle according the problem at hand. This 
contrasts with a more traditional and widespread approach, where the model of 
the phenomenon is developed with the aid of further theory and data and usually 
more in line with the notion of two-place representation (Squazzoni, 2012; 
Windrum, Fagiolo, & Moneta, 2007).       
The popularity of the notion of a two-place representation is to a certain extent 
surprising in a field like computational social science. As mentioned, the 
approach to modelling and experimentation in social theory has been 
traditionally critical about the empirical. Additionally, the agenda for agent-
based modelling is usually put forward arguing about the lack and unreliability 
of the data about the phenomena of interest, as well as the limitation of variable-
based and linear methods (Epstein, 1999; Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005; Macy & 
Willer, 2002). The lack of a critical approach to representation during the 
processes of verification and validation in the general area of computer 
programming and software verification might be linked to the fact that 
verification and validation are usually formulated as ‘success terms’ i.e. 
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according to satisfaction of conditions. The process of model’s evaluation 
acquires within that context a normative character that is visible, for example, in 
the notion of benchmarking. Benchmarks are usually used in computer 
programming for testing performance. In the context of computer simulation, 
benchmarking has been mainly approached in terms on comparing or matching 
against known or base results or scenarios. In equation-based modelling, this 
sometimes depends on available data or in the development of a theoretical 
analytical solution for the equations (Parker, 2008; Winsberg, 2010). Because of 
its status as established knowledge, these benchmark solutions have a higher 
epistemological status. This epistemological unbalance could be especially 
disadvantageous in the case of computational social science if claims about lack 
and unreliability are accurate, for using external data is thought to provide better 
warrants for belief in the adequacy of the simulation and models are hardly 
comparable with each other (Axtell et al., 1996; Bruch & Atwell, 2013; Edmonds 
& Moss, 2005).        
The concepts of verification and validation are useful because they provide a 
large theoretical-methodological framework that has been developed historically 
in several areas. The problem is that this approach works best when simulation 
is treated as a problem-solving computer implementation. This might fit the 
practice in the impact-oriented areas of computational social science, such as 
operational research, but it fails as a general account, for it misrepresents the use 
of simulation as an experiment in empirical contexts. It neglects manipulation 
and, because of this, it downplays the questions regarding the adequacy of the 
instrument. The problem-solving approach to verification and validation that 
computational social science has adopted depicts model testing as a process in 
which  “[…] the model is subjected to test data or test cases to determine if it 
functions properly” (Balci, 1998, p. 336). That ‘properly’ is a normative guideline 
that can only be applied retrospectively. That is, in part, why the manipulative 
character of simulation, for example, in terms of calibration, is usually 
subordinated as a subset or a step of verification or validation techniques (e.g. 
Louie & Carley, 2008; Squazzoni, 2012; Windrum et al., 2007). In an 
experimental setting, manipulation has its distinctive epistemological status and 
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only at the end, when enough confidence has been built over the robustness of 
the instrument and the manipulation, the process of experimentation can be 
reconstructed in terms of the experimental setting working properly (Galison, 
1987).    
This section identified the most important elements in the discussion about 
modelling in computational social science. It was suggested that the different 
levels of commitment to the notion of ‘artificial societies’ set three wider areas in 
which the discussion had to be grounded: manipulation, representation and 
validation. The manipulative character of computer models has been 
downplayed in social simulation, due to the focus on simulation as a way of 
inference. Yet, inference in agent-based modelling, as the execution of the 
program, is not intelligible process that researchers can access and understand 
directly. The formal character of the simulation is important, instead, because it 
allows for experimental control. For manipulation, the notion of artificial 
societies is important because it determines the features ascribed to the object of 
manipulation. It was argued that computational social science should be 
understood as an experimental method manipulating a material model in a 
physical machine. This approach unveils important representational and 
validational issues.  
Regarding representation, computational social science has given a significant 
representational role to models, although their relationship with theories, which 
had been traditionally taken as the locus of representation, is not clear. 
Additionally the notion of artificial societies affects significantly the selection of 
both the source and target of representation. In spite of this, it was suggested 
that in general terms the source has to deal with the bottom-up and dynamic 
nature of the model, while the target has to deal with the philosophical 
foundations of macropatterns, which are usually processes or mechanisms. Two 
philosophical principles: non-redundancy and levels ontology, it was argued, 
underlay the way the source and target have been approached.   
The difficulties in manipulation and representation have not been addressed 
during the process of evaluation. Computational social science evaluates 
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adequacy following the verification-validation distinction. This distinction 
misplaces the connection between manipulation and representation, due to an 
underdeveloped conceptualisation of the empirical and the experimental in 
computer simulation. This erroneous conceptualisation, it was argued, led to 
disregarding the materiality of simulation, misrepresenting the connection 
between the conceptual and the computational model, and failing to account for 
the distinction between the computational model and the model of the 
phenomenon. In models that conceive representation as a two-place 
relationship, the philosophical foundations of the distinction verification and 
validation also led to an uncritical approach to the use of empirical data and 
theory.      
Theorising  
The discussion about theorisation in computational social science is scarce and 
somewhat ambiguous, for the terms ‘model’ and ‘theory’ are not used rigorously 
and are sometimes used interchangeably. This ambiguity is partly produced by 
the particular development of the two concepts in the literature on theory in 
social science, especially in what has to do with the level of formalisation. Since 
theory and models are usually formulated in natural language, references to one 
or the other have regularly been motivated by contextual reasons. In 
computational social science, however, there is a noticeable preference for the 
use of the concept of model. The practice-oriented nature of computational social 
science has pushed theoretical concerns into the background, for theory is 
considered relevant during the process of conceptual modelling, which is not 
usually reported in scientific publications and is sometimes not explicitly 
addressed during the process of model building (Grimm et al., 2010; Robinson, 
2011). There are also methodological or ideological reasons. The role of social 
theory, for example, has also been downplayed arguing that most of it is ill-suited 
for agent-based modelling, because it is mostly “armchair theorising”, developed 
without strong empirical foundations (Moss & Edmonds, 2012). Likewise, theory 
has been dismissed in some occasions under the argument that models have 
explanatory autonomy (Norling et al., 2013).         
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In simulation studies, as said in the prologue, the role of models in theory 
building has been approached in two ways. The strong formulation assumes the 
relationship between models and theories as an issue of identity. A strong notion 
of identity, for example, by taking the simulation as such as an axiomatic system, 
is not common in computational social science. In the field, identity is usually 
interpreted in terms of instantiation of theory. The relationship of instantiation 
has been approached differently e.g. in terms of instantiating a structure (e.g. 
Troitzsch, 2004) or formalising a model articulated in natural language (e.g. 
Edmonds & Hales, 2003). The notion of instantiation of theory by models has 
also been used in the opposite sense, so to deny the identity relationship. This 
view is in fact put forward to support the autonomy of models and the 
instantiation relationship means that models are considered to have explanatory 
sufficiency regarding the phenomenon of interest (Küppers & Lenhard, 2005).  
This divergence in the approach to theory building just ends up creating 
confusion. The divergence is not by itself a problem. It becomes an issue because 
the different views are not consistent with each other and because it derives 
from important misunderstandings and misrepresentation when accounting for 
theory in social science. The notion of instantiation as a way to highlight the 
autonomy of models, for example, operates under the old fashioned assumption 
that only theories have explanatory and representational roles. That view is only 
consistent with the syntactic view of theories, an approach that has been widely 
dismissed in philosophy of science and has barely influenced social science 
(Frigg, 2006; Hacking, 1983; Suárez, 2009b). On the other hand, instantiating a 
structure is different from instantiating a theory in natural language. These two 
notions of instantiation move in different directions in the processes of 
abstraction. Additionally, a notion such as structure, while increasingly 
important from a philosophy of science point of view, does not say much about 
current practices in social science (Kincaid, 2008; Massimi, 2011). The problem 
with the instantiation approach to the theory-model relationship is that it is built 
based on a conception of theory that is outdated and not representative of social 
science. At the same time, this approach dismisses the most important issues of 
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the epistemology of computer simulation: it fails to account for the manipulative 
and representational characters of models.  
The weak formulation of the role of models in theory building is computational 
social science is not adequate either. This approach focuses on the advantages 
produced by computer simulation in the process of theory building. Yet, the 
emphasis on inference is misleading when it is meant to account for the formal 
features of programming languages (e.g. Hanneman, 1988; Ostrom, 1988). Unlike 
mathematics, the level of abstraction of computer languages does not provide 
any advantage beyond the execution of the specific model. While computer 
languages provide a more restricted syntactic and semantic framework in 
comparison to natural language, computer simulation is not producing theory 
using this alternative symbolic system. Both the conceptual model and the 
interpretation of the simulation results are expressed in a combination of 
different symbol systems. Computational social science is not producing 
formulations of theory in computer language in the same way that, for example, 
theories in the natural domain are entirely formulated in mathematics. Certainly 
the model itself could be called a theory, but this is an approach that does not 
advance the discussion about the connection between theory and models in 
computational social science. It fails to provide more than a linguistic alternative. 
Calling a model a theory does not give any insights regarding issues typical to the 
philosophical discussion about theories, such as generalisation and unification. 
For that a new level, that of a meta-theory, should be introduced.      
Both formulations have the additional disadvantage that they overemphasise the 
linguistic or inferential over the experimental. Yet, as suggested, it is important 
to take into account the manipulative features of computer simulation so to 
understand the role of this method in the production of knowledge. The weak 
formulation is useful only when it is used in a deflationary way, as to simply 
mean that computer models can be used to formalise and operationalise 
theoretical statements from social theories that are usually vague or ambiguous 
(Epstein, 1999; Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005). This acknowledgement, however, is 
insufficient, for it can be taken to mean both that the implemented model is a test 
for a theory derivation (e.g. Klüver et al., 2003) or that it is providing results for 
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theory building (e.g. Bleda & Shackley, 2012). The distinction between the two, 
again, is not simply a matter of terminology, but points to important differences 
in the conceptualisation of scientific practices. 
KISS, KIDS and the discovery-justification distinction 
In computational social science, the transition from an approach based on simple 
abstract models to one of intricate and descriptive models i.e. KISS to KIDS, has 
been justified in terms of facilitating prediction, but also in terms of the need to 
provide more accurate and realistic representations of the target phenomenon 
(Boero & Squazzoni, 2005; Bruch & Atwell, 2013; Edmonds & Moss, 2005; Heath 
et al., 2009; Hedström, 2005; Thompson & Derr, 2013). The discussion has been 
grounded on the assumption that if prediction and realism are the goals of 
science, then these should also be the goals of models. This assumption is wrong. 
Models are not meant to have a truth value for their role in science is 
heuristically diverse. They should not be judged in terms of how precise is their 
representation of the target phenomenon, but on their capacity for answering 
questions (Contessa, 2011; Mäki, 2010). Epstein (2008b), for example, lists 
sixteen reasons other than prediction to build models in computational social 
science. While accurate quantitative forecasting requires facsimile empirically 
calibrated models, any of the other uses does not need such a requirement. 
Dismissing the use of these abstract non-empirical models and suggesting that 
computational social science should set standards promoting the development of 
empirically-calibrated models (Edmonds, 2010) neglects the heuristic diversity 
in modelling and, most importantly, distorts the process of production of 
knowledge.  
One of the major difficulties for the conceptualisation of how different activities 
contribute to the development and testing of theories is the traditional 
distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. The 
distinction was popularised by logical positivism, for it allowed a clear 
distinction between the domains of science and philosophy of science 
(Hoyningen-Guene, 1987). The context of justification, because it constituted a 
linguistic logical derivation, was thought to be the only part of science that was 
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amenable to philosophical analysis. Philosophy was meant to unveil the logical 
structure of scientific theories. The context of discovery, on the other hand, was 
considered important for disciplines such as sociology, psychology and history 
(Popper, 2002).   
This context distinction is, at the core, a distinction about the factual and the 
normative. While these two elements are of major importance in the study on the 
production of theories, the way the distinction was formulated led to important 
misunderstandings. Two are worth mentioning in this case: the first one is that it 
sets ‘discovery’ and ‘justification’ as two events in temporal succession; the 
second is that it shifts the attention from the processual theory building and 
testing of theories to the static already-articulated theory testing of the syntactic 
view (Hoyningen-Guene, 1987). Attention to the process of theory building was 
brought back in the last decades of the twentieth century by the new 
experimentalist movement in philosophy of science and by the emergence of the 
social studies of science and technology (Arabatzis, 2006; Boon, 2009). These 
two movements stressed the importance and relative autonomy of the 
experimental features of scientific activity and the processual character of theory 
building and testing. 
Pleading for facsimile empirically calibrated models, arguing it is the better, if 
not only, way to achieve proper knowledge, is a position that cannot be justified, 
unless there is an explicit or implicit support of the context distinction. If not 
this, then it is a position that underestimates the complex relations of 
representation that underlies the use of both models and experiments. From a 
representational point of view, facsimile models could only be considered 
superior if the representation relationship is considered one of mapping. This 
view of modelling, however, has been shown to poorly capture the principles 
behind representation. Several successful cases of modelling in science 
intentionally alter or omit aspects of the target phenomenon during the process 
of modelling, according to criteria that the researchers consider relevant within 
that context. Some others omit these aspects because of the need for 
simplification (Frigg, 2006; Suárez, 2003). It misses, as well, the fact that 
important progress in science, especially in relatively new or unknown fields, has 
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been achieved by the interdisciplinary transference of highly abstract models, 
based on loose analogies (Bokulich, 2012; Humphreys, 2004).  
While ‘realism’ is a notion that has been constantly used to advance the agenda 
of facsimile empirically calibrated models, the connection between abstractness, 
representation and realism is far more complex. It is, as well, an intense topic of 
debate in contemporary literature on modelling. Highly abstract models such as 
structures, for example, are the base of structural realism, a deflationary version 
of realism which some consider the most robust version of contemporary 
scientific realism, if not the only tenable one (Massimi, 2011; Psillos, 2009). 
When applied to social science, structural realism might imply a move away from 
individual decision-making, which is, because of the traditional micro-macro 
distinction, the way realism is usually justified in social science (Kincaid, 2008; 
Ross, 2008). Likewise, the increasing popularity of fictionalism in modelling has 
reinvigorated non-realist positions in science (Murad, 2011; Suárez, 2009b). 
Computational social science, as a practice-oriented field where models have a 
fundamental role, needs to address these latter developments in philosophy, so 
to develop a robust account of theorisation using agent-based modelling.   
Models and experiments are said to aid in the process of theory building and 
testing from an autonomous and mediating perspective. This does not make the 
notion of theory trivial. While models could have a high degree of explanatory 
autonomy, computational social science still needs to account for the 
relationships between different models. This is an issue of major importance, 
taking into account that in the field most models basically start anew and 
generalisation and unification, because of the semantic and syntactic flexibility, 
seems to require a lot of effort to make the models match (Axtell et al., 1996). 
The strong and the weak formulation of models as tools for theory building 
overemphasise a unitary approach to the activity of modelling. For this reason, 
they cannot explain the relative consistency in the assumptions that different 
models connected to the same theory instantiate, nor why some theoretical 
assumptions can accommodate at the same time a wide range of different models 
(Morrison, 2007; Portides, 2005a).  
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In the case of natural science, there are core sets of laws or equations, such as 
Maxwell’s equations in thermodynamics, which can be connected to a diverse set 
of models. The question is whether computational social science could help 
identifying such cases in social science. Naturally, there are some underlying 
problems, such as whether there are these nomological, axiomatic or 
generalising principles in the social domain. Contemporary orthodoxy tends to 
reject the idea of their existence. Yet, for example, taking into account the 
robustness of the process of segregation for different implementations and 
extension of Schelling’s model (Aydinonat, 2007; Bruch & Mare, 2009; Fossett & 
Dietrich, 2009), it could be questioned whether segregation, as a process that 
ends up in clustering in social or geographical space, could not be considered as 
one such principles.  
Computational social science needs to account for the practice of modelling from 
a social epistemological perspective, in order to conceptualise in a better way the 
dynamics of the construction of knowledge in the field. This project, however, 
could be hampered by the way particular requirements for the practice of 
modelling in computational social science constrain the prospective use of the 
method in social theory building and testing.     
Agent-based modelling and the model microfoundations 
The discussion about realism has important implications for theory building. The 
push towards descriptive empirically calibrated models is not only meant to rule 
on problems of adequacy, but also, explicitly or implicitly, sets a research agenda 
for the field. As mentioned, computational social science has developed an 
individualist view of modelling, influenced by the philosophical principles of 
non-redundancy and levels ontology. This has redirected to a certain extent the 
theoretical focus of computational social science towards the cognitive aspects of 
human action (Bruch & Atwell, 2013; Edmonds, 2010; Hedström & Ylikoski, 
2010; Manzo, 2011). The focus on action affects the overall practice of agent-
based modelling. In empirically calibrated models, for example, data about 
individual decision-making is usually considered fundamental. Likewise, while 
computational social science aims at explaining macropatterns, because of the 
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bottom-up nature of the process, the discussion of the outcome usually include 
theoretical reflection about action.  
There are, however, two disadvantages for theorisation derived from the 
overemphasis on action in the practice of agent-based modelling. The first one 
regards the possibility of modelling social institutions directly. The possibility of 
modelling social institutions directly is usually disregarded, based on the 
philosophical principles of non-redundancy and ontology of levels. Modelling 
higher-level entities is considered not only unnecessary, but also 
methodologically undesirable, for it could affect the bottom-up character of the 
process (Conte et al., 2001; Epstein, 2011). Yet, there are two reasons why 
computational social science should further discuss the possibility to include 
social institutions.  
The first reason is the strong philosophical burden neglecting social institutions 
puts on the model’s initial conditions. Agent-based models allow for the 
emergence of institutions from what is usually called in social science ‘a state of 
nature’ i.e. a normless situation. The bottom-up process shows how an 
institution emerges from individuals’ actions and is, at the same time, maintained 
and changed by these actions. Yet, as with theories of social contract, that 
normless situation cannot be taken to be more than as hypothetical situation 
with a methodological value (Parsons, 1949). A hypothetical state of nature 
shows the constructive nature of individual action because the basic principles of 
interaction are endogenised. Computational social science has not provided so 
far a justification for this endogenisation and, in doing so, is neglecting an 
important part of those institutional factors that the method is supposed to 
account for in the first place. An iterated game, for example, can be dissolved by 
changing the payoff structure or the turn-taking structure. While these elements 
are predefined and usually left untouched during the game, there is, in principle, 
no reason why the field cannot explore the effect of changes in these structural 
factors. An explicit account of social institutions does not undermine the 
approach. It, instead, could provide a more robust understanding of the long 
term effects of structural changes.    
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The second reason why it might be important to explicitly account for social 
institutions is that in some cases these institutions have strong top-down 
influence. The bottom-up approach of agent-based modelling usually accounts 
for institutions as rules e.g. regularised patterns of action that moderate 
behaviour. Modelling institutions as individual rules, however, might fall short in 
reproducing some features of those institutions. Formal social institutions, 
because of its bureaucratic organisation, provide distinctive pathways and 
shortcuts for social action, which can be regulated by centralised decision or 
control (Weber, 1978; Weiss, 2003). In the study of contentious politics, 
repression, for example, has usually been endogenised within the agent’s 
decision-making heuristic (Brichoux & Johnson, 2002), has been articulated 
within  simple spatial structure of incentives (Miodownik, 2006) or has been 
performed by independent entities operating on a local level (e.g. Epstein, 2006).  
The central coordination of the State’s repressive apparatus, however, 
constitutes one of the most important spatiotemporal challenges that 
contentious movements face. It gives the government an important 
organisational advantage that can significantly affect the outcome of the 
contentious episode (Francisco, 2010). The government can, depending on the 
circumstances, for example, modify the intensity, extension and localisation of 
repression. The above modelling approaches cannot reproduce these conditions 
adequately because repression is local, sometimes even built within the 
contentious agent itself. These localised models downplay the role of repression 
because they study contention politics and mobilisation as a problem of 
propagation. This approach can certainly give important insights about the 
bottom-up nature of these phenomena. Yet, as with the basic structure of 
interaction, there is no reason why, in principle, agent-based models cannot 
explore the operation of strong top-down effects of social institutions.         
The second disadvantage of focusing on intentional action is that computational 
social science ends up neglecting one of the major advantages provided by the 
possibility to experiment with models of heterogeneous agents. Most theory on 
the cognitive foundations of action is normative i.e. it focuses on expected 
outcomes of particular cognitive states. It connects means and ends through 
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criteria that are considered plausible, given the circumstances in which the 
action is meant to take place. It does not, however, provide an actualist approach 
to action i.e. the analysis does not depend on the action actually occurring (Macy 
& Flache, 2009; Turner, 2003b). On the other hand, most empirically-grounded 
work on uncoordinated collective action rarely produces theory that robustly 
connect these actions with cognitive states (Gintis, 2011). An approach that puts 
a strong emphasis on cognitive action in agent-based modelling would be limited 
by the gap between these two areas of research. The strong emphasis on 
cognition could lead, at least under the current state of development in social 
science, to a strong normative use of agent-based modelling. While this is a 
possible use of agent-based modelling, there are additional areas in social 
science that are worth researching.  
One of those areas has to do with the complexity of social life. Most social 
theories focusing on the spatiotemporal dimension of action rely strongly on 
cognitive aspects e.g. the ‘I’ and ‘me’ of symbolic interactionism (Mead, 1972), or 
communicational aspects e.g. Habermas’ (1991) communicative action. There is 
an assumption that the complexity of social life can only be produced by complex 
cognitive interaction at the micro level. Agent-based models, however, provide 
evidence indicating that this might not be the case. Results of models with agents 
with zero intelligence have shown close resemblance to some real life situations, 
such as stock markets (Farmer, Patelli, & Zovko, 2005; Ladley, 2012). While 
empirical data about the target phenomena is not exactly reproduced by the 
models, it is not entirely clear whether this divergence is entirely attributable to 
the simplified cognitive structure of the agents. Agent-based models can be used 
to approach the problem of representation and divergence in data from a 
structural perspective. Several decision-making heuristics and structural settings 
can be put into test trying to make the outcome match without any commitment 
to whether they replicate individual motivation. This use of agent-based 
modelling could produce valuable insights, taking into account that the 
structural and environmental conditions cannot be addressed or modelled when 
using many other social methods.   
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Not committing to the replication of the cognitive structure of agents has 
additional benefits. Two important challenges for the practice of agent-based 
modelling are multiple realisation and underdetermination. The two are 
sometimes used jointly, but have different implications (Conte, 2009; Sawyer, 
2005). Underdetermination is an epistemological problem derived from the fact 
that empirical data can fit different theoretical explanations. This is a regular 
problem in social science. It is, for example, one of the reasons why so many 
different theories of action are still accepted in social theory (Joas, 1996; 
Rubinstein, 1977). This limitation is downplayed in formal approaches to action 
in social science because these approaches are restricted by tractability issues. 
Using agent-based models to replicate these formal models could lead to the 
underutilisation of the semantic and syntactic advantages provided by computer 
languages (Klüver & Klüver, 2011). Agent-based modelling could be used instead 
to explore the conditions of underdetermination in more robust and diverse 
approaches to agents’ cognition. The fact that a model of agents with zero-
intelligence (e.g. Farmer et al., 2005; Ladley, 2012) or non-symbolic cognitive 
structures (e.g. Acerbi & Parisi, 2006) can provide important insights about 
several social dynamics should lead to question the assumption that the 
conditions of underdetermination in social science are mostly associated with 
the lack of information about agents’ cognition.    
The same can be said about multiple realisation. The concept is used in 
computational social science to refer to the assumption that any given 
macropattern can be the result of different microfoundations. It is not clear, 
however, whether assumption is linked to the real conditions of realisation as an 
ontological issue or to the understanding of the phenomenon, particularly the 
way it is modelled. Making sense of multiple realisation requires the delineation 
of an ontological and epistemological programme regarding properties and the 
way to measure them (Polger & Shapiro, 2008). Not committing to a particular 
approach to the microfoundations could provide better understanding about the 
phenomenon of multiple realisation by allowing to explore in a formal 
experimental context the implications of different ontological commitments.    
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The emphasis on agents and cognition has the downside that it pushes the 
structural and relational aspects into the background. Moving past this concern 
with cognitive agents will likely produce more understanding of the dynamics, 
for plausibility replaces a vague concept of realism in the exploration between 
the micro and macro connection. If claims about the scarcity and unreliability of 
data are taken seriously, only for a few limited cases, or when approaches such 
as participatory modelling are employed, an agent-based model can be taken to 
have solid empirical foundations about cognition. Agent-based models can be 
used in tasks such as curve-fitting or data mining, but these are uses that are 
unlikely to provide a significant contribution to theory, in terms of unification 
and generalisation. Starting from a non-commitment to the cognitive foundation 
of decision making and focusing instead on the dynamics can eventually produce 
enough understanding as to decide at some point whether a given realistic 
representation of the cognitive structure is just saving appearances or not.   
The neglect of the institutional aspects and the limited understanding of the 
macro implications of actions in agent-based modelling would minimise the 
potential value of its contribution to theory building, if the focus is put on 
cognition, agents and the micro level alone. There is, however, one area of social 
theory where agent-based modelling can provide a significant contribution.      
Agent-based models and social mechanisms 
While the prospective theoretical contribution of agent-based models is usually 
formulated in terms of insights regarding the micro and macro levels (Macy & 
Willer, 2002; Sawyer, 2003), the method can also contribute to theorisation 
about the processual aspect itself. The dynamic character of computational 
models gives the opportunity to directly account in the model for the dynamics 
of the social phenomena of interest. The process generated by the execution of a 
computational model has been described both in terms of emergence, as to 
account for the pattern formation nature of the process (Epstein & Axtell, 1996; 
e.g. Gilbert, 1995), or in terms of mechanism that guides this process (Salgado & 
Marchione, 2012; Sawyer, 2004b). ‘Mechanism’ is a concept used to give a sense 
of identity to the process connecting micro and macro. Yet, its use has been 
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informal and only recently has more attention been paid to the mechanism 
literature in different areas of science (Manzo, 2007b; Sawyer, 2013; Squazzoni, 
2012). The usefulness of the mechanist approach for theory building in 
computational social science derives from its conceptualisation both in social 
science and in philosophy of science.  
From social mechanism, the most important feature is the connection of 
mechanism and the notion of middle-range theory. According to Merton, middle-
range theories are   
“[…] theories that lie between the minor but necessary working 
hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the 
all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will 
explain all the observed uniformities of social behaviour, social 
organisation and social change.” (1968, p. 39)  
Computational social science can find this approach appealing because the use of 
agent-based models is underlain by a concern about the complex nature of the 
phenomenon, which is thought to be poorly covered by nomological approaches. 
The rejection of all-encompassing explanations of social phenomena, however, 
has not led to the rejection of abstraction and generalisation as a whole. How 
much abstraction and generalisation can be achieved within a mechanist view in 
computational social science depends on the particular commitment to the 
notion of artificial societies. Casti’s (1997) approach, for example, would lead to 
highly abstract and generalised theorisation, whereas the weak sense of artificial 
societies, combined with a KIDS approach to modelling, would lead to low levels 
of abstraction of generalisation. Regardless of this, the notion of middle-range is 
interesting for it conceives theory as a toolbox of several mid-level explanations 
of different portions of reality hierarchically organised.     
The philosophy of science’s approach to mechanism is useful for it explains what 
exactly are these mid-level explanations and how they are produced. Social 
science has not developed an individual approach to mechanism and has instead 
adopted one of the most widespread formulations in philosophy of science, 
according to which “[m]echanisms are entities and activities organised such that 
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they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or 
termination conditions” (Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000, p. 3). This 
definition fits the basic idea behind the informal use of ‘mechanism’ in 
computational social science. It is meant to capture the sense of identity of the 
process of change connecting micro to macro.          
Mechanism in philosophy of science argues that, by focusing on the inferential 
approach of the syntactic view and the instantiation approach of the semantic 
view, philosophy of science has neglected the way in with models and 
experiments are used in the process of theory building and the particular way in 
which results from these tools are usually articulated into theory (Craver, 2002). 
This process, it is argued “[…] should be viewed as an extended, piecemeal 
process with hypotheses undergoing iterative refinement” (Darden, 2006, p. 
272). To understand why different models with different levels of abstraction 
and idealisation and with loose or strong empirical foundations can both 
contribute to the development of theory, the process should be understood more 
within the context of Kuhn’s (1970) paradigms or Lakatos’ (1978) research 
programmes. 
The process of theory development and testing is explained in the mechanist 
account using two concepts: sketch and schema. The former refers to “an 
abstraction for which bottom out entities and activities cannot (yet) be supplied 
or which contains gaps in its stages. The productive continuity from one stage to 
the next has missing pieces, black boxes, which we do not yet know how to fill in” 
(Machamer et al., 2000, p. 18). The latter refers to “a truncated abstract 
description of a mechanism that can be filled with descriptions of known 
component parts and activities” (2000, p. 15). Sketches are usually vague and 
ambiguous for usually not enough knowledge about the phenomenon is 
available. They are more common in early stages of theory building and are used 
in a heuristic, hypothetic or programmatic role. Rejecting the usefulness of 
abstract non-empirical models neglects its role in the development and refining 
of sketches. One sketch can be replaced by new one, depending on experimental 
findings, or can become a schema. A mechanism schema whose components are 
entirely identified is an instantiated schema. Instantiated schemata are what 
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should be understood as a theory proper. It would, as mentioned above, give 
sense to the assumptions of a wide range of models that instantiate that schema.     
Regarding the content of theory as such, one of the difficulties is that in social 
science entities and activities are eventually conflated in an individualistic 
formulation, in terms of individual action (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Manzo, 
2010). Yet, in philosophy of science there is an important distinction between 
the two, for the concept of activities is meant to capture the basic features of a 
process ontology (Machamer et al., 2000; Tabery, 2004). It is eventually what 
gives spatiotemporal character to the mechanism through the notion of 
production. Production is important for it allows explaining the sense in which 
the spatiotemporal connection is preserved. Social theory focusing on individual 
actions, however, cannot account for production properly. The mechanism of 
protein production is usually depicted as DNA→RNA→Protein, where the nodes 
are the entities and the arrows are the activities: transcription and translation, 
respectively (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 16). Compare this to the following 
representation of the mechanism of self-fulfilling prophecy: 
Bi→Ai→Bj→Aj→Bk→Ak…., where B stands for beliefs, A for actions and the 
subindex for actors (Hedström & Bearman, 2009, p. 7). While the diagram is 
supposed to describe a process, there is clearly nothing that accounts for the 
arrows. It is just a representation of state changes in the individuals. The type of 
connection between these individuals is not described. This individualistic 
diagrammatic representation has the additional downside that beliefs have to be 
reified as entities so to account for time transitions.  
The challenge for computational social science is to understand process without 
reducing it to individual action. This means accounting for the production 
dynamics in social mechanisms. This requires focusing more on the 
spatiotemporal features of the computational models, but moving away from the 
basic discrete spatiotemporal functioning of the models. The understanding of 
the dynamic requires promoting a critical approach to modelling. This critical 
engagement is what eventually allows understanding and evaluating the 
robustness of different alternatives for explaining a social dynamic.   
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This section discussed the issue of theorisation in computational social science. 
The field has developed by significantly stressing the role of models, while, at the 
same time, downplaying the role of theory. This has resulted in a poor 
conceptualisation of the connection between models and theory, which has 
affected the way the process of theory building is conceived. The main difficulty 
has to do with the notion of realism in models. Realism is more commonly 
associated with facsimile empirically calibrated models in computational social 
science. This approach to realism, however, fails to account for the diverse role 
that models have in contemporary science and neglects important dimensions of 
the process of theory building.  
The preference for empirically calibrated models has directed the discussion 
about theory building in computational social science towards the cognitive 
foundations of actions, due to the misrepresentation of scientific realism and the 
principles of non-redundancy and the ontology of levels that dominate the 
practice of agent-based modelling. It was argued that the combination of these 
three elements leads to the neglect of some important features of higher-level 
social institutions, which are barely accounted for in the models and their 
interpretation. It also misses one of the most important epistemological 
advantages of using agent-based models for the study of social phenomena.  
Instead of focusing on individual action, it was argued, computational social 
science could explore theorisation through mechanisms. The mechanist 
programme has the advantage of focusing both on the context of discovery and 
justification, providing understanding of the role of different models in the 
process of knowledge production. Mechanism conceives theory as a toolbox of 
middle-range theories with different levels of scope and generality. This 
perspective fits perfectly the philosophical principles of the study of complex 
phenomena in social science. It was argued, however, that to properly account 
for social mechanisms, computational social science should overcome the 
reductive view. 
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Conclusion 
The text has focused on setting the foundations for the discussion of modelling 
and theorisation in computational social science. It has been shown that this 
discussion needs to include important developments in theorisation and 
modelling, both in philosophy of science and social theory, as well as 
developments in experimentation and computer simulation. The discussion was 
not meant to be exhaustive, but it allows reaching important conclusions. In the 
conceptualisation of modelling, for example, it is clear that important differences 
emerge from the approach to the notion of ‘artificial societies’. While complete 
consensus in such an issue is unlikely, the focus on the concept does unveil 
important additional issues that need to be addressed. It is clear, for example, 
that more attention should be paid to conceptual modelling. This activity has 
been poorly studied in computational social science and simulation studies in 
general (van der Zee et al., 2011; Wang & Brooks, 2011), despite it could provide 
important insights about representation, by revealing norms and values of the 
community.  
This research should be framed within wider research on the social 
epistemology of social simulation i.e. the way the practice of agent-based-
modelling is organised and normalised within the context of computational 
social science (Goldman, 2011), for, along with conceptual modelling, the role of 
several other peripheral practices has been significantly understudied. It is not 
clear, for example, what are the requirements or the theoretical methodological 
value of other important activities such as replication and model-to-model 
comparison. Research on this area could provide understanding about issues 
such as model perspectivism, which could significantly affect the principles for 
validation, as well as the connection of different models in terms of scientific 
realism (Chakravartty, 2010a; Peschard & van Fraassen, 2014).   
Understanding the process of theory building requires studying the practice of 
agent-based modelling at a deeper philosophical level. This depends on 
establishing better links with mainstream social theory, for example, through the 
process of conceptual modelling, but also on the redefinition of the philosophical 
   96 
principles, so to move beyond the reductionist approach. Conceptualising the 
activity on the context of research on mechanism could allow developing more 
appropriately the connection between agent-based modelling, explanation and 
causation. The generative approach, for example, has been questioned in terms 
of just being able to provide sufficient explanations that do not constitute real 
causal explanations (Grüne-Yanoff, 2008). Likewise, it has been argued that the 
inferential aspect of the simulation in agent-based modelling might provide just 
a sense, but not real understanding (Kuorikoski, 2011). These are claims that 
cannot be appraised without clarifying these connections. 
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Mechanisms 
The mechanist theory of explanation has received significant attention in the last 
two decades in different areas of research (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Bunge, 
2004b; Glennan, 1996; Gross, 2009; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Illari & 
Williamson, 2011; Machamer et al., 2000; Mahoney, 2001; McAdam, Tarrow, & 
Tilly, 2001; Waskan, 2011; Woodward, 2002). Its popularity derives from the 
alleged focus on causal processes. Mechanism provides an alternative to 
nomological all-encompassing explanations, by emphasising the structural and 
functional role of the ‘cogs’ and ‘wheels’.   
For some (Demeulenaere, 2011; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Macy & Flache, 
2009; Manzo, 2010), the focus on process in the contemporary mechanist 
account matches structurally and functionally that of agent-based modelling. In 
this chapter, the robustness of this correspondence will be analysed. There is a 
vast array of approaches to mechanism in social and general science. Mahoney 
(2001), for example, identifies over two dozen different definitions of 
mechanism in social science alone. The discussion, however, will concentrate on 
the account of mechanism that has its foundations on the proceedings of the 
Stockholm Conference: Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social 
Theory, edited by Hedström and Swedberg (1998a). This account of mechanism 
has come to be widely identified in the literature with contemporary analytical 
sociology (Bearman, 2012; Demeulenaere, 2011; Edling, 2012; Hedström & 
Bearman, 2009; Hedström, 2005; Manzo, 2010). This text will follow this 
ascription. It should be kept in mind, however, that contemporary analytical 
sociology is a relatively heterogeneous movement (Hedström, 2009; Manzo, 
2010). The reason for focusing on this approach to mechanism is twofold: On one 
side, analytical sociology provides an account of mechanism where the 
prospective methodological role of agent-based modelling is constantly 
highlighted; on the other, the approach to mechanism from analytical sociology 
is the one that is most often mentioned in the literature on computational social 
science.  
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The chapter proceeds as follows: In the first section, a brief recap of the main 
features of the contemporary mechanist account of explanation will be 
presented. In the following two sections, analytical sociology and the 
contemporary mechanist movement will be compared in their approach to two 
key concepts. The second section will focus on the notion of production. It will 
discuss philosophical issues regarding the nature and character of the ‘cogs’ and 
‘wheels’ that compose the mechanisms. The third section will focus on causation. 
It will analyse its particular status within the mechanist framework and its 
connection with the notion of production. In section five, all the elements 
discussed in the previous sections will be reflected upon, in order to identify the 
implication of these theoretical issues for computational social science.       
Background 
It is usual to hear about the ‘revival’ of the mechanistic perspective, for it is 
actually not a novel concept in philosophy of explanation. Mechanical 
conceptions of nature can be traced back to the ancient Greece (Dugas, 1955). It 
was, however, with the scientific revolution of the XVII century that the concept 
started playing a major role in philosophy of nature. Mechanism emerged as a 
theory of explanation opposing the teleological physics of Aristotle (Bertoloni, 
2008; Westfall, 1977). Mechanists shift the focus of scientific explanation from 
the final to efficient cause in Aristotle’s scheme. That is, they moved on to replace 
teleological explanation with explanation based on interaction and causal chains. 
Two crucial principles put forward by modern mechanist in the XVII century are 
materialism and physical passiveness. The first one suggests explanations should 
only refer to material properties and quantities; the second one, that matter is 
inert, unless acted on (Ellis, 2008a; Osier, 1994). This movement reached its 
peak in Newton’s classical mechanics, which explains most of the physical world 
in terms of interactions between masses and forces. The mechanist perspective, 
however, suffered an important setback with the advent of quantum physics, for 
it challenged the assumption of a machine-like operation of the world, that can 
be fully accounted for by a nomological account (Dugas, 1955; Westfall, 1977).    
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The new mechanist movement in philosophy of science keeps the emphasis on 
interactions and causal chains, but discards the assumption of the machine-like 
functioning of physical, biological and social realms. Although different 
disciplinary antecedents can be identified, all contemporary accounts of 
mechanism are post-positivist realist. The mechanist perspective assumes 
science gives a real depiction of nature, but this depiction cannot be achieved 
following the nomological program of logical empiricism. The authors 
supporting this approach to explanation highlight deficiencies of the Covering-
Law Model (CLM) both in application and foundations. Regarding the latter, 
mechanists underscore well-known criticisms of the CLM in the wider field of 
philosophy of science: explanatory relevance and explanatory asymmetries. The 
first one refers to the need of providing in the explanans causal information that 
makes a difference in the occurrence of the explanandum. Salmon’s (1971) 
example of birth control has become paradigmatic. Birth control pills intake by 
males could be used as evidence for pregnancy prevention in an argument fitting 
the deductive-nomological scheme. Although formally acceptable, the 
explanation would not be illuminating. Findings in biochemistry suggest birth 
control pills do not have any effects in males’ reproductive probabilities. The lack 
of relevance in this argument is evident; Salmon claims, however, in some other 
cases, especially in traditional statistical analysis, issues of explanatory relevance 
are not easy to identify.  
Problems of explanatory asymmetry in the CLM were first identified by 
Bromberger (1966). In some cases, he suggests, it is possible to construct two 
valid arguments involving the same factual information and referring to the 
same law, but with significantly different explanatory power. Bromberger uses 
the example of the period of a pendulum. This movement can be deductively 
explained by referring to the length of the pendulum and the law of simple 
periodic motion. An equally valid deductive argument might use the period of the 
pendulum and the same law to explain the length. Bromberger claims that, 
whereas the former intuitively looks like a proper explanation, the latter does 
not, even though they are both valid deductive-nomological arguments. The 
counter intuitive character of the second argument derives from the fact even 
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though the length of the pendulum could indeed be mathematically deducted, it 
could be questioned whether this mathematical procedure can be taken as a 
plausible answer of why the pendulum has that particular length.     
The difficulties with explanatory relevance and asymmetry of the CLM are 
grounded on three interconnected aspects, broadly accounted for in 
epistemological reviews: the argument-based epistemological approach to 
explanation, the overemphasis on   prediction in scientific explanation and the 
role of causation. These three elements have particular significance for the 
mechanist view. Under the CLM, explanans and explanandum are not related with 
objects and phenomena in the world, their changes, properties, etc., but with 
elements of the language: the logical relations between statements, in terms of 
deductive or inductive inference (Hempel, 1965). In the CLM, a successful 
explanation is one in which the explanans makes the explanandum expected. The 
contraconception argument, for example, is considered a valid deductive-
nomological explanation because it fits the scheme of a universal instantiation of 
predicate logic.  
Additionally, in the CLM it is assumed there is a structural logical identity 
between explanation and prediction (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). The logical 
argument in both cases is the same. The difference is given in pragmatic grounds, 
in terms of the occurrence of the explanans. In an explanation the explanans does 
not need to occur. This is why prediction is commonly taken as the primary goal 
of nomological explanation. The possibility to anticipate and control through 
prediction was, in Hempel and Oppenheim’s (1948) thought, the ultimate goal of 
scientific research. There is no space in this scheme for ‘comprehension’. It is not 
taken as a key feature because it is considered a psychological, not a logical 
concept. The same happens with ‘cause’. Despite its fundamental role in modern 
theories of explanation, causation is not a constitutive element of the CLM. 
Although it appeared frequently in the descriptions of the model, Hempel was 
never committed to more than a regularity theory of causation, that is, a 
statement about a cause could always be reformulated into a statement about 
working laws (Hempel, 2001). 
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Although there has been a reiterated emphasis on the CLM in the mechanist 
literature, when it comes to social science, this emphasis might be misleading. 
Social disciplines have never really followed the CLM. Most explanations 
considered proper within the social disciplines do not fit the CLM, nor is it the 
case that most of them are aiming at that. Although the concept of law has been 
used since the early stages of modern social science, the nomological character of 
these law-like statements can be questioned. They usually have looser meaning, 
work as a shortcut for conceptual context or have less epistemological 
restrictions (Cummins, 2000; Enfield, 1976; Little, 1998; Lukes, 1992). The 
mechanist account, however, is usually presented as an alternative to the CLM 
for there is a deeper and more fundamental questioning about explanation in 
social science using association of law-like statements. This dissatisfaction has to 
do with the role of comprehension and causation in scientific explanation. The 
main aim of explanation, according to mechanists, is to open the ‘black boxes’ 
and show how social phenomena are brought about (Elster, 2007; Hedström & 
Swedberg, 1998b). In the mechanist view, comprehension takes the central role, 
previously reserved for prediction in the CLM. Regularities, whether in terms of 
laws or empirical generalisations, are considered insufficient, even though they 
may appear in explanation (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005). Comprehension, it is 
claimed, is achieved when etiological or componential elements are introduced 
into the general scheme of scientific explanation (Craver, 2009; Ylikoski, 2012).  
Not all theories of social mechanisms adopt the same strategy to improve 
comprehension, for this ideal is ultimately linked to particular ontological, 
epistemological and methodological principles. In the case of analytical 
sociology, Manzo (2010) claims this movement provides a ‘syntax’ of 
explanation: “a set of rules on how to build and empirically test hypotheses 
about mechanisms underlying regularities in social life” (p. 140). The guiding 
rule is: “to explain an observation is to generate it” (p. 142), which means that a 
causal explanation should be formulated in terms of an operating mechanism. At 
the epistemological level, this rule entails the aforementioned rejection of the 
CLM, due to its lack of focus on the generative aspect. At the ontological level, it 
entails bottoming out explanation in individuals and their actions. At the 
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methodological level, it entails the rejection of description of patterns through 
mere statistical associations.  
Analytical sociology rejects the use of traditional statistical approaches alone as a 
proper source of explanation in sociology. While the utility of these approaches 
is still acknowledged, especially in validation (Hedström, 2005), it is agent-based 
modelling, because of its object-oriented character, that has taken a central 
methodological role in analytical sociology’s approach to mechanism. Analytical 
sociology follows the definition of mechanism proposed by Machamer, Darden 
and Craver: “Mechanisms are entities and activities organised such that they are 
productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination 
conditions” (2000, p. 3). The importance given to agent-based modelling derives 
from the assumption that there is a functional and structural correspondence 
between the concept of a mechanism and that of an agent-based model: 
Programming languages allow building agent-based models as a collection of 
entities, in this case individual agents, in a one-to-one correspondence with the 
objects of the phenomenon of interest (Gilbert, 2008). Additionally, in these 
models, the relational structure is thought to emerge as the dynamic result of 
reiterated individual action, produced by the iterative character of computer 
programs (Manzo, 2007a). There is even a functional analogue for the productive 
aspect of the mechanism. One of the most important paradigms in agent-based 
modelling, commonly known as the ‘generative approach’ (Epstein & Axtell, 
1996; Epstein, 2006), claims that explanation in agent-based models requires 
‘growing’ from the bottom-up the macro-property of interest.     
The fact that analytical sociology is said to provide just a ‘syntax’ of explanation 
accounts for diversity in the movement’s research program and, most 
importantly, serves the purpose of keeping the approach empirical, as it is 
supposed to be in a discipline like sociology. While paying excessive attention to 
philosophical issues can be misleading and lead to stagnation in social research, 
something more than rules about building and testing hypothesis would be 
desirable from a project of advancing a new theory of explanation, for a project 
of this scope is always connected to several other issues regarding the 
production of scientific knowledge (Ylikoski, 2012). In the following sections, the 
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robustness of analytical sociology’s approach to mechanism will be evaluated, 
based on the way it deals with mechanism production and causation.  
Production 
In this section, the notion of production in current mechanist account is 
discussed. It will be argued that the individualistic ontology of analytical 
sociology neglects important changes in the philosophy of the contemporary 
mechanist approach, failing to capture the notion of production. The section 
initially describes the main tenets of the structural individualism of analytical 
sociology and its connection with traditional methodological individualism. It 
then approaches the double ontology of the contemporary mechanism view and 
the way the notion of production is derived from this metaphysical novelty. 
Challenges and implications for the implementation of this ontological approach 
in social science are later addressed.      
Unlike some other approaches to social mechanism, analytical sociology 
identifies individuals and their actions as the main entities of the mechanisms 
(Hedström & Bearman, 2009; Hedström, 2005; Manzo, 2010). The approach of 
analytical sociology, however, is not grounded on traditional methodological 
individualism, but on a weaker version called structural individualism. The main 
difference between structural and traditional methodological individualism, it is 
claimed, is that the former is claimed to give explanatory relevance to relational 
structures. In turn, structural individualism is said not depend exclusively on any 
particular representation of action, so to distance itself from instrumentalist 
approaches, such as rational-choice theory (Hedström & Bearman, 2009; Udehn, 
2002). Regarding the micro-macro link, analytical sociologists consider macro 
properties supervene on individuals and their actions. Given this, the relation 
between micro to macro is not one of causation but of constitution. Traditional 
downward causation is understood only as situations in which individuals 
consciously take the state of a macro property into account for their decisions or 
social processes that operate on the background.  
Philosophical issues, however, remain a problem in analytical sociology’s 
structural individualism. The acknowledgement of extra-individual features is 
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always accompanied by a cautionary statement: “That relations are important 
for explaining outcomes does not mean that they are independent of individuals 
and their actions, however. […] [I]n principle all relational structures are 
explainable as intended or unintended outcomes of individual’s action” 
(Hedström & Bearman, 2009, p. 9). The ‘in principle’ suggests the philosophical 
connection between traditional methodological individualism and the structural 
individualism of analytical sociology is stronger than it is initially suggested. 
Demeulenaere (2011) goes even further by suggesting that there is no difference 
between analytical sociology and, what he claims, was the initial project of 
methodological individualism i.e. a methodological individualism that does not 
entail an atomist, utilitarian and pre-social conception of actors. That version of 
methodological individualism, however, disregards any extra-individual element. 
It rejects the most reductive approaches to agency, but keeps intact the basic 
ontological and epistemological assumptions of the most widespread account of 
methodological individualism: “1) Social life exists only by virtue of actors who 
live it. 2) Consequently a social fact of any kind must be explained by direct 
reference to the actions of its constituents” (Demeulenaere, 2011, p. 4).   
The philosophical reductionism of analytical sociology is problematic from a 
mechanist point of view. Metaphysically, it contrasts with the dual ontology of 
contemporary mechanism, especially in Machamer, Darden and Craver’s 
definition, which is the one analytical sociologists have themselves adopted. The 
ontological dualism of the contemporary mechanist view in philosophy of 
science emerges as a way to capture the most relevant features from traditional 
entities and process ontologies. These features are conceptualised as ‘entities’ 
and ‘activities’, respectively, in Machamer, Darden and Craver’s (2000) account. 
While they are the ones more explicitly supporting this metaphysical position, 
this dualist approach to mechanisms is also present in the form of ‘parts’ and 
‘interactions’ in Glennan’s (1996, 2002) account and ‘parts’ and ‘operations’ in 
Bechtel’s (2005; 1993) account. Although Machamer, Darden and Craver 
consider their double ontology approach to be at odds with those of Glennan and 
Bechtel’s, it has been suggested this is only an apparent disagreement due to the 
way the concepts have been defined (Glennan, 2010) and that these different 
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approaches can be synthetised in a formulation that retains the dualist approach 
to ontology (Tabery, 2004). The key metaphysical novelty of these approaches to 
mechanism is the acknowledgement of the independent ontological status of 
activities/ interactions/ operations (activities, hereafter). Explaining all the 
nuances of this ontological stance goes beyond the scope of this text. Yet, it is 
worth pointing out that the distinctive analytic character of modern empirical 
science has led to focus scientific endeavour on entities and their properties 
(Nola & Sankey, 2007; van Fraassen, 2002). Activities have, on the contrary, 
usually been conceptualised in a reductive manner. The reductionist approach of 
analytical sociology, for example, reflects a longstanding view in social science 
that social interaction can be understood as a special case of individual action 
that is oriented towards others (Parsons, 1949; Weber, 1978).  
In the mechanistic approach, however, activities account for the processual part 
of a mechanism. “Mechanisms do things. They are active and so ought to be 
described in terms of the activities of their entities, not merely in terms of 
changes in their properties” (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 5). The assumption 
behind this double ontology might be better apprehended by the everyday life 
use of the concept of ‘activity’. Activities are described in everyday life though 
verbs or verb forms e.g. I will ‘read’ a book, I like ‘having’ conversations. 
Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000) suggest that what these verbal forms 
reflect is the assumption of a sense of identity throughout the process carried 
out. It is this sense of identity that the mechanist approach wants to elucidate 
when they refer to mechanism productivity. Activities have an independent 
ontological status for processes need to be accounted for in terms of production, 
not simply as spatiotemporal changes. There is no definition of production in the 
literature, for a widespread variety of activities can operate in particular ways. It 
is merely described as “a type of cause which makes things up from other things” 
(Tabery, 2004, p. 8). Production has, however, an important heuristic value. It is 
taken as the factor that makes mechanisms behave in a regular manner over 
time. It is what eventually allows opening the ‘black boxes’. As it will be 
discussed later, it is also fundamental in the analysis of causation and mechanism 
individuation.        
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In the specific case of social science, what could be referred to as activities is 
commonly found nominalised and taken processually as a whole. Concepts such 
as socialisation, stratification, and education are common examples in the social 
science literature. The suffix ‘tion’ is etymologically linked to the processual 
operation of an action, so the connection, although subtle, is there. There are two 
reasons that justify the prevalence of nominalisation in social science. The first 
one is that processes in social science have traditionally being explained 
teleologically, that is, by reference to end states. One of the most widespread 
forms of teleological explanation in the social sciences is functionalism (Isajiw, 
1998; Turner, 1986). Following a biological analogy, functionalism usually 
explains phenomena by reference to end states in terms of systemic functions 
(Hempel, 1994). The literature on social stratification in the sixties is one 
paradigmatic example (Allardt, 1968; Theodorson, 1967). Instead of focusing on 
different interactive features, the process of social stratification was usually 
accounted for in terms of the hierarchy of roles that was produced as 
consequence.  
The second reason why nominalisation is more common in social science is 
because of the focus on individual intentions. The productive character of 
activities depends on the potential an object has to produce some change either 
in other objects or the environment. The most complete approach to this 
potentiality is provided by the metaphysics of dispositions, which focuses on 
stimulus-response type behaviour (Ellis, 2008a; Harré, 1970). The analysis of 
dispositions considers the objects that can engage in interactions, the properties 
through which the objects engage and are affected by interaction, and the output 
produced after the interaction. In social science, analysis of disposition have 
been linked to analysis of intentionality (Molnar, 2003; Ryle, 1949). It is 
individual action the main factor in the creation and alteration of the social 
world. The focus on intentionality moves attention away from the process as 
such and places it on the features of the individuals that perform a certain action.   
Both in the functional and the dispositional approach to social life the notion of 
productivity is missing. The lack of focus on process and productive continuity is 
the reason why the direction of causation in teleological analysis is sometimes 
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inverted. In the analysis of social stratification, for example, the causal 
connection between individual contributions and individual roles was 
sometimes inverted. It was not clear whether, for example, a higher position in 
an organisational hierarchy was achieved by providing a larger contribution or if 
this larger contribution was a consequence of having a higher role in the 
hierarchy (Dore, 1961; Theodorson, 1967). Regarding intentionality, action 
theories have always found problems moving from individual action to 
interaction or process because there is not a natural connection between the 
two. The processual character or social interaction in action theories is assumed 
to be derived from the other-orientation of an individual’s action. In Parsons’ 
(1962; 1949) theory, for example, social order emerges from a normative 
complementarity of expectations among actors. The interaction as such, 
however, is hypothesised. It does not need to occur. Traditional theories of 
action have focused on the normative connection between means and ends 
(Bierstedt, 1938; Schulte, 1999). The inquiry on how these affect and are affected 
by others’ actions and the environment, on the contrary, has usually been kept 
within the empirical domain (Gross, 2009; Whitford, 2002). This is a deficiency 
in traditional social science, for sometimes the long-term implications of action 
are difficult to identify. The unlikely emergence of tit-for-tat as the best strategy 
for the iterated version of Axelrod’s (1984) experiments on prisoner’s dilemma 
provide a paradigmatic example.          
Accounting for production in the social domain is difficult not just because 
traditional social science lacks a processual approach to social life, but also 
because the notion of production stands at odds with some longstanding 
philosophical principles in social science. In the particular case of analytical 
sociology, the limitations are set by the two philosophical principles of 
methodological individualism mentioned above. Analytical sociology follows in 
this regard a longstanding philosophical tradition emphasising the ontological 
limitations of macro positions and the ensuing need to develop social science 
based on individuals and their actions. There are, however, deficiencies in this 
approach. 1), that ‘society is composed by individuals’ is an ontological claim. 2), 
that ‘social explanation should be given in terms of individual action’ is an 
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epistemological claim. The connection between the two in traditional 
methodological individualism is rather ambiguous, but it can be unveiled when 
the extent of 1) is questioned. 1) is ontologically evident, but also just partial. 
Society is also composed by the material world. The reason for not including 
materiality as a requirement for social explanation, however, is that 
individualists connect 1) and 2) with an implicit epistemological assumption: 3) 
true explanations have already explained or self-explanatory explanantia. In 
social science, the intelligibility of intentionality is used usually as a justification 
to bottom-out.  
The philosophical implications of the connection between these three 
assumptions of individualism are questionable in many ways (e.g. Ylikoski, 
2012). Of importance here are the ones regarding the challenges for a double 
ontology. While the ontological character of 1) cannot be denied, the same 
cannot be said about 2). The fact that the connection of these two assumptions is 
implicit and grounded on epistemological criteria hinders the fact that 2) cannot 
be justified ontologically in the same way.  Both 1) and 2) face the problem of 
infinite regression. For the former, it is an ontological regressing to increasingly 
smaller sub-individual entities. For the latter, the basis of the regression is 
individuation. The problem of individuation of action has been widely 
considered in philosophy, but not in social science (Little, 2010; Sandis, 2010). It 
refers to the dissection and identification of the basic material and symbolic 
resources that eventually account for individual action.  
In social science, the problem of individuation has not been accounted for 
because actors’ intentionality is taken as given and the study has been carried 
out in terms of formalisation and generalisation of intentional action (Kramnick, 
2010; Little, 2010). Also because of the normative character of the analysis of 
intentionality has led to understand action as instantaneous (Whitford, 2002). In 
philosophy, however, the study of individuation has led to an inquiry about the 
basic conditions of human agency. The results of this discussion suggest that the 
connection between agency and action is not straightforward as it is usually 
claimed in social science. Individuation depends, among other things, on the 
definition of what an action is. Claiming an action is an event or an instance, for 
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example, has important explanatory implications regarding aspects such as 
causation (Bach, 1980; Davis, 1996). In turn, individuation also seems to depend 
on the identification of the intentional state associated with the action (Turner, 
2003b; Winch, 1990). Finally, the study of individuation of action in philosophy 
has shown the importance of dealing with bodily motion, an aspect of action 
systematically neglected in social science (Sandis, 2010; Sintonen, 1989).   
In social science, actions are individuated in the same way as entities are 
individuated: in terms of properties e.g. physical-mental, rational-rational, and 
spatiotemporal location. Yet, unlike entities, actions should also be individuated 
in terms of their spatiotemporal properties e.g. rate, duration (Davis, 1996; 
Helin, Hernes, Hjorth, & Holt, 2014). In a productive approach, actions would 
also need to be individuated by their effects. Changing the approach to action so 
as to avoid approach individuation in an entity-like fashion faces some 
methodological difficulties. A large amount of social methods do not focus on 
actions, but on properties. Property reification or nominalisation naturally 
removes the need for individuation of actions, since it is variables that do the 
‘acting’ (Abbott, 1997; Esser, 1996). In those methods where action has an 
adequate representation, it is spatiotemporally individuated according to 
predefined principles, which usually simplify quantification and make action 
apprehensible. In game theory, for example, the spatiotemporal character of 
action is delimited by the structure of turn-taking during the game. It is a 
methodological simplification that makes the problem tractable. Turn-based 
interaction obviates the nuances of real life interaction in which an actor might 
decide not to act or could act ‘twice’ before the partner has time to act again. 
Some of these spatiotemporal features can have major influences in the results 
(Hoffmann, 2000), starting by the evident fact that an actor’s unwillingness to act 
would simply dissolve the dilemma.  
With no strong epistemological or metaphysical connection between 1) and 2), 
the support for ‘action’ turns out to be simply methodological. Given this, there 
is, in principle, no valid reason why the notion of ‘activity’ should be rejected on 
ontological grounds. Furthermore, if ontological or epistemological criteria are 
used to reject the notion of activity, the same should happen with action, for the 
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conditions of individuation are the same. Both have to be spatiotemporally 
individuated and also accounted for in terms of production. The current account 
of social explanation based on individuals and action is not tenable and 
explanation in terms of individuals alone is not an option.  
In this section, philosophical issues regarding the structural individualism of 
analytical sociology have been discussed. It has been argued that the 
epistemological principle of analytical sociology, which requires explaining social 
phenomena only in terms of individual action, is at odds with the dual ontology 
of contemporary mechanist approaches. This principle has followed traditional 
individualistic social theory in underestimating the ontological importance of the 
concept of interaction. By doing this, it was argued, analytical sociology’s account 
of mechanism fails to capture the nature of the notion of productivity in 
contemporary mechanism. It was suggested that this philosophical principle, 
although with a long tradition in social science, is both untenable and 
unnecessary and does not pose a serious philosophical challenge for the 
implementation of a more process-centred approach.       
Causation 
In this section, the main requirements for a causal approach to mechanism are 
reviewed. It is suggested that, while the causal character of mechanism is 
acknowledged, analytical sociology has an ambiguous approach to causation that 
has pushed causal concerns into the background. This makes it miss the 
opportunity to understand the nature of causal mechanism and the way 
productivity has taken the central role in this discussion. The section starts with 
a description of analytical sociology’s approach to causation. Later, the 
discussion about causation and mechanism in the wider philosophy of science is 
presented. It finishes with the prospects of implementing a robust causal account 
into the mechanist perspective.   
There is an overabundance of definitions of mechanism in social and general 
science. Yet, the causal character is one feature that is common across all 
definitions of the concept (Gross, 2009; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Illari & 
Williamson, 2011; Mahoney, 2001). The mechanist view was not initially linked 
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to any particular account of causation, and, as it will be discussed later, there is a 
debate regarding the requirements for a causal account to fit the mechanist 
perspective. In spite of this, the idea of causation is fundamental for an account 
of mechanism, since it is the underlying causal structure that guarantees the 
spatiotemporal preservation of the mechanism. Analytical sociology’s approach 
to the relationship between causation and mechanism is ambivalent because it 
has been advanced on two complementary, but subtly different fronts. On one 
hand, mechanism in social science has been advanced by analytical sociology as a 
challenge to the generalising character of nomological and generalising variable 
causation (Elster, 2007; Hedström, 2005; Manzo, 2010). Nomological approaches 
and variable causation in the form, for example, of correlations, are criticised in 
terms of explanatory sufficiency. The criticism focuses on the black boxes this 
kind of causal statements leave in explanation. On the other hand, analytical 
sociology advances the idea of mechanism as a way to decompose social 
phenomena into their constitutive components i.e. individuals and their actions 
(Demeulenaere, 2011). In this second interpretation, the criticism about 
explanatory sufficiency extends to any form of causal statement that does not 
refer to individuals and their actions.  
Bottoming-out in individuals and their actions is not merely a special 
requirement in the mechanist perspective of analytical sociology; it, instead, 
reflects a different stance on the relationship between mechanism and causation. 
In general science, mechanisms are causal systems. In analytical sociology, on the 
contrary, mechanism and causation are explanatory theories that share some 
common concerns (Hedström & Bearman, 2009; Hedström, 2005). This has 
important implications for the discussion about causation. In general science, the 
main requirement from a theory of causation to be compatible with the 
mechanist perspective is that the notion of causation should be productive 
(Machamer et al., 2000). In regularity theories of causation, such as those of 
Hume (1999, 2007) or Hempel (1965), cause and effects are merely temporally 
contiguous. The causal connection is nothing more than a psychological 
conceptualisation, based on empirical evidence. In productive theories, on the 
other hand, causes are taken to have a generative influence on the event. Causes 
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bring about the events they are connected with. Productive means that 
components of mechanisms are spatiotemporally organised in a chain of causally 
connected stages in which previous stages have productive influence on later 
ones (Craver & Darden, 2006).      
Because of its secondary role, analytical sociologists do not discuss causation at 
length. Sometimes causal language appear when discussing generation, but the 
discussion is ambiguous, for the two concepts are usually kept separate in terms 
of their function in scientific endeavour (Manzo, 2011). Generation is treated 
causally usually when the methodological role of agent-based models is 
discussed. Analytical sociology considers agent-based models present a form of 
causation defined as algorithmic. Doreian (2001) speaks of algorithmic causation 
in the context of computer models. In the context of computer simulation, he 
suggests, results of the simulation depend on the rules of action built into the 
model. Causal connection is derived from the fact that the parameter space can 
be explored in order to identify the nature of the links between rules of the 
model and the results of the simulation. This approach to causation, however, 
has not been further developed, for the connection between the model and 
simulation is more commonly interpreted in a mechanism-only fashion, in terms 
of generation, not causation. It is suggested the computer model is the 
mechanism and the simulation is the processual aspect of it (Manzo, 2011).  
Doreian’s idea of algorithmic causation points in the right direction in terms of 
accounting for the connection between causation and mechanism. As mechanism 
in general science, this approach takes causal relations as underlying the 
productive continuity of a mechanism. The implications of this approach, 
however, have been neglected because of the individualist focus of analytical 
sociology and also for the distinction between causal and generative processes. 
As an individual-based approach, analytical sociology is not committed to more 
than a very basic account of agent causation i.e. agents cause things. Yet, as 
discussed in the previous section, it is activities, the overlooked item in the 
double ontology, that account for the causal character of mechanism in 
contemporary science. The notions of causation and generation are more closely 
connected than the individualist approach of analytical sociology suggests. The 
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role of activities in causation was introduced in the contemporary discussions by 
Anscombe (1993). She claims ‘cause’ is a concept too general, which can only be 
understood when certain thick causal concepts, exemplified by causal verbs such 
as pull, push, break, are used as primitives in the causal description. 
Contemporary mechanism takes one step further in trying to unveil the 
character of the production.  
Causally accounting for production, however, has proven a difficult task. In 
philosophy of science, causal theories are divided in two major groups: 
difference-making and process accounts (Hitchcock, 2013). The latter are 
conceptually connected to the traditional idea of mechanism by the operation of 
“contact” forces between bodies or entities. The idea of mechanical causal 
explanation in contemporary approaches to causation was first introduced by 
Salmon (1984). His theory focuses on causal processes and interactions. The 
former are sequences of events through which the causal influence is 
transmitted. The latter are interactions that generate and modify the causal 
structures. It is causal interaction that accounts for the productive character of 
the causal mechanism. Despite the focus on causal production, the character of 
the transmission in process theories has been heavily questioned. The 
explanatory power of these theories resides on the identification and 
conceptualisation of that which is transmitted. The concept of ‘marks’ i.e. 
modifications, initially used by Salmon (1984) or conserved quantities (Dowe, 
2000), to which he later subscribed, only appear to have correlates on a 
restricted set of phenomena. Because of this, process theories have not been 
considered as an adequate option for a foundational approach to causation.  
About the second option, within the wide array of difference-making theories of 
causation, most contemporary mechanist literature seems to favour 
interventionist approaches, such as Woodward’s (2003) or Pearl’s (2000). 
Interventionist theories feature elements from manipulative and counterfactual 
theories of causation. From the former, they take the idea of causes as elements 
that can be manipulated in order to reveal their connection with the effects 
(Menzies & Price, 1993). From the latter, they take the idea of causes as 
difference-making elements. Counterfactual theories are based in conditional 
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reasoning of the form ‘if the cause had not occurred, the effect would not have 
occurred’. The semantic structure of counterfactual reasoning is relevant for this 
approach since it captures the manipulative character of interventions. It 
provides a manipulation context in which those elements that change and those 
that remain fixed are specified.  
In interventionist theories, manipulations are defined as ‘interventions’. 
Intervention is a heuristic notion devised as processes by which the cause is 
changed in such a way that, if the effect is changed or produced, it is so only by 
means of the change in the cause. Interventions are supposed to isolate or 
redirect the causal pathway from causes to effects. They are exogenous ways in 
which the fixed and changing elements in a counterfactual reasoning are 
controlled. Interventionist theories of causation, however, drive themselves 
apart from traditional manipulation theories of causation in the sense that 
interventions are established counterfactually and do not rely on a reductive 
notion of agent causation (Woodward, 2003b). This allows for causal analysis of 
situations in which no intervention occurs, either human or natural, and 
situations in which an intervention is not possible.   
Causal relationships under the interventionist approaches are those that remain 
invariant under intervention. Invariance is a generalisation that is not so strong 
as a law-like generalisation, but not accidental either (Woodward, 2003b). 
Invariance is a modal notion that is defined through the purposed interventions. 
It is a relationship that should hold if certain changes were to occur. The scope of 
the generalisation is always defined in the context of manipulation. The relation 
between tertiary education and income can be tested for manipulations 
involving different age groups, classes, gender, occupation, etc. A researcher 
might expect the relation to hold in some cases and break for some others. In a 
highly homogeneous ethnic population, gender, for example, could break the 
invariance while race would not. The same would happen, for example, in a 
strongly patriarchal society. A different condition of invariance might occur in a 
society with colonial structure, where race is usually a locus of social inequality. 
The specification of those cases theoretically and methodologically for the 
experimental context is necessary to establish causal connections. 
   115 
Interventionist accounts also face challenges on two fronts regarding 
productivity. The first one questions whether interventionist approaches, as a 
special case of counterfactual theories of causation, can give satisfactory 
accounts of complex causal situations, while still assuming locality i.e. 
spatiotemporal connection between causes and effects. According to Hall (2004), 
there is a tension between the underlying principle of dependence in 
counterfactual reasoning and locality. The analysis of causation in philosophical 
literature usually focuses on specific cases that challenge particular intuitions 
about causation. To answer some of these problems, counterfactual causation, 
Hall claims, relies on a particular set of intuitions about causation that force to 
dismissing locality to answer some others. This alleged incompatibility leads Hall 
to claim there are actually two concepts of causation, one based on 
counterfactual dependence and one based on production. Locality, he claims, is 
only tenable under a productive notion of causation he proposes. The idea Hall 
has of production is somewhat similar to the one the mechanists have, for it also 
emphasises the generative character of causal processes. There has not been any 
influence between the two, however.           
Interventionist accounts are also criticised because of the focus on what would 
happen instead of what actually happens (Bogen, 2004; Machamer, 2004; 
Waskan, 2011). It is said the lack of specific spatiotemporal and processual 
awareness decontextualise causal analysis and fails to account for the 
spatiotemporal roots of human causal perception (Salmon, 1998; Waskan, 2011). 
Counterfactuals work on a modal basis. Causal connections are established in 
terms of logical dependence, grounded on hypothetical situations in which 
circumstances could be different. Psillos (2004) considers one of the major 
challenges for the interventionist approach is that it requires truth (logical) and 
evidence (factual) conditions of confirmation, but only the later ones are 
accounted for during interventions. By not focusing on what really happens, it is 
claimed, the linkage between truth and evidence conditions cannot be unveiled.  
There is not a straightforward answer to these challenges. The discussion about 
the relationship between causation and mechanism depends on important 
elements associated with the pragmatics, the linguistics and the perception of 
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causation (Menzies, 2007; Price, 2007; Woodward, 2003b). Crucial differences 
about causal intuitions are often grounded on how these aspects are dealt with. 
The way, for example, productivity and the spatiotemporal dimension are 
believed to be connected affects the criteria by which plausible causes are 
evaluated. Education is thought to have a long-lasting effect on income over the 
years, whereas, as time passes, a previous aggression is more unlikely to be 
accepted as a justification for retaliation. The same happens with the connection 
between productivity and omissions. Although it is not clear to what extent not 
doing something or that something does not happen should be taken as causally 
relevant, social science is full of causal claims relating behavioural traits in 
adulthood to omissions during an individual’s upbringing.  
Woodward (2011b, 2013b) suggests that to better account for productivity it is 
necessary to integrate difference-making and process theories of causation. The 
notions of invariance and the counterfactual manipulative reasoning of 
interventionist theories should be complemented by the emphasis on locality of 
process theories. The emphasis on organisation and dynamics on a 
spatiotemporal dimension of process theories could provide insightful causal 
information about complex phenomena on which the component properties and 
organisation impact causal relationships and outcomes in significant ways 
(Glennan, 2009; Woodward, 2013b). This emphasis on the processual character 
of a causal connection can also help understanding better the connection 
between truth and evidence conditions in counterfactual reasoning (Glennan, 
2010).  
The interventionist theory of causation, despite the difficulties in accounting for 
production, has slowly made its way into the mechanist perspective (Craver & 
Darden, 2006; e.g. Craver, 2009; Glennan, 2002) because of its emphasis on the 
experimental character of causation. Woodward constantly stresses (2003b, 
2006, 2011b) the nature of interventions as manipulations in experimental 
settings. Causal relations can be unveiled when ‘what if’ questions can be 
answered in hypothetical or real settings on which alternatives are 
methodologically and theoretically accounted for. This experimental approach to 
causation is important for causal understanding is significantly shaped by 
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methodological considerations. The effect of foreign economies on a nation’s 
development is often underestimated, if taken into account at all, not because it 
is not considered relevant, but because it is methodologically demanding to do 
so. As it will be shown, later, agent-based modelling provides an experimental 
test bed that could provide insights about the relationship between causation 
and production.  
This section contains a discussion about the prospects and limitations of 
implementing a causal account in the mechanist perspective. It was said that 
analytical sociology underestimates the causal character of mechanism because 
of its individualistic character, which leads it to support just a simple notion of 
agent causation and to separate causal and generative questions. In general 
science, on the contrary, causation and production have been explored together, 
particularly in the context of mechanistic theories of explanation. While a robust 
framework of productive causation has not been articulated yet, researchers on 
both areas: the interventionist theories of causation and the mechanist theory of 
explanation, have started to address this issue.  
Agent-based modelling 
The focus of this chapter has been analytical sociology’s approach to mechanism, 
for it highlights the important methodological role agent-based models can play 
in the study of mechanisms. In the previous sections, the individualistic 
character of the approach to mechanism of analytical sociology has been 
challenged. In this section, some implications from this discussion for 
computational social science will be derived. It will be suggested that agent-
based models are not constrained by the theoretical limitations of analytical 
sociology and can, on the contrary, methodologically account for its limitations. 
The section will start with an analysis of the connection between agent-based 
modelling, methodological individualism and the theoretical principles of 
analytical sociology. It will later show how the method can move past these 
theoretical limitations. It will finish with an assessment of how the causal 
interventionist framework can be used in computational social science.       
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As said before, analytical sociology suggests there is a functional and structural 
correspondence between agent-based models and mechanisms. The foundation 
for this analogy is that both agent-based models and mechanisms are said to 
explain social phenomena from an individual-based perspective. The first section 
challenged the individual-based view of mechanisms. This explanatory approach 
focuses on decomposition of the target phenomenon into its constituent parts 
and localisation of the causal structure and influence across these constituent 
parts. This focus, however, does not require thinking of the mechanistic account 
as individual-based, for there is an ontological concern with productive 
engagement of the componential entities. The question is whether the same can 
be said about agent-based modelling. After all, the methodology is commonly 
associated with methodological individualism either from the normative: “Agent-
based modelling contributes to the research program of methodological 
individualism” (Neumann, 2008), the methodological: “[a]lthough 
methodological-individualism is older by many decades,[…][agent-based 
modelling] can be characterised as its fullest formal representation” (Macy & 
Flache, 2009, p. 248), or the factual: “to adopt agent-based modelling does not 
compel one to adopt methodological individualism. However, extreme 
methodological individualism is certainly possible (indeed common) in agent-
based models” (Epstein, 2006, p. 21).  
Agent-based modelling allows for directly modelling actors and behavioural 
rules. In that sense, it can be said to have an individualist orientation. Its 
explanatory principles, however, deviate from those of traditional individualism 
in significant ways. In agent-based models, actors are embedded within a social 
and physical environment. That makes them materially and behaviourally 
interdependent on other actors’ actions and environmental constraints. Because 
of that explicit interdependence, agent-based models already constitute a move 
forward form the ontological half-truth of 1) above i.e. social life exists only by 
virtue of actors who live it. Results of the simulations are often interpreted in 
terms of individual decision-making. Yet, this approach to interpretation, which 
has ideological, pragmatic or technical reasons behind, should never be taken as 
evidence for downplaying the effects of the explicit representation of the 
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environmental and social interdependence in agent-based models. The 
explanation in those cases is still apprehensible because there is a visualisation 
or description of the model that complements the narrative about the outcome in 
terms of individual decision-making.  Schelling’s (1971) model, for example, is 
usually explained in terms of individual preferences alone. Yet, spatially and non-
spatially explicit models of segregation should be explained using different 
metrics. In spatially explicit models, clustering is better explained by identifying 
the conditions of spatial distribution and interaction (Bruch & Mare, 2009; 
Reardon & O’Sullivan, 2004). In turn, while explanation is usually given in terms 
of individual action, there is always reference to the visualization, where there is 
an explicit representation of space.     
The lack of awareness on the interdependence is one of the reasons why 
production can be difficult to account for from an individualist perspective. 
Analytical sociologists usually take Merton’s (1968) self-fulfilling prophecy as a 
paradigmatic example of a social mechanism. The dynamic is usually represented 
with the following diagram: Bi→Ai→Bj→Aj→Bk→Ak…., where B stands for beliefs, 
A for actions and the subindex for actors (Hedström & Bearman, 2009, p. 7). This 
is a clearly static humean representation of state change, hence the need to reify 
beliefs (B). It does not account for the productive aspect of the mechanism, for 
there is nothing that explains the arrows. While an inquiry about cognitive 
aspects of human decision-making could give insights regarding the dynamics of 
belief change, the process cannot be fully explained without understanding the 
social dynamics. The lack on temporality in the conceptualization of this 
mechanism makes the explanation of the diagram equally plausible giving an 
atemporal interpretation where belief change is assumed to be instantaneous.  
When the productive aspect of a social dynamic is accounted for, the limitations 
of the diagrammatic representation become visible. Translating this diagram into 
an agent-based model might, for example, lead to a different representation of 
the process depending on whether it is taken as an instance of diffusion of 
information or as a process of belief formation. Models of the latter have 
naturally tended to focus on cognitive aspects, while the former have brought to 
attention the effect of important external aspects, such as network topology 
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(Afshar & Asadpour, 2010; Macy & Skvoretz, 1998; Rosenkopf & Abrahamson, 
1999; Sobkowicz, 2009). The problem with the diagram is not derived from the 
degree of abstraction. The failure to represent activities does not make the 
diagram abstract, it makes it too general. Both things are not the same. 
Abstraction is related with the amount of detail, generality with the scope 
(Machamer et al., 2000). Representing self-fulfilling prophecy in that way is like 
describing Schelling’s model in terms of increasing satisfaction of individual 
preferences, making no reference to the model visualisation or operation.  
Neglecting the environmental and social interdependence just to favour 
explanations in terms of actions can lead to misrepresenting the extent and 
robustness of the results. It can also affect the future agenda on the topic. In 
analytical sociology, this agenda has focused on the cognitive foundations of 
action, leaving aside the exploration of the material and structural elements of 
social mechanism. Analytical sociologists reject instrumentalist approaches to 
scientific endeavour and link realism to a requirement about the 
representational complexity of intentional action (Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; 
Hedström, 2005; Manzo, 2010). It is suggested that an inquiry about social 
mechanism should provide information about actual heuristics of action and 
provide elements for empirical calibration. This requirement significantly 
distorts the research programme. While spatial distribution is rarely addressed 
when discussing Schelling’s model, for clustering emerges as a result of the 
interaction regardless of the spatial configurations, some aspect of the spatial 
topology can significantly influence the speed and the magnitude of the 
segregation (Banos, 2012). The significance of these effects on such a simple 
model should not be underestimated. If clustering is a pervasive result, the 
analysis of the model should equally focus on how different spatial 
representations affect the process and patterns of clustering, so to say anything 
relevant about these dynamics in real life phenomena (Aydinonat, 2007; Pancs & 
Vriend, 2007). If for example, more robust spatial representations display clearly 
identifiable tipping points, that information can be used to devise social 
interventions in order to avoid segregation.  
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It might be further argued that, although structural arrangements of interactions 
are rarely discussed, they do affect researchers’ modelling decisions. O’Sullivan 
and Perry (2013) put forward a typology of spatial models, dividing popular 
examples in three categories: Aggregation/segregation, random walks and 
mobile entities and percolation and growth. The typology as such reflects a 
concern for process and dynamics. In turn, models under one category usually 
share important principles or intuitions about modelling e.g. many of the models 
in the first category are cellular automata because of the advantages this type of 
modelling provides in terms of discrete time and space. Not paying attention to 
structural features makes it difficult to understand the rationale behind different 
modelling approaches.    
Although macro properties are said to emerge in agent-based models as the 
result of individual actions, agent-based modelling differs from traditional 
individualism, and from 2) above i.e. a social fact of any kind must be explained 
by direct reference to the actions of its constituents, in that it is not just action, 
but most importantly, its consequences, that accounts for the macro-property in 
agent-based modelling. Agents respond to stimuli in agent-based models. 
Adaptive behaviour, however, is generated in response to actual influence of 
other agents or the environment (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005; Macy & Willer, 
2002). In most methods, changes attributable to interaction are produced 
probabilistically. States or variables change according to probabilistic transition 
rules. The process-centred approach of agent-based modelling, on the contrary, 
allows understanding individual action and its consequences factually. By 
simulating social phenomena in a processual way, agent-based models can, 
unlike the theoretical model of analytical sociology, account for the productive 
character of mechanisms. As said, the problem of the notion of activities is not 
philosophical, but methodological. Agent-based models, however, can 
spatiotemporally individuate activities in a very precise way because of its 
explicit representation of spatial and temporal arrangements in the model. The 
study of adaptive responses is lacking in traditional action theories, but it is, on 
the contrary, the locus of mechanism production.     
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While the cognitive foundations of action are certainly important in modelling 
adaptive behaviour, productive relations are an aspect of social phenomena that 
had not been explored before and its implications are poorly understood. In 
social theory, it is often assumed that the complexity of the social world cannot 
be explained without explaining the complexity of human decision-making (e.g. 
Garfinkel, 1967; Mead, 1972; Parsons, 1991; Schütz, 1967). That is why the 
future agenda of analytical sociology is mostly set in that direction. Yet, the 
counterintuitive fact that non-realistic decision-making heuristics, such as zero 
intelligence (Farmer et al., 2005; Ladley, 2012), can recreate complex social 
dynamics and even produce data close to that of real phenomena, show the need 
to further study the implications of production. 
The exploration of productive relationships faces an unnecessary restriction in 
analytical sociology’s request for complex empirically calibrated models. In the 
KISS vs. KIDS debate that surrounds computational social science (Edmonds & 
Moss, 2005; Heath et al., 2009), analytical sociology has promoted the 
descriptive approach, supported in an alleged need for realism (Hedström, 2005; 
Manzo, 2007b). This methodological position derives from a very narrow 
understanding of the roles of modelling in science. It also has two significant 
setbacks. The first one is that it does not seem to reflect the scientific practices 
within the community; the second is that it misrepresents the aim of agent-based 
modelling. Initially, the appeal for complex models seems to obviate the fact that 
what practitioners usually take as examples of mechanisms, for example, 
segregation (Schelling, 1971), cooperation (Axelrod, 1984) and opinion 
formation (Hegselmann & Krause, 2002), are all very simple models. The reason 
is straightforward, and it underlies the very use of agent-based modelling: for 
phenomena on which there is not a significant amount of information, only 
simple models allow tracking with certainty the changes in the system, so a 
mechanism can be later identified and experimented on (Axelrod, 1997b; Epstein 
& Axtell, 1996; Gilbert, 2008; Macy & Willer, 2002). A mechanism can be 
modelled and accounted for by making agents follow simple rules and by 
keeping track of environmental effects. Simple models such as Schelling’s cannot 
be empirically calibrated because they are not modelling real life situations. 
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Schelling’s model is not really enquiring about people’s reason to segregate, the 
same way Axelrod’s model is not enquiring about people’s reason to cooperate. 
They render the mechanism intelligible at a high level of abstraction. 
Implications for real cases such as residential segregation come from high-level 
conceptual analogies. That, however, does not prevent the model or the 
mechanism from complying with the requirements of a realist philosophy.  
Despite the desire to get results that involve real world data, there are two 
reasons for starting with simple models. The first one is methodological. In 
empirically calibrated models, results have to be verified and validated against 
external data, through well-defined procedures. Unless enough reliable data is 
available, empirical calibration might not guarantee the right results. A complex 
cognitive structure without enough background knowledge, for example, might 
simply lead to overfitting the model. This might be a particularly sensitive issue 
in the cases of agent-based modelling, where the connection between theoretical 
principles and modelling choices has been rather weak (Grimm et al., 2010).  
The second reason that justifies starting with simple models is theoretical. It is 
one reason why the methodological programme of the mechanist view in 
philosophy of science is interesting. Mechanism rejects theorisation through 
nomological subsumption, typical of logical positivism. It acknowledges the 
importance of models in science and, in turn, concedes the influence of pragmatic 
and perspectival aspects in explanation. It also concedes the systematising and 
generalising character of scientific theories. The mechanist view adopts an 
approach to theorisation similar to Merton’s (1968) notion of middle-range 
theory. For him, sociological theory should be developed as a collection of 
several middle-range theories, which could be applied to a limited range of 
phenomena. Like Merton’s, the mechanist account considers science should focus 
on producing a ‘toolbox’ of mechanisms with different range and scope 
hierarchically organised. The nature of this theorisation process has been 
emphasised. According to the contemporary mechanism perspective, the process 
of theory building should be understood precisely as that: an incremental 
process in which more robust theories are developed, accepted or substituted 
(Darden, 2006). Research on simple models is able to produce this 
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diversification and hierarchisation of the process of theorisation in 
computational social science.       
Interdependence, adaptability and simple heuristics are usually recognised as 
the distinctive features of the agents in agent-based modelling (Gilbert & 
Troitzsch, 2005; Macy & Willer, 2002). These three explanatory principles 
provide the basis for the criticism of the theoretical view of mechanism in 
analytical sociology. While the focus on agents supports the most basic 
postulates of methodological individualism, agent-based modelling can capture 
the productive character of mechanism in a way the theoretical view of analytical 
sociology cannot. It does so while avoiding the unnecessary philosophical 
restrictions imposed by the theoretical perspective.  
One topic that will need further inquiry is causation. As mentioned, causation has 
not received enough attention in agent-based modelling and it is mostly 
accounted for in terms of generation. The notions of causation and generation 
are usually kept separate because it is thought the first one refers to production, 
while the latter refers to counterfactual dependency (Manzo, 2011). The 
previous sections have shown, however, that this distinction does not apply to 
the causal account of the mechanist perspective. Causation should be used to 
study processes expanding in time and space. What would be required is to 
define the interventions in such a way as to capture the spatiotemporal roots of 
the productive continuity of the mechanism. As said, the problem with 
interventionist counterfactuals is in terms of the truth value of the 
counterfactual. Those values would be provided by inserting the counterfactual 
analysis within a spatiotemporal scheme. 
The most interesting feature of interventionist approaches is that causation is 
framed within an experimental setting. This implies that the approach needs not 
be grounded on metaphysics, but on a conceptualization of what can be 
methodologically achieved by the use of agent based models (Cartwright, 2007; 
Hitchcock, 2007a). The prospective advantage of agent-based modelling in the 
study of causation is that there is a functional correspondence between agent-
based modelling and interventionist approaches to causation. Counterfactual 
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causation is a modal notion. Model parameterisation in agent-based models 
could be used to work in the same way. By exploring artificial societies, confined 
within the boundaries of the model, agent-based modelling provides a situation 
in which the philosophical perils of hypothetical interventions are avoided. The 
computer model can render all interventions possible. Simulations avoid another 
thorny issue of real life interventions: Modularity. Interventions work under the 
assumption that the causal path between cause and effect can be isolated 
(Woodward, 2003b). That creates complications in real life interventions, for the 
world is not modular. That is a criticism that is particularly highlighted in social 
science (Goldthorpe, 2000; Steel, 2004). Yet, in agent-based models, the different 
elements constituting the world can be modified in such a way as to provide the 
isolation an interventionist approach requires. It also provides solution for 
another problem of the interventionist account: the chance that individuals 
become aware of the intervention and react to it (Woodward, 2007b).     
Accounting for explanation using causal mechanism in computational social 
science would, however, require certain changes in practices. In some cases, the 
processual dynamics are not exhaustively explored, prioritising the connection 
between initialisation conditions and results. One key advantage of computer 
simulation is that it allows processing large amounts of information when the 
model is executed. So far, the emphasis has been put in using these computation 
power capacities for identifying the output of certain initial conditions. Yet, 
because of the speed of the simulation, which processes information at a pace 
that is too fast to understand from a human perspective (Humphreys, 2004; 
Wolfram, 2002),  and the lack of social methods to analyse the dynamics in these 
stochastic processes, the dynamic aspect of the simulation as such has been 
neglected. A causal-mechanism would require changing this tendency. As 
mentioned, it is important to understand production as changes produced in the 
system spatiotemporally. An adequate spatiotemporal tacking of these changes 
can provide better information for explanation and control, especially for 
phenomena that display radical changes, such as phase transitions. In the same 
way, the interventionist approach is only powerful if chains of counterfactual 
dependency are accounted for theoretically. Counterfactuals need to link both 
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relata of causation in a way that identifies how the occurrence of the antecedent 
affects the occurrence of the consequent. In some models, especially the intricate 
ones, the reliance on the wide exploration of the parameter space might go 
against this desideratum. Without theoretically accounting for modal 
configurations of parameters, the causal character of mechanism is not 
applicable.   
One issue that concerns inference and causation using agent-based models is 
that the method is considered to provide only a sufficient approach to 
explanation (Conte, 2009; Epstein, 2006) either because: 1) the explanandum 
might be generated using implausible microfoundations, 2) there are alternative 
set of microfoundations that explain the explanandum or 3) there is not enough 
information to simplify a model that reproduces the explanandum, but is 
formulated in such an intricate way that the mechanism is not intelligible. This 
has been taken as evidence that agent-based models can only play a contributory 
factor in explanation (Grüne-Yanoff, 2008). This view, however, neglects 
important aspects of the role of agent-based models, and models in general, in 
the production of scientific knowledge. Agent-based modelling operates on 
artificial societies and interventions produce changes in that society. The 
question about how these results can be taken to say anything about the real 
world is a an empirical matter related with an issue of representation using 
computational models (Frigg, 2006; Parker, 2013). It is not correct to think, as 
those pushing for more realistic and empirically calibrated representations, that 
validation is entirely dependent solely on how faithfully the model recreates the 
features of the phenomenon of interest. If that were the case, lack of information 
would certainly undermine the model usefulness. This view, however, as 
mentioned, oversimplifies the connection between representation and realism. It 
misconstrues as exclusive of the activity of modelling some representational 
issues that are equally present in many forms of experimentation in natural, 
biological and social sciences.   
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Computational models are useful because they can be used in an experimental 
fashion (Keller, 2003; Lenhard, 2007; Winsberg, 2010). The question about how 
this experimentation provides information about causality in particular and 
social explanation in general is related to the question that underlies the model 
development and operation (Knuuttila & Merz, 2009; Morrison, 2009; Suárez, 
2010). One of the reasons why it would be important to develop a theory of 
explanation in computational social science is because there are several 
interconnected philosophical aspects that any given theory of explanation should 
answer regarding a particular methodological approach (Ylikoski, 2012). In the 
case of agent-based modelling, these answers mirror to a certain extent those of 
the mechanist theory of explanation, for the main concern is the spatiotemporal 
extension of the phenomenon of interest. It is important, however, to identify the 
aspects of this approach that can better contribute to computational social 
science. Production and causation where argued to be the two explanatory 
aspects of mechanism that can strengthen the methodological approach to agent-
based modelling. Yet, as mentioned, it is the mechanist approach in philosophy of 
science, not the one advanced by analytical sociology, that provides a more 
robust foundation for the methodological approach of computational social 
science.        
The implications of mechanism in computational social science were discussed in 
this section. It was argued that, although agent-based modelling supports a very 
basic notion of methodological individualism, the methodology is not consistent 
with the explanatory mechanist programme of analytical sociology. The 
explanatory principles of autonomy, adaptability and simple rules that underlie 
agent-based modelling, unlike the theoretical account of analytical sociology, can 
account for the productive aspects of mechanism both at the ontological and the 
epistemological level. It was also suggested that the causal account of current 
mechanism blurs the distinction made so far between causation and generation. 
Furthermore, agent-based models, because of their modal and modular 
character, allow for the exploration of causal mechanism under the 
interventionist causal approach. 
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Conclusion 
The chapter has explored the potential role of mechanism in computational 
social science. It has focused on the approach of analytical sociology, which 
explicitly addresses the role of agent-based modelling. The first two sections 
discussed two crucial elements of contemporary mechanism: production and 
causation. The mechanistic account of analytical sociology was assessed 
regarding these two elements. Conclusion was that intentional fundamentalism 
i.e. the idea that all social phenomena should be explained in terms of individual 
and their actions, does not allow grasping the productive character of 
mechanisms, for it fails to acknowledge the metaphysical implications of the 
double ontology of contemporary mechanism. This limitation extends to the 
analysis of causation, where an unnecessary distinction between counterfactual 
causation and generation is proposed. This distinction prevents analytical 
sociology from analysing the implications of interventionist theories of 
causation, while linking analytical sociology’s account of mechanism to a very 
basic notion of agent causation.  
Some implications of this theoretical discussion for computational social science 
were presented. While in computational social science the model and its results 
are usually interpreted from an individualistic perspective, mechanism provides 
an alternative to start grounding contextually the interpretation of simulation, by 
putting more emphasis on its processual character. An approach to mechanism 
that could eventually provide philosophical foundations for computational social 
science would need, unlike analytical sociology’s, a satisfactory account of 
production and causation. This, however, would require the revision of some 
practices within the field, as well as establishing some links with other areas of 
philosophy and social theory, where computational social science, because of its 
empirical orientation, has the most limitations.     
An important effort has to put on linking this discussion about production and 
causation to other accounts of mechanisms, for the conceptualisation of the 
spatiotemporal dimension and the causal process varies significantly across 
definitions. Bunge (2004a, 2004b), for example, provides a popular approach 
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where mechanisms are processes in systems, but this definition does not fit the 
dualist ontologies of the accounts focusing on production. Likewise, McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly (2001), advance another popular account of mechanisms where 
“social processes” are sequences of mechanisms that can be disaggregated and 
mechanisms are classes of events or delimited changes. The articulation of 
production into this account faces different issues. McAdam et al.’s accounts has 
been criticised for either mechanisms only acquire temporal character through 
their articulation or insertion into social processes or mechanisms and processes 
end up being the same thing (Koopmans, 2003). The problem in this case is they 
way the categories of spatiotemporal hierarchy have been devised. Like these 
two, many of the popular accounts of mechanism in social and general sciences 
posit challenges that the conceptualisation of production and mechanist 
causation have to account for if they are meant to be compatible with agent-
based modelling and other diachronic research methods.      
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Explanation  
Explanation is usually taken as the main goal of science. While there is a 
widespread consensus around this idea, there is significant divergence regarding 
the way explanation can be achieved. In the everyday practice of science, the 
form and content of what is called an explanation vary significantly, depending 
on factors such as subject, discipline or the method. For this reason, an important 
goal for the philosophy of computational social science is the articulation of an 
account of explanation, focused on the practice of agent-based modelling in 
social science.  
In what follows, the basic elements of that account will be addressed. In the first 
section, the concepts of explanation and understanding will be analysed. While 
explanation has taken a central role in the discussion, recent literature 
acknowledges the need to place a distinction between explanation and 
understanding. This in order to properly conceptualise the role of the knowing 
subject and the way how different explanatory goals are dealt with in different 
disciplines. Social science, it will be shown, is a paradigmatic case of the 
implications of the distinction. The second section will focus on explanation in 
the context of computational social science. It will be shown that the 
conceptualisation of explanation in the field has developed following different 
foundations and concerns to those addressed in the philosophical literature on 
computer simulation. This, it will be argued, leads to the neglect of important 
aspects of the epistemology of computational modelling that are fundamental for 
a theory of explanation. These aspects will be addressed in the following two 
sections. The analysis decomposes these challenges between those arising from 
the model-based character of the method and those arising from its 
computational character. The two are discussed in the third and fourth section, 
respectively. The chapter will finish with a discussion about causation. The 
reason for keeping the discussion of this concept separated is because, despite its 
relevance for the conceptualisation of explanation, computational social science 
has significantly neglected causation. It will be shown that the concept of 
causation can become an important feature of an account of explanation in 
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computational social science, but only if previous issues in the epistemology of 
the field are addressed first.          
Explanation and understanding 
Three main views have dominated the approach to explanation in the philosophy 
of science. The first one is put forward by logical positivism. Under this view, 
explanations are arguments (Hempel, 1965). The explanans is a set of 
explanatory sentences referring to particular facts and empirical laws. The 
explanandum is a sentence referring to the phenomenon of interest. Explanation 
operates by means of a logical deduction. It is meant to show how the 
explanandum is expected, given the information provided by the explanans. 
Because of the nomological character of the explanans, in logical positivism 
explanation is associated with the subsumption under a general law. The 
empirical character of the argument is given by the descriptive terms of the 
premises, which are supposed to account for different aspects of the world, via 
some correspondence rules (Hempel, 2001).  The argument: “All men are mortal. 
Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal”, for example, is formalised as x 
(man(x) mortal(x)), man(a)  mortal(a). Where ‘a’ is the observation, ‘man’ 
and ‘mortal’ are the descriptive terms and the rest is language of predicate logic. 
The conclusion ‘mortal(a)’ is expected given the information provided by the 
premises and the logic structure of the logical argument.      
The positivist view of explanation has been criticised on several fronts (Salmon 
& Kitcher, 1989). One of these fronts regards its dismissal of the causal nature of 
explanation. Logical positivism rejected the idea of making causation a primitive 
term in its theory of explanation. It suggested any statement about causes could 
be reformulated in a statement about working laws (Hempel, 2001). The second 
major view of explanation in the philosophy of science: the causal-mechanical 
account, was set to correct this deficiency. It adopts a totally different account. 
This account of explanation is conceptually connected to the traditional idea of 
mechanism by the operation of “contact” forces between bodies or entities. It 
claims that explanation is not achieved by subsumption, but by focusing on how 
things work, through the reconstruction of a causal history (Salmon, 1998). The 
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idea of mechanical causal explanation in contemporary approaches to causation 
was first introduced by Salmon (1984). For this theory, he builds upon his 
previous work on statistical relevance i.e. a statistical approach to how causes 
increase the probability of occurrence of an effect (Salmon, 1971), and adds the 
notions of causal processes and interactions. The former are sequences of events 
through which the causal influence is transmitted. The latter generate and 
modify the causal structures. A paradigmatic example is a billiard ball. Energy is 
transferred to the ball when the cue stick hits it. An interaction occurs when the 
ball hits some other ball and transfer part or all of its remaining energy.     
The final major account of explanation in philosophy of science, the unificationist 
account, as its name suggests, is based on the intuitively appealing idea of 
explanation as knowledge unification. The most common examples come also 
from the physical sciences: The unification, for example, of terrestrial and 
celestial theories of motion by Newton or Maxwell’s unification of electricity and 
magnetism. Unificationists account also emphasise the role of arguments in 
explanation. Under this view, explanation is increased when the number of 
independent argument patterns needed to explain different phenomena are 
reduced (Kitcher, 1989). When the amount of argument patterns is reduced, the 
more difficult it is for new observations to instantiate these patterns, but the 
amount and power of the conclusions derivable from them increases 
(Woodward, 2013a). Like logical positivism, unificationist accounts subordinate 
causation to the notion of explanation. Unificationsm considers causal claims can 
be reformulated in terms of relationships derived from theories with a high 
degree of unification. Competing argument patterns with different degree of 
unification are fundamental in addressing problems of explanatory asymmetry 
and relevance that plagued the explanatory approach of logical positivism 
(Bromberger, 1966; Salmon, 1971).          
A problem shared by all three approaches is the focus on the structural and 
formal aspects of explanation. In doing so, they downplay the different ways in 
which an explanatory account can be articulated. The basic notion of explanation 
as an answer to why-questions (Hedström, 2005; Hempel, 1965; van Fraassen, 
1980) is already just  a convention based on the assumption that it can provide 
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an appropriate standard phrasing for all scientifically relevant explanation-
seeking questions (Hempel, 1965). Research on erotetic logic, however, has 
shown that there is a complex connection between the diverse formulation of 
explanation-seeking questions and the rationales for explanation (Bromberger, 
1966; Sintonen, 1989).      
The question ‘what kind of result is produced by Schelling’s (1971) model?’ 
seems to radically differ from the question ‘why the simulation produces 
clustering?’. At first sight, it could be argued that the latter requires a more 
comprehensive explanation: for the former, a basic manipulation of the model or 
simply the aid of the visualisation might be thought to suffice; for the latter, on 
the contrary, picking up the mechanism underlying the dynamics of the model 
would be necessary. Depending on the context, however, both questions might 
eventually be taken to pose the same requirements from an explanation. In some 
methodological approaches in social science, such as the comparative historical 
(Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2008; Przeworski & Teune, 1970), the development 
of explanations is closely associated with taxonomical work e.g. Weber’s (1978) 
ideal types. Within this context, the question ‘what patterns emerge?’ is not 
answered just by the identification of those patterns, but with the linking of 
those patterns with particular dynamics. This basically makes the rationales for 
explanation essentially the same for both questions.             
Likewise, why-questions have also been highlighted as the goal of explanation 
for most questions of this type have a contrastive structure i.e. they do not 
simply ask ‘why p’, but ‘why p rather than q’. This structure delineates a scope of 
operation for putative factors influencing the outcome. Exposure to a disease, for 
example, could count as an explanation of why an individual is infected, in 
comparison to some other individual who was not exposed. It could not be used 
to explain why, between two exposed individuals, only one got infected (Lipton, 
2013; van Fraassen, 1980). While this contrastive structure can certainly help 
with the identification of difference-making factors, it does not necessarily imply 
that the contrastive structure can provide all the relevant information for a 
successful explanation. For micro-oriented social scientists, an answer in the way 
‘a person does x rather than y because of a norm’ might not be explanatory, in 
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spite of the fact that a norm, as a regularised pattern of behaviour, can, in 
principle, account for the observation and serve other equally explanatory goals, 
such as prediction or control (Elster, 2007; Hedström, 2005).         
Arguing that explanations provide answers for why-questions can have an 
important heuristic value because it gives general insights about the process of 
explanation. Yet, it just shows the importance of accounting for the pragmatic 
facts that eventually determine whether any given explanation is considered 
adequate within its ambit of application. This is a point that has not been 
properly addressed in the most well-articulated theories of explanation in the 
philosophy of science (de Regt, 2013; Koertge, 1992). The problem with these 
major views of scientific explanation is that they all share the goal of 
conceptualising the process of explanation, or at least the key part of it, in purely 
objective terms, rejecting explicitly or implicitly, to assign an anthropomorphic 
character to scientific explanation (de Regt, 2013; Salmon, 2006). Giving a major 
role to the pragmatic aspects of explanation, for example, the cognitive state of 
the knowing subject, puts that goal of objectivity at risk (Hempel, 1965). While 
there is something to explanation that goes beyond the features of the knowing 
subject, scientific explanation and its connection with other concepts such as 
understanding can only be correctly conceptualised when all these pragmatic 
elements are accounted for.  
The contemporary literature on the distinction between explanation and 
understanding is important for it focuses on the implications of the pragmatic 
features surrounding the production of knowledge. One of the key aspects of this 
literature is that it takes understanding as a concept that rejects the notion of a 
transcendent knowing subject. It focuses on the changes in the cognitive states of 
the knowing subject produced by the explanation (de Regt, Leonelli, & Eigner, 
2009). It, additionally, grounds the analysis of scientific explanation and 
understanding on the practice of science as a whole. One of the problems with 
the three major approaches to explanation in traditional philosophy of science is 
that they account for explanation following the discovery-justification 
distinction. Explanation is thought of as an activity linked with the latter. It is 
taken mostly as a process by which an already well-articulated knowledge is 
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transmitted or communicated. This approach, however, neglects the important 
role that the process of discovery can have for explanation and understanding, 
both for the researcher engaged with the production of knowledge and for 
whomever this knowledge is later transmitted (Gijsbers, 2013; Nickles, 2006). 
Including the context of discovery in the study of scientific explanation is crucial 
for conceptualising the role of activities such as modelling and experimentation 
(Franklin, 1989; Hacking, 1983; Morrison, 1999; Winsberg, 2010). It also allows 
unveiling the similarities and differences between and within the approaches to 
explanation in diverse disciplinary areas. This is an important factor to 
understand the nature of explanation in social science, where the concept of 
understanding seems to be have a much more relevant role (Turner, 2013).  
The notion of understanding seems to be particularly relevant for some streams 
of social science where the explanation of the social world heavily relies on the 
understanding of individual action (Helle, 1985; Joas, 1996). Instrumental 
accounts of action, such as rational choice theory, do not impose major 
constraints on the conceptualisation of action and, therefore, do not demand 
much in terms of understanding. Explanation is clearly grounded on issues of 
prediction; understanding, in terms of identifying the real motivation behind the 
action, takes a secondary role. Under these accounts, the explanation of 
individual action does not necessarily depart from the objectivist accounts of 
traditional philosophy of science in terms of a transcendental knower. It just 
emphasises the role of explanation in terms of individuals and their actions.    
It is on interpretative accounts of action, such as Weber’s (1978), where 
understanding takes a significantly different role. Here the emphasis is on the 
proper identification of the meaning associated with that action, through 
processes of rational interpretation. The German verstehen, for example, 
popularised in social science by Weber and Simmel, refers to that interpretative 
process of identification of the motivation of the actor performing the action. In 
interpretative theories of action, understanding takes the primary 
epistemological role. This has important philosophical implications for the 
conceptualisation of explanation, which become manifest in the micro-
macro/structure agency tensions in social theory. The reason why micro-
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oriented social scientist would not consider adequate reference to a social norm, 
institution or collectivity as an explanation of an individual’s behaviour, despite 
being an answer that accounts for several important explanatory goals, is that it 
does not provide information in terms of the individual’s motives for action. 
Coleman’s (1990) popular approach to the micro macro link, for example, 
stresses the need to understand Weber’s (2003) analysis of the influence of 
protestant ethics on capitalist behaviour in terms of individuals and not of 
normative behaviour and group belonging, even though these could be useful 
proxy for prediction and control.      
Although interpretative theories emphasise understanding, the way the 
connection between understanding and explanation is conceived varies 
significantly. In Weber’s approach, for example, understanding of individual 
action can lead to a more general account of causal explanation of social 
phenomena (Weber, 1949, 1978). Causation is conceived in terms of the classical 
two-place relationship, where intentionality takes the role of cause and the 
action takes the role of the effect. Weber suggests that patterns of cause-effect in 
social science can be probabilistically generalised. Some other interpretative 
accounts, such as cultural anthropology (Geertz, 1973) and ethnomethodology 
(Garfinkel, 1967), stress the crucial role of understanding, but do not give any 
significant role to explanation, at least in the causal form. In both cases, 
explanation is equated to description, although the reasons for it are different. 
Geertz does it because he thinks descriptive explanations are the way to account 
for underdetermination of theory by data. Garfinkel, on the other side, does it 
because he believes ethnomethodology relies on the ordinary methods used by 
regular people for retrospective-prospective sense-making in everyday life. 
Finally, some other types of interpretative accounts, such as hermeneutics, 
totally redefine the connection between explanation and understanding (Stones, 
2009). Hermeneutics, for example, suggests the process of understanding is not 
an isolated process of analysis, but requires the establishment of a ‘dialogue’ 
between the researcher and the individuals that participate in the phenomenon 
of interest. During this dialogue, the meaning of everyone involved is equally 
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identified and transformed. Explanation, under this approach, acquires a strong 
moral component because of the dialogue that has to be established.    
While explanation has been taken as the main goal of scientific practice, the 
specific way in which explanation is meant to proceed is not clear. Providing an 
explanation clearly has to do with answering questions, for explanation is meant 
to address particular gaps in knowledge. The problem with the traditional 
philosophical accounts is that they approach explanation as a matter of satisfying 
rational objective epistemic needs, such as prediction. Explanation, however, 
depends on particular combinations of epistemic and non-epistemic factors. 
Even traditional criteria for the evaluation of scientific knowledge, such as 
simplicity and elegance, for example, have been linked in many cases to the 
satisfaction of aesthetic needs (Kuhn, 1977; Newton-Smith, 1981). All these 
aspects that contextually affect explanation should be addressed explicitly. 
Different combinations of these epistemic and non-epistemic factors underlie 
accounts of explanation in different disciplinary contexts. As said, for example, 
the emphasis on understanding intentionality in action-oriented accounts in 
social science, as well as the multiple ways in which this intentionally is meant to 
be accounted for, have important implications for the conceptualisation of 
explanation in the social domain.  
In what follows, the basic elements required for the conceptualisation of 
explanation and understanding in computational social science will be discussed. 
The notion of explanation in computational social science has a strong link with 
the practice of computational modelling. In the next section, the most 
widespread account of explanation will be analysed. Later, some deficiencies will 
be addressed.  
Explanation in computational social science 
In the philosophical literature, the connection between computer simulation and 
explanation has been explored focusing on three major areas: 1) The connection 
between theory and models, 2) the technical and methodological features 
associated with the use of simulation and 3) the relative epistemological 
autonomy of simulations (Winsberg, 2001). In computational social science, this 
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epistemological exploration has not occurred. Explanation has been framed 
within what is known as the generative paradigm (Epstein, 2006). This account 
of explanation is strongly linked to the entity based and processual character of 
simulation. The generative paradigm assumes that explanation is achieved when 
the phenomenon of interest is accounted for in a bottom-up way. An initial 
population of autonomous computational agents is put in a computational 
environment and asked to interact. The resulting macropattern is meant to be 
the result of this interaction. This approach conceives simulation as the 
reproduction of the process of emergence, therefore the popular motto: “If you 
didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain its emergence” (Epstein, 1999, p. 43). 
There are not many commonalities between the literature in computational 
social science and philosophy, for they address significantly different concerns. 
In computational social science, one key epistemological assumption is the levels 
ontology, which underlies the approach to modelling in the field. A distinctive 
feature of using computer simulation models is that these models are dynamic, 
changes occur in time (Casti, 1997; Hartmann, 1996). In traditional equations-
based simulations, changes are meant to represent variations in the system’s 
variables. It is a qualitative approach to temporal or structural change, in which 
simulation is used to overcome tractability limitations (Lenhard, 2007; 
Winsberg, 2010). In computational social science, the approach has a more 
profound philosophical foundation. Changes produced on agent-based models 
have been thought to address variation in the entities’ variables, but also an 
epistemological change in the system. Simulation accounts for the micro to 
macro transition in social systems (Gilbert, 1995; Sawyer, 2005).  
This epistemological assumption attached to the use of agent-based models has 
two negative consequences: It puts an unnecessary epistemological burden on 
the method and, most importantly, deviates the attention from some of the 
crucial aspects of the epistemology of social simulation. The focus on emergence 
is considered to be a crucial aspect for explanation using artificial societies. It is 
argued that the ability to directly represent this emergent process with the 
simulation provides both explanation and understanding (Axelrod, 1997a; 
Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Gilbert, 2000). The reason is that this interpretation of 
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the processual character of computer simulation couples the why-question with 
the how-question. This is a feature that is highlighted frequently when the 
method is compared with other traditional methods used in social science (Macy 
& Willer, 2002; Sawyer, 2004a).  
The problem with approaching the use of agent-based modelling through the 
epistemological assumption of a level transition is that it forces computational 
social science to come up with solutions for the problems of multiple realisation 
and wild disjunction i.e. that social macropatterns might be the result of different 
combinations of well-differentiated microfoundations (Conte, 2009; Sawyer, 
2005). This, however, is a pervasive problem in social science and one of the 
main points of disagreement in traditional micro-macro theories (Alexander & 
Giesen, 1987). Awareness of the impossibility to come with a solution for this 
issue has led to the acknowledgement that the generative paradigm constitutes a 
necessary, but not sufficient, approach to inter-level social explanation (Epstein, 
1999).  
The admission of the lack of sufficiency of the explanation produced by agent-
based models is problematic for necessity is based on the inferential character of 
the simulation. Computational models, it is argued, produce a necessary 
explanation in terms of inference: every run of the computer program produces 
an algorithm that can be retrieved and analysed (Epstein, 1999). The problem 
with this approach to necessity is that, while the outcome of the simulation can 
indeed be backtracked to the initial conditions, this is not a normal practice in 
the field and its application could pose additional methodological difficulties 
(Casti, 2001; David et al., 2007). Unexpected or inconsistent outputs are usually 
solved by parametric or structural modifications of the computational model, 
according to a review of its connection with the conceptual model, the data used 
for calibration, the parameter specifications for the executions, etc.  
A difficulty with this approach to necessity in terms of inference is that the 
dynamic aspect of the simulation is epistemically opaque (Humphreys, 2004). In 
static models, understanding depends on the ability to properly separate the 
model’s input from the output and the way these two are connected. A map, for 
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example, allows turning the input string x° y” z’ into an output referring to 
geographic coordinates, where x is degrees, y is minutes and z is seconds. This by 
following geodetic rules of transformation (Hartmann, 1996; Kitcher, 1989). In 
computational simulation, however, the process is too fast for a human observer 
and it is also computationally irreducible i.e. the outcome is known only by 
performing the computation (Wolfram, 2002). The deductive character of 
computer simulation does not provide the same warrants for explanation as 
traditional deduction algorithms. In basic formal proofs, the outcome is easily 
identifiable as a syntactic consequence of a combination of a relatively small set 
of sentences to which some inference rules has been applied. In a computer 
program the lines of code and the execution of those lines would provide a 
significantly long algorithm, if it were to be looked as a deductive proof. The 
focus on inference is replaced by a focus on the technique used to analyse the 
outcome. The lack of comprehension about the step-by-step algorithmic solution 
is, in part, the reason why agent-based modelling struggles to get recognition in 
areas where this traditional approach to deduction is more common (Lehtinen & 
Kuorikoski, 2007; Ormerod & Rosewell, 2009).  
The emphasis on the inferential character of the simulation undermines the 
realisation of the explanatory potential of agent-based modelling in social 
science. Initially, it would imply that its contribution to the understanding of the 
micro-macro transition would be minimal (Grüne-Yanoff, 2008). If anything, 
simulation could only provide the illusion of understanding e.g. a feeling of 
achieving understanding that is nonetheless neither reliable nor truth-
conductive (Kuorikoski, 2011; Ylikoski, 2009). Furthermore, if the generative 
paradigm is accepted the way it is usually presented, computational social 
science cannot be taken to provide more than a possible explanation. For this 
explanation to have any scientific relevance, however, an excessive emphasis 
needs to be put on the adequacy of modelling. Otherwise, it would be difficult to 
argue that the outcome of the simulation has a superior epistemological status to 
that of a mere opinion.  
This conclusion about the explanatory potential of agent-based modelling, 
however, does not seem to adequately depict the practice of computational 
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modelling in social and general science. Computer simulation, both through 
equation- and agent-based models, despite its methodological and philosophical 
limitations, has provided results that have been considered sufficiently 
explanatory and, most important, used effectively for prediction and control in 
the natural, biological and social sciences (Brenner & Werker, 2007; Casti, 1997; 
Wolfram, 2002). The contradictory character between the practice of agent-
based modelling in social science and its philosophical interpretation derives 
from the fact that computational social science has paid little attention to the 
epistemology of computer science developed since the late nineties. This 
philosophy has emphasised the connection between simulation and theory and 
the basic epistemological aspects of using computer models (Morrison, 2009; 
Parker, 2013; Winsberg, 2010).  
To clarify the epistemic and non-epistemic factors affecting the notions of 
explanation and understanding in the field, it is necessary to discuss both those 
issues computational modelling shares with other instances of modelling, as well 
and those that are specific to the practice of computer simulation. This is the 
topic of the next two sections.    
Explaining with models  
The notion of theory has received most of the attention in the philosophy of 
science. Several of the relevant discussions in the area, such as scientific realism, 
reductionism or relativism are formulated in terms of theories (Chakravartty, 
2007; Psillos, 2009). The production of scientific knowledge itself has been 
usually conceived as a successive replacement of theories (Kuhn, 1970). This 
theory-centrism in philosophy of science was challenged during the last decades 
of the twentieth century. Three developments were fundamental for this 
challenge. The first one was the replacement of the positivist view of theories, 
according to which theories are arguments formulated using logical and non-
logical terms, for a view in which theories are classes of non-linguistic models 
(Craver, 2002; Giere, 2001). This second view, usually known as the semantic 
view of theories, reduced the importance of theories in philosophy of science by 
shifting the attention from theories to models.  
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The second important development was the emergence of the new 
experimentalism movement. This movement, originated within philosophy of 
science, challenged the dominant position of theories by arguing that 
experiments have, to put it in Hacking’s (1983) famous expression, a life ‘of their 
own’. This movement focuses both in the activity of experimentation as such, as 
well as its place within the wider framework of the practice of science. This 
movement unveiled important features of experimentation that had been 
neglected in traditional philosophy of science, such as the fact that experiments 
can have representational autonomy or that some experimental results are not 
affected by theory change. It showed as well how the experimental setting affects 
in significant way the criteria for the production and validation of knowledge 
(Franklin, 1989; Galison, 1987; Hacking, 1983). This latter aspect was further 
explored in the area of social and historical studies of science and technology, 
which was the third important development in the challenge of the theory-
centrism in philosophy of science. This area moved past the theory-centrism in 
the philosophy of science by focusing on knowledge production from the context 
of the everyday practice and culture of science (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Knorr-
Cetina, 1981b; Latour & Woolgar, 1986). 
While the semantic view focused on theories as classes of models, the formal 
character of the account kept the discussion within the boundaries of natural 
science. Since the late nineties, however, there has been a significant increase in 
the literature about modelling in general science. This literature, following the 
insights from new experimentalism, highlights the autonomous character of 
models in regards to representation and robustness and independence of results 
(Morrison, 1999). It has, additionally, stressed its mediating role between theory 
and reality (Morrison & Morgan, 1999b) as well as its pedagogic features, which 
derive from the fact that models, like experiments, allow for particular forms of 
manipulation (Contessa, 2007; Morgan, 1999; Winsberg, 2010).  
The activity of modelling has been fundamental for the conceptualisation of the 
connection between explanation and understanding. This because of the 
particular way models deal with their epistemic and non-epistemic goals and 
their ontological referent (Knuuttila & Merz, 2009). Models are both models ‘for 
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something’ and ‘of something’. The former means there is a strong problem-
solving character attached to the use of models in science. They are built to 
answer specific questions that the modellers consider relevant. Any question for 
which an answer is being sought shapes the way the particular model is built and 
used. This question, at the same time, is linked to several contextual elements, 
including the functional and structural organisation of the research setting, the 
skills and cognitive conditions of the researcher, as well as the ontological and 
epistemological character of the model (Goldman, 2002; Ylikoski, 2009). Because 
of this, the analysis of what models are for has to conceive the practice of 
modelling as a three-place relationship. To the model and the target of 
representation, the first two objects, a third object, the user, should be added. 
The specific features of the model and the way this model is used depend on the 
knowing subjects that develop and use the model.   
The conception of modelling as a three-place relationship also has important 
effects in the conceptualisation of what models are of. Models provide 
explanations of reality by indirect means because there are moral, economic of 
technical issues that prevent direct experimentation. This makes representation 
a crucial aspect in the discussion about the explanatory features of models 
(Chakravartty, 2010b; Frigg, 2006; Suárez, 2010). Representation is usually seen 
as a two-place relationship. The first object, the source, represents the second 
one, the target. The semantic view of theories initially considered the connection 
between the source and the target to be one of isomorphism or partial 
isomorphism (da Costa & French, 2003). But that notion is problematic, 
especially because isomorphism is a symmetric, transitive and reflexive 
relationship, which is not the case for scientific representation (Suárez, 2003, 
2004) A painting of someone is not a representation of itself, nor is that person a 
representation of the painting. Similarity has also been proposed as criterion of 
representation (Giere, 2004), but similarity is too weak as a criterion of 
representation for any two things can always be found to be similar in some 
regards (Goodman, 1968; Suárez, 2003). In order to correctly conceptualise 
representation in modelling, it is necessary to understand the issue of what 
models refer to also as a three-place relationship, in which the connection 
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between the source and the target depends on the epistemological and non-
epistemological values and needs of the knowing subject.  
The issues about what a model is of and for have not been correctly addressed in 
computational social science. In what follows, the topic of representation will be 
addressed. The problem-solving character of modelling will be addressed in the 
next section. Computational social science has not paid enough attention to the 
problem of representation. There is divergence in terms of what both the source 
and subject are, as well as the connection that mediates between the two. 
Regarding the former, agent-based models have been said to represent many 
different things, such as events, processes, patterns, mechanism, etc. Schelling’s 
(1971) model can be analysed using segregation as a process, in terms of 
relocation of individuals, or as a pattern, in terms of the eventual clustering. In 
turn, a mechanism, for example, can be taken as an observable real aspect of the 
world (e.g. Bunge, 2004b), as an abstract object that is apprehensible only by its 
effects (e.g. McAdam et al., 2001) or as an abstract concept used to make sense of 
results (e.g. Demetriou, 2009). While not necessarily incompatible, these 
differences can have technical, theoretical-methodological and philosophical 
effects in the way the models are interpreted and the results are validated. The 
visualisation of the world, for example, might be enough to gain understanding of 
segregation as a pattern in Schelling’s model, but might not be enough to 
understand segregation as a process (Aydinonat, 2007; Banos, 2012).  
There is a relative consensus in the approach to the source of representation in 
computational social science, for the options are limited by the options provided 
by object-oriented programming. Agent-based models are taken to represent 
social phenomena through ontological correspondence with the 
microfoundations of the phenomenon of interest i.e. agents and the environment 
(Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Gilbert, 2008). Emphasis has been put on modelling 
agents as heterogeneous and autonomous entities, following simple rules (Macy 
& Willer, 2002). This has led to think of the method as supporting the basic 
principles of methodological individualism, despite that some questions have 
been raised regarding the ontological implications of this individualist focus, 
which is more ideologically than methodologically grounded (Epstein, 2011, 
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2006; Sawyer, 2013). While the method has generally acquired a distinctive 
individualist focus, there is some disagreement about the explanatory value of 
different ways of modelling agents. Agent-based modelling can work with a 
multiplicity of assumptions regarding the representation of agent’s intentionality 
(Gilbert, 2008). Some consider that an accurate representation of the cognitive 
functions supporting intentionality is a matter of research objectives (Gilbert, 
2006), whereas some others consider that only models with an accurate  
representation of these cognitive functions have scientific value (Edmonds, 
2010).  
One reason impeding the adequate conceptualisation of the relationship of 
representation in computational social science is that the field has conceived 
modelling as a process of abstraction. The model is meant to provide a simplified 
version of the real phenomenon (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005; O’Sullivan & Perry, 
2013; Railsback & Grimm, 2012). This approach conflates two ways in which 
abstraction can be performed: It might proceed by isolating relevant aspects of 
the target phenomenon and building them into the model or by building some 
elements into the model, following assumptions that could never obtain in the 
real world. These two processes are usually defined in the literature as 
abstraction and idealisation, respectively (Chakravartty, 2001; Portides, 2005a). 
The approach to modelling as simplification fits the notion of abstraction, but not 
that of idealisation. This neglect is somewhat surprising, taking into account that 
idealisation has an important role in social science at the level of generalisation 
(Kincaid, 1990; Little, 1998), interpretation of action (Boudon, 2003; Joas, 1996) 
and explanation (Elster, 2007; Hedström, 2005). 
The problem with not defining adequately the features of representation is that 
this hampers understanding about the relationship between the model and the 
target phenomenon and the warrants for explanation. Take, for example, the 
debate between KISS and KIDS. The argument made in favour of the KIDS 
approach to modelling is made under the assumption that descriptive 
empirically calibrated models allow achieving a higher degree of realism in the 
representation, which would provide better warrants for belief in the adequacy 
and accuracy of the explanation provided by these models (Bruch & Atwell, 
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2013; Edmonds & Moss, 2005; Edmonds, 2010). Yet, it is difficult to argue that a 
computational model, even with a very detailed cognitive structure, can provide 
something more that an idealised representation of the agent’s intention or the 
environment. The same does not necessarily happen with the KISS approach. If it 
is argued that abstract models allow capturing social mechanisms, in the sense of 
abstract robust structures identifiable across different phenomena, the KISS 
approach would be on a par with contemporary scientific structuralism (Kincaid, 
2008; Ross, 2008), which some consider a perfectly tenable form of realism, if 
not the only one (French & Ladyman, 2011; Massimi, 2011).  
It is not clear in computational social science how abstraction and idealisation 
are linked to models’ realism, nor how realism affects the explanatory features of 
models. The plea for empirically calibrated models certainly accounts for 
prediction, which is an important epistemological goal, but it fails as a general 
account of representation in agent-based modelling, and science in general. The 
lack of conceptualisation about how different explanatory goals are articulated in 
the use of agent-based modelling is due to the relative simplicity in the approach 
of computational social science to scientific explanation using-agent-based 
models. Defining modelling simply as a process of simplification and neglecting 
the three-place character of the relationship of representation leads to ground 
the link between source and target using misplaced criteria, such as realism. This 
mistake is readily visible when reviewing the diversity found in participatory 
modelling, an approach where users play a major role in the definition of the 
structural and functional aspects of the computer model (Barreteau et al., 2013). 
Models are not meant to have truth value, for abstraction and idealisation make 
them all false in some regard. That is what makes them models of something in 
the first place (Cummins, 2000; Mäki, 2010). The connection between the source 
and the target is mostly justified by the way models satisfy the explanatory needs 
of the knowing subject (Knuuttila & Merz, 2009; Suárez, 2010).  
Because of the three-place nature of the relationship of representation, an 
adequate conceptualisation of the connection between the model and the target 
requires a prior understanding of the epistemic goals behind the development 
and potential use of the model. This, at the same time, is strongly linked to the 
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structural and functional conditions of the practice of modelling. Defining what 
models are for within the context of computational social science requires a 
proper conceptualisation of the implications of using computational models. This 
area has not received enough attention, partly because of the relative 
philosophical novelty of computer simulation and the fact that most literature so 
far is based on equation-based models, which is the most common form of 
simulation in different areas of study in the natural, biological and social domain 
(Guala, 2002; Parker, 2013; Winsberg, 2010).    
Explaining with computational models 
One key aspect required to properly conceptualise the practice of modelling is 
the characterisation of the material context. To identify the way in which agent-
based modelling contributes to explanation and understanding in social science, 
both the material character of the method and the physical, human and social 
conditions on which the research is carried on should be analysed. Regarding the 
material character of agent-based modelling, the emphasis on inference suggests 
that computational social science conceives computer modelling as an abstract 
activity, closely resembling exact science (David et al., 2007; Edmonds & Hales, 
2005; Fetzer, 2001). This view, which has been traditionally popular in the field 
of computer science, neglects two aspects of the practice of social simulation. The 
first one is that is that the activity should be analysed in terms of its materiality 
i.e. the process of developing, implementing and using a model in a physical 
machine. The second one is that the key explanatory factor in computer 
simulation is the experimental character. 
Acknowledging the experimental character of agent-based modelling is 
fundamental to understand how hypotheses are generated and tested within the 
field. As said, explanation and understanding in computational social science 
cannot be linked to the inferential character of the simulation. The formal nature 
of computer programming, however, is important for it allows the articulation of 
an experimental setting in which controlled manipulation can be performed over 
the functional e.g. simulation parameters, and structural e.g. agent’s architecture, 
features of the simulation. The controlled character of the manipulation is 
   148 
provided in both cases by the modular underpinnings of computer programming. 
This gives the possibility to identify and isolate the implications of different 
variations or modifications on the execution of the program while, at the same 
time, making easier to identify and correct faults (David, 2013; Sargent, 2008). 
This is a fundamental feature from a experimental point of view, for modularity 
has been one of the key requirements of modern empirical science and has 
gained even more relevance in the study of complex adaptive systems (Callebaut, 
2005; Simon, 1996; Woodward, 2003b)  
For the experimental character to be properly conceptualised, however, it is 
necessary to understand the development and use of a simulation from an 
experimental perspective. Currently, significant emphasis is put on the transition 
from the conceptual to the computational model, both in computational social 
science and general simulation studies (Balci, 1997; David, 2009; Oberkampf & 
Roy, 2010; Ormerod & Rosewell, 2009). This transition, however, has been 
approached mostly as a linguistic transformation that could be formally verified, 
more than as the articulation of an instrumental setting (Parker, 2013; Winsberg, 
2010). Approaching this activity from the latter perspective can give insights 
regarding the philosophical assumptions that affect warrants for explanation.  
It has been argued, for example, that because simulations manipulate 
computational models, they do not have the same epistemological power as 
traditional experiments (Morgan, 2003) or that, because of the difference on the 
target of manipulation, experiments and simulations have different validation 
requirements (Guala, 2002). This, however, oversimplifies the philosophical 
character of experiments in different areas of science. One shared assumption 
between agent-based modelling and laboratory experiments in social science, for 
example, is that the social world can be explained, fully or to a certain extent, by 
individual action. This is a strong philosophical assumption, for it deprives non-
human material aspects of the social world of experimental relevance. In the 
same way, unlike most experiments in the real world, simulation allows altering 
some fundamental features of the real world, for example, time span of a human 
life can be significantly reduced or the laws of physics can be violated. Certainly 
all these modelling choices affect the warrants for explanation with agent-based 
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modelling. The explanatory features of the method cannot be correctly 
conceptualised if the connection between the representational and the 
experimental features of computational modelling are not addressed together 
(Barberousse et al., 2008; Parker, 2009; Winsberg, 2010).     
The materiality of computational simulation allows unveiling the connection 
between explanation and understanding in agent-based modelling. The 
experimental character is crucial for explanation, but its role in achieving 
understanding depends on the way the activity of computational modelling 
responds to different cognitive needs of the agents involved in the process. One 
activity that has received significant attention in the literature about social 
simulation is replication (Edmonds & Hales, 2003; Wilensky & Rand, 2007; 
Zhong & Kim, 2010). An interesting fact about this activity is that it has this dual 
epistemological value. It is considered both a trivial task, ideal for new entrants, 
and a difficult task with a significant contribution to the field (Rouchier et al., 
2008). The reason for this duality is closely connected to a matter of skill and 
cognitive needs. A new entrant trying to get familiar with the method can find 
replication useful for it allows skipping the process of conceptual modelling. 
Something very helpful, taking into account that successful conceptual modelling, 
both in terms of time invested and adequacy of the result, has shown to be 
strongly linked to skill and experience (Wang & Brooks, 2011; Willemain, 1994, 
1995). Additionally, replication also allows dismissing the problem of 
representation, for the original model is the target during a replication.  
An experienced researcher will find replication useful for the opposite reason. 
Results of the replication are meant to review, test and contrast the connection 
between the computational model, the conceptual model and the target of 
representation (Kitcher, 1993; Wilensky & Rand, 2007). Advances in knowledge 
are produced in this case because replication allows unveiling faults in these 
connections, which cannot be identified by just focusing on the original model 
and its interpretation alone. This approach requires more knowledge and skills 
than those shown by new entrants and even some regular practitioners. It 
requires, on one hand, a good command of the technique and, on the other, a 
good command of the theoretical-methodological background. Replication, from 
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this approach, can be a difficult practice for it leads to an inquiry about implicit 
assumptions of the model and the tacit knowledge involved in the practice of 
modelling as a whole (Collins, 2010; Edmonds & Hales, 2003; Goldman, 2002).  
The material character of the computer model also becomes and important 
resource in dealing with the epistemic opacity of the simulation. One key aspect 
for explanation using computer simulation is the visualisation. The way results 
are presented has an important epistemological status in science for it has a 
major role in the processes of interpretation and dissemination (Gooding, 2004; 
Kitcher, 1993; Wimsatt, 2007). In equation-based computer simulation, the 
epistemic opacity of the process has traditionally been accounted for using 
traditional statistical techniques, such as time sequences (Barberousse et al., 
2008). In agent-based modelling, because of the entity-based character of the 
simulation, in which agents and environment can be represented, simulations 
could also include a visualisation of the simulation world. In some simulations, 
such as simple models using cellular automata, the visualisation takes an 
additional explanatory role. It could be questioned, for example, whether the 
visualisation in agent-based modelling could help achieving understanding, 
without being able to match this understanding with an explanation (Lipton, 
2009). That is, in part, the assumption behind the involvement of different 
stakeholders in the simulation process in approaches such as participatory 
modelling (Barreteau et al., 2013).  These approaches might provide an excellent 
test bed for questions about understanding and explanation that are unique to 
computational social science due to the particular ways in which the 
visualisation can be devised.  
The visualisation is also important for it shows the way in which epistemic and 
non-epistemic goals are dealt with in computational social science. Not 
everything displayed in the visualisation is actually relevant for the operation of 
the model, but might be considered explanatory relevant or simply added to 
satisfy other non-epistemic values. Take the case of GIS. Currently, GIS and 
agent-based modelling present different levels of integration. The use of this 
graphic data does not necessarily mean there is a very stringent spatial 
representation underlying interaction (Crooks & Castle, 2012; Stanilov, 2012). 
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Sometimes it is just added because of the psychological effect of familiarity it 
adds to the visualisation or because it ends up being aesthetically pleasing. The 
effect of these non-functionally relevant elements becomes relevant when 
explanation and understanding are set in the wider context of the practice of 
computational modelling and its connections with other areas such as policy 
modelling. An aesthetically pleasing model can have a more positive effect on 
stakeholders, but makes it more difficult to separate understanding from the 
illusion of understanding, which would end up being a major issue if the model is 
meant to aid policy making. This question acquires more relevance looking into 
the future, for advances on computing urge practitioners to look into the 
relationship between agent-based modelling, virtual reality and serious and non-
serious games (Patel & Hudson-Smith, 2012; Zyda, 2005).      
Computational social science has neglected the fact that the problem-solving 
character of modelling requires understanding this activity as a three-place 
relationship, both in terms of what the model is of and what the model is for. The 
former points to the issue of representation. Failure in addressing the problem of 
representation from the three-place perspective has led to erroneously justify 
the connection between the source and the target using criteria such as realism. 
In turn, the lack of attention paid to the philosophical implications of the 
processes of abstraction and idealisation has not done much in solving the 
representation issues arising from the definition of the source and target as such. 
Regarding the use of models, computational social science has overemphasised 
the inferential character of simulation as the key feature of explanation. This 
approach, however, fails to provide a sufficient or necessary account of 
explanation and understanding, for it neither copes with multiple realisation nor 
provides a satisfactory solution for the epistemic opacity of the simulation.      
A proper account of understanding and explanation in computational social 
science needs to acknowledge the experimental underpinnings of the use of 
computational models, as well as the material conditions in which this 
manipulation takes place. This will provide insights regarding the way epistemic 
and non-epistemic values and goals are combined in the practice of agent-based 
modelling. The harm produced by the emphasis on inference should not be 
   152 
underestimated. Salmon (1984) suggested theories of explanation can be divided 
in three major categories: modal, ontic and the epistemic. Putting it simply, the 
modal focuses on what is possible. It explains by showing that, given the 
circumstances, a phenomenon needed to happen. The ontic focuses on patterns. 
It explains by showing how a phenomenon fits into a discernible pattern. Finally, 
the epistemic focuses on nomic expectability. It explains by showing how the 
given phenomenon was expected, according to some laws of nature. Because of 
its focus on inference, the generative paradigm should be classified within the 
epistemic category, along with the syntactic model of logical positivism. Although 
there is no appeal to laws, there is an appeal to algorithmic deduction. 
Phenomena are meant to be explained by the fact that they are considered 
expected, given the rules of inference that dominate computer programming.  
The generative paradigm not only shares with logical positivism the semantic 
approach to explanation. It shares, as well, the reluctance to inquiry about the 
role of causation in explanation. Logical positivism rejected the idea of taking 
causation as a primitive concept of explanation. Although the concept of cause 
was sometimes used, the account was not committed to a notion of causation 
beyond one that can be always reformulated as subsumption under working 
laws (Hempel, 2001). Computational social science has not rejected causation, 
but has not provided a robust account of it either. The vagueness and ambiguity 
in the approach, as it will be shown below, end up undermining the possibility to 
understand causal relationships with the use of agent-based models.    
Causation 
Causation is one of the most widespread notions underlying intuitions about 
explanation. Explanation and causal explanation are used interchangeably in 
many cases and, for some approaches in natural and social science, causal 
explanations are not only considered standard, but also the most robust form of 
scientific explanation (Elster, 2007; Hedström, 2005; Salmon, 1998; Woodward, 
2003b). Although the ubiquitousness of causation and the significant divergence 
in different philosophical and scientific accounts of it has led some, such as 
logical positivist, to reject the idea of causation, the concept is still pervasive in 
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science and philosophy of explanation. First, because causal thinking seems to be 
connected with basic perceptual and cognitive processes (Danks, 2010; 
Woodward, 2011a) and, second, because the current philosophy of causation has 
given up on the idea of identifying a metaphysical foundation of causation, which 
was supposed to help introducing the concept as primitive in a theory of 
explanation (Hitchcock, 2007b; Woodward, 2003b).        
The references to causation in computational social science are scarce and 
usually linked to basic intuitions or platitudes about causation. Among the few 
references to causation in computational social science, two major influences can 
be identified. The first suggests agent-based models are causal because they 
enquire about the causal effects of individual action (e.g. Tesfatsion, 2006); the 
second one suggests causation is linked to the process of generation as such (e.g. 
Epstein, 1999). The analysis of action, as mentioned, has had a significant 
influence in the conceptualisation of explanation and understanding in social 
science. Not all action-oriented accounts in social science consider explanation 
should, or can, be causal (Joas, 1996; Stones, 2009). In those in which causation 
is considered important, the locus of causation is considered to be in the 
connection between intention and action. This is the case both for those accounts 
in which action is approached as a strategic-decision making, without 
emphasising much on intentionality, as well as those focusing on the real 
motivation behind the performance of the action (Helle, 1985; Winch, 1990). In 
spite of the implications this difference has for the conceptualisation of 
explanation and understanding, in terms of causality both accounts strongly rely 
on the assumption that the social world is constituted by the consequences of 
individual action. This assumption is at the core of the interpretation of action in 
causal terms.  
The action-oriented approach to causation has some inherent difficulties that go 
beyond its use in agent-based modelling, especially in its application to social 
sciences (Sehon, 2007; Sintonen, 1989; Woodward, 2003b). For the case of 
computational social science in particular, the problem is that, despite the fact 
that agent causation satisfies the individualist approach to the micro-macro 
tension developed in the discipline, it does not provide an illuminating 
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interpretation of causation in terms of intentions, which is the key assumption 
behind these accounts (Weber, 1978). Agent-based modelling uses a very diverse 
set of cognitive assumptions governing agent’s decision-making. Some of these 
assumptions, such as the ones in the non-symbolic paradigm, are full 
idealisations, sometimes even brought from other domains, such as biology 
(Axelrod, 1997b; Gilbert, 2008). While these decision-making architectures allow 
reproducing macropatterns, they do not provide any useful information about 
agent’s intentionality so as to satisfy these action-oriented approaches of 
explanation.  
It could be argued that even without a realistic representation of intention the 
method shows the causal effectiveness of action, as Schelling (1978) does by 
framing the tipping model within his methodological individualist approach, and 
that, in principle, there are no limitations for more accurate representations. 
This claim, however, misses two important points. First, suggesting that agent-
based modelling provides ontological support for a notion of effective agent 
causation neglects the fact that the plausibility of this claim rests on a proper 
conceptualisation of the representational and material aspects of the method. 
These two aspects, however, have not been properly addressed in computational 
social science. Second, the fact that models without a proper representation of 
intentionality provide proper explanations raises the question about the causal 
relevance of intentionality in the first place. If the output of these models is 
considered plausible, intentionality should not be given more than a 
contributory causal role, if any at all. This, however, goes against the basic 
assumption of action-oriented accounts of causation.       
The idea of a link between causation and generation, on the other hand, has been 
present in different realist approaches to the philosophy of science since the 
second part of the twentieth century (e.g Bhaskar, 1998; Bunge, 2004b; Harré, 
1985). Yet, it was not until Salmon’s (1984) causal-mechanical approach that the 
notion of generation was properly articulated into an explicit framework of 
causal explanation. Salmon developed an account in which explanation is meant 
to unveil patterns or mechanisms produced by ‘contact’ forces between bodies 
or entities. The analysis was meant to focus on the spatiotemporal character of 
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these patterns and the structural changes produced by those contact forces. 
Salmon’s causal mechanism received significant criticism, especially because of 
its notion of causal transmission. It is not usually considered a tenable 
alternative as theory of causation, especially for the social sciences (Hedström & 
Ylikoski, 2010; Hitchcock, 1995; Woodward, 2003b). In spite of the demise of the 
causal-mechanical framework, the notion of generation has remained strongly 
linked to the notions of process and mechanism.  
Computational social science seems to have picked the idea of generation from 
this philosophical approach, although the notion “generative” used to name the 
paradigm was inspired by the use of the concept Chomsky makes in linguistics 
(Epstein, 1999). In most recent literature, the notion has been linked to the 
philosophical account of generation, especially to the contemporary mechanist 
movement, which has developed partly by redefining the tenets of Salmon’s 
account (Elsenbroich, 2012; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Manzo, 2007b; 
Squazzoni, 2012). In general, however, the approach to causal generation in the 
field has remained closely linked to a narrow view of generation as 
computational inference. Causation, under this view, is considered to have 
algorithmic foundations, due to the fact that, in computer modelling, a 
simulation’s outcome depends inferentially on the rules of action built into the 
model (Doreian, 2001; Epstein, 1999).  
Generation as such, however, fails as an account of causation for the same 
reasons it fails as an approach to explanation: the epistemic opacity of the 
simulation. A proper account of causation should be illuminating about the 
connection between cause and effect. Although the formal character of the 
simulation links formally the successive steps of a simulation, using this link as a 
criterion of causation is not useful, for it can only explain causation in terms of 
expectation i.e. one step makes the next step expectable, according to the specific 
values of the entities and the rules of transition. Yet, expectability, as can be seen 
from logical positivism, is a weak criterion of causation, for it allows dispensing 
with the criterion of causation altogether, since expectability fails to grasp the 
basic aspects of widespread intuitions about causation (Salmon, 1998; 
Woodward, 2003b). In computational social science, one such intuition is that 
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the processual aspect of the simulation is causally relevant. This is due partly to 
the important epistemological value attached to it. A micro to macro transition is 
meant to be a qualitative transition that depends on the accumulated effects of 
individual actions. As it will be shown below, the processual aspect of the 
simulation can indeed be given an important causal role. Yet, this is only possible 
if the causation in computational social science is approached from a different 
perspective.  
Despite the limitation in the approach to action-oriented and generative 
causation in computational social science, agent-based modelling can still be said 
to account for causation in another more interesting way. For that, the focus of 
causality should shift from action and inference to the experimental and material 
character of the simulation. Additionally, causation should stop being conceived 
as a matter of expectability. Once these two changes are made, the practice of 
agent-based modelling can be reoriented to become a search for causal 
explanations through interventions and the inquiry on mechanism, which are 
two popular accounts of causation in contemporary philosophy (Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen, 2005; Machamer et al., 2000; Woodward, 2003b, 2004). These 
accounts have been presented as competing approaches to causal explanation in 
some context, including computational social science (Elsenbroich, 2012; 
Waskan, 2011). The two aim at different aspects of the causal relationship. Yet, 
this difference actually makes them complementary. This becomes visible in 
their application to the practice of agent-based modelling.  
The interventionist account of causation incorporates features of manipulative 
and counterfactual accounts. From the former, it takes the idea that causal 
relationships can be unveiled by manipulation of the cause (Menzies & Price, 
1993). From the latter, they take the idea that the semantic structure of 
counterfactual reasoning can capture the manipulative character of the 
manipulations. The notion ‘manipulation’, however, is replaced by ‘intervention’. 
Both notions refer to isolation of the causal pathway from causes to effects. The 
notion of intervention, however, is devised as a heuristic notion. It diverges from 
the traditional ideal of manipulation in the sense that it is established 
counterfactually and does not rely on a reductive notion of agentic manipulation 
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(Woodward, 2003b). This allows for causal analysis of situations in which no 
intervention occurs, either human or natural, and situations in which an 
intervention is not possible.   
Computational social science provides important methodological advantages in 
the study of causal interventions. The fact that it uses an artificial society makes 
all interventions, in principle, possible. The anthropocentric character negatively 
associated with traditional accounts of manipulative causation is also absent, 
because, for the artificial system, the researcher is in the position of omniscient 
observer. The fact that the research is carried on using computer models also 
helps overcoming two criticisms of interventionist accounts of causation. The 
first one regards reflexivity of the agents being intervened (Goldthorpe, 2000; 
Woodward, 2007b). Because research is made using an artificial society, there is 
no awareness by the agents regarding the magnitude and character of an 
intervention. The second criticism regards the modularity of the real world. 
Interventionists, and manipulative accounts in general, are criticised because 
there is never certainty about whether a causal pathway between the cause and 
the effect has been entirely isolated (Bogen, 2004; Goldthorpe, 2000; Woodward, 
2007a). The modular character of computer programming, however, provides a 
way to guarantee this isolation in the structural and functional features of the 
simulation, which make them amenable for controlled manipulation (David, 
2013; Simon, 1996).  
The counterfactual part of the interventionist accounts is important for it deals 
with the semantic aspect of the causal relationship, which is crucial for an 
account of causality in social science. One of the reasons why causality is 
neglected in computational and mainstream social science is that it is usually 
considered to be a matter of generalisation. That is the approach to causation 
which has traditionally dominated in social science (Barringer, Eliason, & 
Leahey, 2013; Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). Counterfactuals theories of causation, 
however, became popular because they allow focusing on the causal processes 
underlying singular cases, or token-causation, as it is usually referred to in the 
philosophical literature (Lewis, 2001; Woodward, 2003b). In the interventionist 
account, causal relationships are those that remain invariant under intervention. 
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Invariance is a modal notion meant to identify the strength of the causal link, 
though the identification of those circumstances in which the effect still obtains, 
despite intervention (Woodward, 2003b). In that sense, it still allows for 
spatiotemporal-variance. 
The notion of invariance formulated in the way described above seems appealing 
for social science if the aim is to acknowledge for the contextual dimension of 
social phenomena. It overcomes a widespread discomfort with nomological 
generalisation in social disciplines, while still allowing for the inclusion of the 
formalism of causal analysis in social science. Historical and geographical context 
have proven to be important elements when studying the possible extent of a 
generalisation in social science. While there is a significant amount of literature 
suggesting and strong connection between economic development and 
democracy (Robinson, 2006), a significant portion of Latin American countries in 
the sixties and seventies followed the opposite path. Several dictatorships 
emerged in the region when the countries where facing periods of significant 
economic development (O’Donnell, 1979). This type of spatiotemporal 
specificity, far from redundant or unnecessary, is an important element to unveil 
the nature of this causal relationship (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán, 2003).     
Invariance identifies both the strength and the scope of the causal connection, 
but it is also dependent on the level of sensitivity to changes in the background 
conditions (Woodward, 2006). The interventionist account significantly relies   
on context, for successful identification of the effect of interventions is 
contingent on the conceptualisation of the counterfactual dependence and 
background conditions. Schelling’s (1971) model is usually understood in terms 
of the effect i.e. counterfactual relevance, of individual preferences on 
segregation as a dynamic or a pattern. Yet, it makes a difference for the study of 
preferences whether, for example, these are analysed spatially (Reardon & 
O’Sullivan, 2004), if they are taken to be a continuous or step function (Bruch & 
Mare, 2009) or if the preferences are for or against segregation (Macy, Centola, 
Flache, van de Rijt, & Willer, 2011). If the focus is on the spatial character of 
segregation, counterfactual dependence will be intervened on issues such as the 
neighbourhood size or whether relocation made following ecological conditions. 
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In that case, the function of the preference might be taken as a background 
condition.  
The strong contextual dependence makes the interventionist account highly 
reliant on the practice of modelling in computational social science. 
Representation is fundamental, for structural features of the model underlie the 
delimitation of the nature and scope of invariance, as well as the difference 
between background and causal conditions. The experimental use of the model is 
also fundamental, for interventions have to be tested through counterfactual 
exploration of response space. Because of the focus on inference, the 
experimental nature of the model is usually approached as an issue of validation, 
in terms of benchmarking. That is why, for example, calibration is usually 
subordinated to verification or validation (e.g. Louie & Carley, 2008; Squazzoni, 
2012; Windrum et al., 2007). The interventionist account of causation needs this 
experimental character to take centre stage as an explanatory resource. Agent-
based modelling can unveil causal relations through interventions when these 
are meant to help identifying the different counterfactual implications of 
structural and parametric modifications.  
An additional advantage of agent-based modelling is that it provides a way to 
explain this counterfactual dependence processually. The intuitions about the 
explanatory and causal relevance of the processual character of the simulation 
can be better accounted for by linking the agenda of computational social science 
to the agenda of contemporary mechanism in the philosophy of science. 
Contemporary mechanism is a processual account of explanation, based on the 
analysis of ‘mechanism’ as “[…] entities and activities organised such that they 
are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination 
conditions” (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3). There are two fundamental elements of 
this approach worth mentioning: the notions of activity and production. The first 
one is meant to set mechanisms apart from static entity-based approaches to 
explanation, in which processes are reduced to changes in properties. This is 
done by the implementation of a double ontology of entities and activities 
(Glennan, 2010; Illari & Williamson, 2013; Tabery, 2004). This leads to focus the 
analysis of the latter in terms of production, which is the other interesting aspect 
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of this account of explanation. The wider metaphysical base of agent-based 
models, which includes human and non-human entities, combined with the 
dynamic aspect of the simulation, can be used to explore this double ontology 
and, in particular, the role of activities.  
The key ontological aspect for the conceptualisation of activities is the notion of 
production. This notion has been closely associated to folk accounts of causation, 
but has failed to be properly articulated into the traditional philosophical 
analysis of the term, for it does not fit the metaphysical underpinnings of the 
programme (Anscombe, 1993; Danks, 2010; Illari, 2010). Yet, the shift to a more 
scientifically based approach to causation, in which causal primitivism is not 
needed, has allowed for a better conceptualisation of production and its 
connection with causation (Hitchcock, 2007b; Illari, 2010; Woodward, 2003b). 
Production has to do with capturing the real metaphysical character of the 
changes the cause produces on the effect, instead of just some kind of essence of 
it. It comes from folk accounts of causation, for production is something 
accountable by experience in everyday life. It is captured by verbs used in 
natural language to describe causal relations e.g. ‘I moved the table’.  Production 
is rare in social science, for process is usually accounted for by probability-based 
state transitions. Agent-based models, however, can account for production in 
the sense that agents interact with one another and the space. Changes can be 
metaphysically linked to this interaction, instead of probability. The processual 
aspect of the simulation is important for explanation because the phenomenon 
or pattern produced is the result of actual interaction between entities in the 
model. 
This embeddedness of interaction, in combination with the experimental 
character of computational simulation, can make agent-based modelling an 
excellent tool for the analysis of causation. By focusing on interventions and 
mechanisms, agent-based modelling provides an option for bridging the gap 
between the two big major accounts of causation: difference-making and 
processes (Campaner & Galavotti, 2010; Craver, 2009; Woodward, 2011b, 
2013b). For this, however, apart from the conceptual changes, some 
methodological changes are also necessary. The simulation as such is still in 
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many cases treated as a black box, for most of the attention is paid to on the 
initial and final conditions, mostly because of validation concerns. The 
relationship between explanation, causation and validation is a complex one. 
Grüne-Yanoff (2008) suggests computer simulations cannot provide causal 
explanations in social science for these simulations cannot be completely 
validated. Yet, it is not the validation of a specific simulation that determines its 
causal relevance, but its contribution to and accomodation of the knowledge 
about the counterfactual dependence of that particular phenomenon.  
The research programme of segregation dynamics constitutes a paradigmatic 
example. There is a robust research programme on the analysis of segregation as 
an abstract dynamic in social and spatial dimensions (Bruch & Mare, 2009; 
Fossett & Dietrich, 2009). Agent-based models help rendering this phenomenon 
illuminating by providing a formal experimental setting in which the basic 
features of these self-reinforcing processes can be tested. Three aspects have to 
be mentioned: First, it is clear that there is a connection between the simplicity 
of the model and the possibility to unveil causal connections. Intricate models, 
even with the modular advantage provided by computer simulation, can make it 
impossible to identify these connections. Second, practitioners have to pay more 
attention to the dynamics as such, trying to reduce the epistemic opacity. 
Counterfactual understanding about the process can be reduced by the simple 
implementation of longitudinal indexes and indicators. Other options, such as the 
visual exploration of the simulation’s response to interventions while the model 
is running can be of help. Finally, progress in computational social science 
requires a conceptualisation of representation in modelling, for this directly 
affects warrants about validation. Although the use of computational models 
puts a significant weight on the establishment of empirical links, the approach to 
this problem has led to a misrepresentation of the different aspects involved and 
their importance.  
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Conclusion  
This chapter has addressed the topic of explanation in computational social 
science. The first section showed that, despite widespread agreement on the 
crucial role played by explanation in science, traditional philosophy of science 
has neglected the role of non-epistemic values and goals of explanation, such as 
aesthetics. Acknowledging the existence of these non-epistemic aspects allows 
distinguishing between explanation and understanding. The crucial difference 
between the two is that understanding always needs to be conceptualised in 
terms of the cognitive changes in the knowing subject. This is clear, for example, 
in interpretative action-oriented social science, where explanation is developed 
as inquiry on intentionality.  
The second section compared the approaches to explanation in computational 
social science and general philosophy of science. It was shown that the 
epistemological features of computational modelling have not been properly 
addressed in the former. Computational social science has developed an account 
of explanation that emphasises the inferential approach of the simulation, which 
renders the account untenable. The third and fourth sections addressed how to 
overcome this limitation. They discussed the key epistemological foundations for 
a theory of explanation in computational social science. In the third section it 
was argued that computational social science has not produced a robust account 
of representation. Additionally, it has neglected the three-place nature of this 
relationship. This has led to a misconception of abstraction and idealisation and 
to the use of erroneous criteria to justify the connection between the source and 
the target.  The fourth section suggested that computational social science has 
also failed to acknowledge the three-place character of models as problem-
solving tools and the way this affects the explanatory goals behind the use of 
computational models of social phenomena. The experimental and material 
aspects of computer simulations were identified as crucial for understanding and 
explanation in computational social science.  
The last section focused separately on the topic of causation. Causation is usually 
taken as a fundamental criterion of explanation, but computational social science 
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has failed to provide a robust account of causation and has usually addressed it 
in terms of agent causation or formal inference. Both approaches were shown to 
be inadequate. The former because intention is not crucial for explanation with 
agent-based models; the latter because of the epistemic opacity of the simulation 
makes the inference unintelligible. It was claimed, however, that agent-based 
models could still be used to enquiry about causal relationships in social 
phenomena when causation is interpreted in terms of interventions and 
mechanisms. Both of these popular accounts of causation in contemporary 
philosophy find useful correlates in agent-based modelling when the methods is 
approached from an experimental point of view. For this causal approach to 
work, however, the problems of representation and materiality of computer 
models should be properly conceptualised. Additional issues with data 
production and theorisation should also be addressed.       
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Agency, Action and Interaction 
Computational social science has been constituted as a practice-oriented area of 
inquiry, with the development of the field revolving around the use of agent-
based modelling methodology. This empirical focus has pushed theoretical 
concerns into the background, a position reinforced by the lack of a theoretical 
common ground between practitioners. Theoretical development on the field is 
predominantly case-oriented and only a few basic theoretical principles have 
widespread acceptance. 
The lack of a comprehensive theoretical framework might be taken as a sign of 
the diversity within the field. While this claim is true to a certain extent, a deeper 
inquiry points to overlooked theoretical issues associated with the methodology. 
As Abbott puts it, “[a]ny methodological strategy (what we might call 
Methodology with capital “M”) brings with it general constraints that are, 
properly speaking, theoretical. Since any social methodology must parse the 
social world in particular ways, it must contain elements of an implicit social 
theory” (2001b, p. 189). It is the discussion about these implicit theoretical 
assumptions that agent-based modelling lacks. Most of the implicit social theory 
associated with agent-based modelling has been directly translated from 
traditional social methods or slightly adapted, following traditional theoretical-
methodological discussions, such as the methodological individualism-
collectivism/holism debate.   
This chapter will focus on three entwined concepts that have produced long-
lasting discussion in social science: agency, action and interaction. It will focus on 
what could be labelled as the layered model of agency, action and interaction, on 
which theoretical dependence is represented through hierarchical levels. The 
concept of agency has played a predominant role in social explanation and is 
naturally placed at the bottom of the model, serving as the core foundation. 
‘Agency’ has diverse philosophical roots that have been translated in a 
multiplicity of ways to social theory and methods. In computational social 
science in particular, as it will be discussed later, the understanding and use of 
the concept has followed traditional social dualisms. The concept of action, on 
   165 
the other hand, is closely connected to that of agency. As with agency, there has 
been a long historical theorisation on the concept of action, although modern 
understanding in social science commonly conceive it as the ‘medium’ through 
which agency is exerted. It is for this reason that the concept of action has had 
significant relevance when it comes to formalisation and operationalisation of 
agency. It is naturally one step below in terms of theoretical importance, for the 
heuristics of action always depend on philosophical principles regarding agency. 
Finally, interaction is usually taken as the case of reciprocation of action between 
two or more individuals. While the concept of interaction is conceptually more 
complex than the concept of action, the subordination of the former to the latter 
obeys a presumption of reduction, either in practice or in principle, derived from 
a specific worldview that has prevailed in social science’s theoretical-
methodological principles since the XVIII century.  
While the concept of agency has received significant attention in computational 
social science because of its foundational character, the concepts of action and 
interaction have not received an equal treatment. Yet, because of the bottom-up, 
entity-based and interactive character of agent-based modelling, computational 
social science has implicitly adopted this layered model of agency, action and 
interaction. The chapter analyses the implications of this decision. The 
argumentation has a twofold character: on one side, it shows that the layered 
model presupposes important assumptions that are ill-suited to understand and 
describe the way agent-based modelling works; on the other side, it discusses 
the way agent-based modelling can help improving the theoretical 
understanding of these three concepts, both in computational and mainstream 
social science.  
The text will be divided as follows: the first section presents a general review of 
the way the concept of agency has been approached in computational social 
science. It discusses the methodological foundations of the concept in the field 
and its consistency with the principles of the micro-macro distinction. Next, the 
concept of action is approached. Its theoretical principles and its connection to 
measurement are assessed, paying special attention to its role in agent-based 
modelling. Finally, the subordinated character of interaction and its role in social 
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analysis are reconsidered, following the insights of contemporary social theory. 
Implications for agent-based modelling are then derived.  
Agency: Rationality and reductionism 
In this first section the approaches to agency in computational social science will 
be discussed. It will be shown that, while there are key common aspects about 
which most practitioners agree, important theoretical elements of the concept of 
agency have been oversimplified. The section will describe how the approach to 
social agency in the field developed initially from two sources: the concern on 
computational agency in simulation and artificial intelligence and the increasing 
interest in complexity and emergence theories. It will later discuss how the 
transfer of this concern to social science led to an alleged support of 
methodological individualism. The plausibility of this assumption will be 
assessed.    
The emergence of computational simulation methods in social science is usually 
understood as a three-stage process. Although these stages can be ordered in 
temporal succession, all of them are still common in different areas of social 
research (Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005; Macy & Willer, 
2002). The first two approaches, macrosimulation, or system dynamics, and 
microsimulation, are both equation-based information-processing methods. The 
former, originated during the sixties, focuses on social dynamics from a top-
down perspective, taking the system as a whole. The equations are set to 
represent causal connections between systemic attributes. Throughout the 
simulation, values of variables are recalculated at every step, depending on the 
changes experienced by those variables engaged on causal relationships. The 
latter, popularised in the following decade, employs the opposite modelling 
approach: bottom-up. System variables are substituted by individual variables. 
Social aggregations, such as households or organisations, as well as individual 
actors have been taken as units of analysis in microsimulation models. Unlike the 
macrosimulation approach, in microsimulation models individual attributes 
experience changes over time according to transition rules recalculated at every 
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step. Macro values in these models are obtained by an aggregated sample of 
individual results, representing the total population.  
Agent-based modelling, located historically in the eighties, also uses a bottom-up 
approach. It differs from microsimulation in that units in the model have the 
possibility to interact. It is distinguished from both of the previous approaches in 
that the representation is not grounded on equations, but in a one-to-one 
ontological correspondence between the objects and relations in the model with 
those in real life. Different entities of the world, such as individuals, tools, natural 
resources and the environment can be included as part of the model, naturally, at 
a given level of abstraction. Computer code is syntactically and semantically 
richer than mathematics and allows for a much more complex representation of 
agents’ cognitive, biological and relational features in a formalised way (Gilbert, 
2008). This gave significant opportunities to deepen the discussion about action 
and agency that was latent during the early nineties in the wider areas of 
artificial intelligence and cognitive science (Conte & Castelfranchi, 1995; 
Wooldridge & Jenning, 1995).         
The concept of ‘agent’ was initially not elaborated theoretically and was not 
entirely analogous to the one in social science. It was, instead, a concept 
approached in an operational fashion, related mostly to the possibilities and 
limitations of programming languages (Fisher & Wooldridge, 1995; Moulin & 
Chaib-Draa, 1996). Agents were conceived as self-contained programs or portion 
of code, capable of executing certain tasks or performing certain actions, 
according to the evaluation of the surroundings and a set of internal processing 
rules. Different agent architectures, either using symbolic e.g. production 
systems, non-symbolic e.g. neural nets, and hybrid representations allowed this 
to be done in a multiplicity of ways. Agent-based modelling became a particularly 
useful research tool in social simulation for it provides tools to endow agents 
with heterogeneous and adaptive features. This opened the possibility of 
exploring a much wider range of social phenomena than traditional simulation 
methodologies. This range was also increased by two other important features of 
these computer models: first, agents could be coded so to make them operate 
autonomously, that is, without following a predefined central command; second, 
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behaviour was usually determined by a small set of simple rules (Conte & 
Castelfranchi, 1995; Gilbert, 2008). 
As the inquiry on the theoretical foundations of agent-based modelling 
developed in computational social science, the concern for agency was replaced 
by a wider concern about the connection between individual action, interaction 
and social emergent phenomena. The processual aspect of computer simulations 
was considered the main factor allowing the unveiling of the character of the 
linkage (Gilbert, 2000; Hartmann, 1996). Social simulation was thought of as 
working under the principle that a population of autonomous and heterogeneous 
agents would, based on simple behavioural rules, engage in a recurrent adaptive 
interaction with the environment and between each other, producing a stable 
social pattern. The theoretical foundations for this processual and interactive 
view in agent-based modelling came from two separate but complementary 
frameworks. First, there was the renewed and more philosophically refined 
theory of emergence (Bedau & Humphreys, 2008; Clayton & Davies, 2006), 
which became key for the conceptualisation of the connection between levels; 
second,  there was the much more comprehensive complexity theory (Holland, 
1995; Miller & Page, 2007). Through its focus on the dynamic aspects of 
processes, such as path dependence and non-linearity, the complexity theory 
framework could provide an account of how complex social patterns emerge 
from simple individual interactions (Axelrod, 1997b; Epstein & Axtell, 1996; 
Gilbert, 1995; Goldspink, 2002).  
When a social analogue for this wider multidisciplinary framework was sought, 
the micro-macro and agency-structure dualisms took a central role (Goldspink & 
Kay, 2004; Sawyer, 2003). The micro-macro and the agency-structure tensions 
have been normally taken as the more comprehensive expressions of traditional 
dualisms in social science. All others dualisms e.g. individual-society, subjective-
objective, free will-determinism are usually looked at through the micro-
macro/agency-structure lens. Although important differences could be found 
between the micro-macro and the agency structure dualisms, both accounts have 
been commonly understood as the American and the European accounts, 
respectively, of the problem pertaining to the constitution and character of social 
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phenomena (Alexander & Giesen, 1987; Barnes, 2003). In its approach to these 
dualisms, computational social science has followed the widespread 
understanding of the tensions as an inquiry about connections between and 
within different levels of social reality (Axelrod, 1997a; Epstein & Axtell, 1996; 
Macy & Flache, 2009). The influence of complexity and emergence theories led 
computational social science to emphasise the bottom-up character of social 
phenomena and the importance of inquiring about the constitution and features 
of the microfoundations.   
Computational social science has enquired about microfoundations in a wide 
range of topics of interest for social science (Heath et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 
2009; Squazzoni, 2010). Yet, due to the empirical character of computational 
social science, much of the debate regarding the microfoundations of social 
phenomena has been carried out following another important dualism in social 
science: methodological individualism-methodological holism. Despite the 
‘methodological’ in its name, this is a dualism that merges the methodological, 
the ontological and the epistemological. Ontologically, the dichotomy has put 
particular emphasis on the primary object of explanation i.e. the 
microfoundations. Classical methodological individualism claims that only 
individuals and their actions are needed to explain social phenomena, whereas 
holist positions claim some sort of supraindividual entity or power should play a 
role in explanation (Alexander & Giesen, 1987; Knorr-Cetina, 1981a). The former 
has usually been understood in terms of bottom-up explanation, starting from 
individuals as microconstituents, whereas the latter has been understood as top 
down or same level explanations, moving down from macrocomponents or 
states. Because of bottom-up nature of agent-based modelling and the theoretical 
predominance of a weak notion of emergence i.e. one where the higher levels are 
thought to be reduced, at least in principle, there is a relatively wide consensus 
in that “[a]gent-based modelling contributes to the research program of 
methodological individualism” (Neumann, 2008).    
Once the discussion about agent-based modelling moved from foundational to 
empirical matters, following a natural process of maturation of the field (Meyer 
et al., 2009), the perspective on the micro-macro/agency-structure changed: It 
   170 
became reductionist. Literature on linking or synthesising accounts of micro-
macro tension has been outnumbered in computational social science by 
literature emphasising the importance of purposive and rational action (Meyer 
et al., 2009). Social dualisms are taken more seriously in sociology than in any 
other social discipline. Historically, the discipline has provided a large amount of 
macro or synthesising theories (Alexander & Giesen, 1987; Archer, 1996). Yet, 
even sociologically oriented accounts of agent-based modelling tend to be 
reductive. Macy and Willer’s (2002) popular survey about sociologically 
grounded social simulation is made under the assumption that “Agent-based 
modelling is a new tool for theoretical research at the relational level, with 
particular relevance for sociologists as a bridge between the micro and macro 
level” (2002: 162). A review of the models presented shows that research in the 
two areas identified: the development of social structures and the constitution of 
social order, is dominated by game theory, an approach that is closer to the 
philosophical principles of methodological individualism. In most models, no 
systematic effort to link the case analysed with any major previous development 
in the micro-macro/agency-structure literature can be seen. Some widely 
discussed aspects, such as the reproduction of social life, is only mentioned 
explicitly by one of the articles reviewed (Cohen, Riolo, & Axelrod, 2001), even 
though agent-based modelling, because of its process oriented character, should 
potentially have a lot to say about this issue. 
Taking this latest empirical development as a support to traditional 
methodological individualism is, however, both unnecessary and misleading. The 
approach to agency of methodological individualism is grounded on two 
principles: a strong notion of causal and ontological reduction and a reliance on 
an account of individual rationality as the crucial factor to understand individual 
behaviour (Udehn, 2001). These two principles have proven helpful in social 
science, especially in quantitative research, due to the important philosophical 
restrictions and assumptions with which social methodology has historically 
developed (Abbott, 2001b; Udehn, 2001). Agent-based modelling, however, is 
not constrained by these restrictions and assumptions. Agents in these models 
need not be rational. “[T]he challenge is usually not to limit the rationality of 
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agents but to extend their intelligence to the point where they could make 
decisions of the same sophistication as is commonplace among people.” (Gilbert, 
2008: 16) This exploration in computational social science, however, has not 
become an inquiry on the cognitive properties of a ‘rational action’. Since agent-
based modelling does not have the analytical restrictions of other methodologies, 
several accounts of rationality governing agents’ behaviour can be used, without 
the burden of the traditional conception of rationality. Axelrod (1997), for 
example, expands on his initial approach to the emergence of cooperation by 
introducing adaptive evolutionary processes. These involved learning as an 
individual decision-making mechanism, but also reproduction as a population 
level constraint. Whereas the former could be achieved with low rationality 
requirements, the latter included a biological aspect that goes beyond a matter of 
individual choice.    
The reductionism principle also seems ill-suited to describe the way agent-based 
models work. Taking individuals and their actions as the locus of causation and 
explanation has gained ground in social science because of its advantages for 
quantification. Formalisation and operationalisation can be performed in a more 
straightforward way (Abbott, 1997; Esser, 1996; Hausman, 2005). At the same 
time, the philosophical principles of materialism and realism of contemporary 
science allegedly rule out the possibility of giving ontological and causal status to 
social properties or entities (Demeulenaere, 2011; Hedström, 2005). While 
certainly the use of non-properly delineated social entities or powers seems like 
an approach to social explanation to be avoided, depicting the opposition 
between individualism and holism/collectivism using straightforward 
reductionism neglects some important theoretical aspects of social dualisms.  
Take the case of game theory, an increasingly popular approach in contemporary 
science and agent-based modelling (Gintis, 2009a; Macy & Willer, 2002; Meyer et 
al., 2009). Most social theoretical foundations of game theory come from 
economics and psychology. In economics, von Neumann & Morgenstern’s (1953) 
seminal work laid the ground for social applications of games, and, at the same 
time, rooted the approach in the neoclassical assumption of individual rationality 
and utility satisfaction driven action. On the other hand, following a disciplinary 
   172 
concern with internal mechanisms of decision-making, psychological research 
focused especially on the empirical contrast of these behavioral assumptions 
(Pruitt, 1967; Scodel, Minas, Ratoosh, & Lipetz, 1959) and the cognitive and 
behavioural challenges individuals face when involved in social dilemmas (e.g. 
Platt's (1973) notion of social trap). 
Several advances have been made since the 1950s in the theoretical foundations 
of game theory in social science, as well as in its applications. In 
conceptualisation of agency, the notion of bounded rationality was the major 
breakthrough, for it not only added realism, but also expanded the possible 
applications (Grüne-Yanoff, 2007; Simon, 1986). Likewise, disciplinary areas 
such as political science have become an important empirical testing ground for 
game theory’s assumptions. Axelrod’s (1984) foundational research comes from 
this field. Despite all these improvements, the theoretical foundations of game 
theory have always remained very micro-oriented. The macro characterisation 
of social phenomena is given by the structural or procedural dispositions of the 
game itself. Yet, if there is anything in game theory that resembles what it is 
usually been understood in sociology as ‘structures’, is the rules of the games 
(Fararo, 1984; Gelman, 2009). Rules in games, however, are imposed and 
assumed in advance. While game theory models allow grasping important 
features of the structuring character of social phenomena, important elements of 
the processes are taken as given. Claiming success in causal and ontological 
reduction in such cases might be unwarranted.  
In turn, taking game theory as a support of methodological individualism just 
because of its emphasis on individual decision-making misrepresents the scope 
and implications of the methodological agenda of game theory in social science. 
Two elements are worth mentioning here. First, most contemporary 
practitioners of game theory “are not theorists, but rather experimentalists. With 
few exceptions, they do not provide, nor aim to provide, cogent models for the 
phenomena they discover” (Gintis, 2011, p. 97). Strategic behaviour in 
contemporary game theory has more to do with fitting or hypothesising about 
certain parameters than with explaining them (Camerer, 2011; Grüne-Yanoff, 
2011). Second, social elements underpinning interaction appear endogenised in 
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the contemporary approach to games, for example, in concepts such as ‘other-
regarding preferences’. In turn, it is well acknowledged that a comprehensive 
system of preferences whose applicability goes beyond a particular 
implementation of a game depends on the existence of an external system of 
social norms already in place (Binmore, 2010). Contemporary game theory 
practitioners do not dismiss this fact. There is an overt recognition of the 
limitations of game theory’s methodological agenda in this regard. There is, 
however, an equally overt recognition of how inaccurate it is to take these 
limitations as a support of methodological individualism. “It is a mistake (the 
error of methodological individualism) to think that social norms can be brought 
within the purview of game theory by reducing a social institution to the 
interaction of rational agents” (Gintis, 2009b, p. 163).   
Agent-based modelling is not necessarily at odds with classical methodological 
individualism. Yet it does seem to be better equipped to provide novel and 
valuable insights regarding the micro-macro/agency-structure divide. In this 
section it was argued that the concern for agency in computational social science 
was inherited from artificial intelligence and quickly translated into the 
framework of traditional social dualisms. Because of its empirical nature, the 
problem of agency in computational social science was approached mostly 
through the methodological individualism-holism/collectivism tension. Due to 
the bottom-up character of the methodology, computational social science 
quickly adapted an account of agency in line with traditional methodological 
individualism. This decision, although understandable, overlooks the important 
fact that agent-based modelling needs not assume rationality or causal and 
ontological reduction. Not being bound by these two philosophical principles 
becomes an advantage, not a liability for agent-based modelling. This will be 
discussed in the next section, which focuses on the concept of action, as the 
cornerstone of the concept of agency in the layered model.  
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Action: Rationality and purposiveness  
A theory of action delineates the material, cognitive and relational features 
ascribed to individuals according to philosophical principles associated with the 
broader theoretical framework and the methodology employed. This section will 
briefly discuss the historical and philosophical context that gave rise to the most 
widespread conceptualisation of action in social science. It will be claimed, first, 
that this traditional account of action has representational limitations that are 
not corroborated by methodological features and, second, that its popularity is 
mainly due to methodological reasons. The way agent-based modelling fares 
against these theoretical-methodological restrictions regarding the 
conceptualisation of action will be addressed later.   
The concept of action is at the core of modern social science. It has been 
commonly taken as a primary epistemological building block for the explanation 
of social behaviour, since it is the concept through which the basics of the 
distinctive character and features of human behaviour are supposed to be 
grasped (Alexander, 1987; Joas, 1996). ‘Action’ is associated with that part of 
general human behaviour that involves intention or meaning. The belief of 
intentionality has set the philosophical foundations for the analysis of action, as 
well as its connection to other important concepts, such as causation, and most 
importantly, agency, to which the concept is commonly subordinated. The notion 
of action that underlies contemporary social science is closely linked to key 
developments in the last few centuries. The important social changes occurring 
during the transition to modernity paved the way for an approach to action 
focused on human capabilities and deeply grounded in the human capability for 
reason.  
Modern thinkers (e.g. Hobbes, 1988; Hume, 2007; Kant, 1973; Locke, 1975) put 
significant emphasis on human rationality as the foundation for decision-making. 
Human beings were considered to be consciously aware of the world. This 
awareness could allow them to intervene in it through a rational hermeneutic, 
which was meant to be manifestation of individual intentions. The central role 
given to the individual in the conceptualisation of agency and decision-making 
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came as a response to the determinist conception of human behaviour. As with 
any other scientific inquiry, the challenge for these thinkers was to understand 
what lies beneath rational thinking, in order to provide a generalised account of 
human action (Archer, 2004; Kramnick, 2010). Rationality, especially after the 
Enlightenment, was assumed to feature a clear discursive character. When 
discussing individual action, intentionality was usually replaced with the more 
conceptually robust idea of purposiveness. Whereas the basic notion of 
intentionality simply implies a direction i.e. actions are directed towards 
something, the notion of purposiveness includes the notion of end. Action was 
accounted for following the assumption that a means-ends scheme controls the 
decision-making process. The specific connection between means and ends was 
sometimes idealised, as with the case of neoclassical economics, which used 
instrumentalised accounts of decision–making heuristics (Tribe, 2003), or 
constituted the very focus of inquiry, as with the neo-Kantian early German 
sociology, which focused on the real motivation behind individual action (Helle, 
1985; Winch, 1990). Either way, a scientific explanation of the heuristics of 
decision-making was considered plausible on the assumption that a rational 
motivation or intention, connecting present action with future goals, could be 
identified and generalised.  
Despite being a common topic of discussion in contemporary science, grasping 
the nature of the scientific character of action has proved to be difficult. 
Pragmatism, analytical philosophy and Marxism, for example, both in philosophy 
and social science, developed accounts of action in response to Hegel’s idealism. 
The three accounts, however, put forward significantly different accounts of 
action. Likewise, different philosophical principles have been synthesised over 
the years. Schütz (1967), for example, tried to enrich Weber’s neo-Kantian 
approach to action with some insights from phenomenology. One contribution 
that led to a significant divergence in the research agendas of philosophy and 
social science was Wittgenstein’s (1986) work, for it set the philosophical 
analysis of action on a linguistic path that was not followed by social science. 
Because social sciences are empirically oriented, the study of action was kept 
close to the ideal of achieving better measurement. Due to this restriction, the 
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perspective from economics, with important influence and support from 
utilitarian philosophy, gained more ground in general social science due to the 
advantages it provides in operationalisation and formalisation (Abbott, 1997; 
Joas, 1996). 
This need to ground action empirically generated considerable limitations for 
the comprehension of the concept, for it hindered the research on further 
theoretical-methodological connections. The empirical analysis of action through 
a quantitative means-ends scheme did not come from a naturalisation of human 
intentionality. It just provided a methodological heuristic that produces plausible 
results and removes all complex cognitive requirements for the understanding of 
action (Ellis, 2008b; Horkheimer, 1974; Stewart, 2008). A paradigmatic example 
is the notion of instrumental rationality. This approach to rationality normatively 
links two explanatory relata through a criterion that is considered rational 
because it is common, expected, desirable, etc. When, for example, going into 
higher education is linked to expectations of a higher salary, a simple way to 
generate prediction and retrodiction regarding enrolment in higher education 
can be devised. By conceiving rationality in this way, the decision-making 
heuristics and their causal effects over time are simplified, especially in long-
terms causal processes or diversely motivated decisions (Card, 1999; Morgan & 
Winship, 2007).  
It could be questioned, however, how much this theoretical-methodological 
conceptualisation of action in social science is informative about purposiveness. 
Action can only be apprehended in an empirical way through modelling. With 
quantitative techniques, individuals are sometimes not even modelled, as in the 
aforementioned system dynamics simulation, in which only macro level 
variables interact. When individuals are simulated, they do not necessarily act in 
a purposeful way. In microsimulation models, there are not individual actions 
affecting the individual performing the action and other individuals around 
them. Individuals are modelled as collection of state variables and changes are 
just produced probabilistically. Likewise, in many popular methods, such as 
regression, outcomes are results of manipulation and association of individual 
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states, not actions. Years of education, is not a variable that can be linked to 
individual goals and intentions.  
Only a very particular set of social methods, such as lab experiments, allow the 
notion of purposeful action to be put to test. Yet, in most cases, the results of 
social methods in general are interpreted as if they were. A paradigmatic 
example that is of relevance for computational social science is Schelling’s model 
of segregation. In his seminal work, Schelling wanted to unveil the “mechanisms 
that translate unorganised individual behaviour into collective results” (1971, p. 
145). The model is highly praised for it shows mild preferences for similarity at 
the individual level can produce significant segregation patterns at the macro 
level. Clustering has been proved to emerge even in highly tolerant populations 
(Aydinonat, 2007; Banos, 2012; Clark & Fossett, 2008; Pancs & Vriend, 2007). 
Schelling’s checkerboard model of segregation is a numerical model with explicit 
representation of agents and actions. The model, however, never explores the 
motives of those who would like to move. It does not have any significantly 
elaborated cognitive assumption regarding agents’ behaviour. Yet, Schelling 
frames the model and its results into his wider research programme on what he 
labels as the micromotives of macrobehaviour, a programme grounded on the 
assumption of purposive behaviour (Schelling, 1978). Schelling does point to 
some difficulties of the traditional rational purposive approach, such as the effect 
of cognitive biases, but never questions the basic purposive means-ends action 
scheme.  
While Schelling’s segregation model does show how macropatterns of 
segregation emerge from individual uncoordinated action, and that is in part 
why the model is considered foundational in the field of computational social 
science, it cannot be taken to say anything significant about the cognitive 
foundations of individual behaviour. With such simple behavioural rules, 
interpreting agents’ behaviour in terms of purposive action is just a narrative 
imposition. In some cases, this narrative imposition derives from framing the 
model in a more general research agenda, either at personal or disciplinary level. 
By the time he devised the checkerboard model, for example, Schelling had a 
long history of research on strategic decision-making and he thought the 
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segregation model could fit within the bottom-up paradigm of traditional 
methodological individualism (Schelling, 1978). That same model, however, can 
be plausible interpreted, for example, using social practices (e.g. Chattoe-Brown, 
2013), following a more complex approach to the processual connection 
between agency and structure. Narrative impositions of purposiveness in the 
interpretation of methodological outcome can also occur if the perspective of 
rationalist theories of action is adopted, for these theories tend to equate 
individual goals with descriptive behavioural principles (Conte & Castelfranchi, 
1995; Elster, 2009). Maximisation of utility or marginalism are empirical 
descriptors for individual action in several context, but they are not themselves 
the motives individuals have to act the way they do.    
This challenge to the way the concept of purposiveness is interpreted should not 
be taken as an issue of model intricacy. Purposive behaviour does not necessarily 
depend on sophisticated cognition, either by the real agent or by the agent’s 
representation in the model. It depends, instead, on conceptual criteria. ‘Ends’ is 
a subjective category that allows for the linkage between agency and rationality 
in the study of human action (Bierstedt, 1938). The concept of rationality was 
heavily contested in social science after the mid-twentieth century (e.g. Elster, 
2009; Sen, 1977; Shafir & Leboeuf, 2002). The same has not happened with the 
concept of ends. Once the stringent requirements of rationality are dropped for 
the more plausible idea of bounded rationality, however, the notion of end could 
be detached from much of its conceptual load. The only key remaining element is 
directionality. Intentionality takes again centre stage.  Orientation towards 
something implies initially an assumption of temporal orderability.  Once the 
concept of action is stripped from its conceptual load, the two basic categories of 
input and output, linking the past, the present and the future, can be 
conceptualised in diverse ways. The temporal organisation emphasised by the 
linking is the factor in which diverse social theories differ. Traditional mean-ends 
theories are usually future-oriented, while pragmatist theories (e.g. Gross, 2009; 
Joas, 1996) are more past-oriented and phenomenological theories (e.g. Schütz, 
1967) are more present-oriented.          
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Building up from directionality in order to develop an appropriate account of 
action depends on representational capabilities. In agent-based models, 
directionality is built starting off from simple input-output pairs, based on 
individual rules, coded in ‘if…else…’ statements. Orderability derives in this case 
from the temporal order through which the computer program is executed. 
Schelling’s model is at the lowest level of intricacy, for agents perform a simple 
decision, based on a simple arithmetic rule and the current conditions of the 
spatial distribution around them. It is a one-turn strategy. Of particular interest 
for social science, especially if the aim is to have empirically adequate 
representations, is the question of how to build up from these simple reactive 
exchanges. Abandoning the traditional conceptualisation of rational, forward-
looking and purposive action could have important effects on the way agent 
architectures, model-building strategies and simulation’s output analyses are 
taken to say something important about the concept of action in computational 
and general social science.  
Several alternatives in social science have been neglected because of the focus on 
purposive action. Agent-based modelling can help establishing theoretical-
methodological links with those alternatives that have not been formalised and 
operationalised in traditional variable- and action-based approaches. It starts 
with straightforward fundamental questions, such as how alternative 
approaches to the heuristics of action in agent-based modelling e.g. learning 
(Shichijo & Nakano, 2002), can be generalised and fed back to social theory and 
back again to method. Peripheral theoretical elements of these modelling 
approaches, such as the notion of backward- or sideways-looking (e.g. Macy & 
Flache, 2002), open the door for a different conceptualisation of the way history, 
context and decision-making are linked in the analysis of action. Learning, unlike 
traditional purposive action, cannot be adequately conceptualised as forward-
looking. It could, on the other hand, be connected with some critical approaches, 
such as Dewey’s (1928, 1939) notion of ‘means-ends continuum’. According to 
Dewey, when action is understood as a process, the use of ‘means’ and ‘ends’ to 
interpret the heuristics of decision-making is a value judgment that occurs only 
when a one-shot action is analysed retrospectively by the actor or the 
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researcher. Agent-based models provide a way to move past this future-oriented 
synchronicity in the analysis of action. It is possible to build models with 
different cognitive representations that prioritise certain temporal organisations 
of the agent’s knowledge and perception.  
Computational social science can go beyond providing new links with social 
theory that has been overlooked in traditional formal methods. It could 
contribute to the research on some heavily underestimated element in the study 
of human action, such as embodiment (Frank, 1991; Shilling, 1997). 
Philosophical rationalism and idealism significantly influenced the traditional 
concept of action in social science. The character and effects of human action 
have regularly been approached in terms of mental properties associated with 
decision-making. Action in social science is more closely linked to changes and 
transmission of values, beliefs and knowledge, pushing into the background the 
study of action and its bodily features. Parsons, for example, (1949) puts volition 
at the centre of his theory of action. Mental processes of rejection/assimilation of 
social influence ends up being the key mechanisms to solve the problem of order 
(Parsons, 1949, 1991).  
This mental bias in social science’s approach to action was reinforced in both 
micro and macro research because of three interrelated aspects: a) The 
methodological advantages of variable-centred methodologies (Abbott, 2001b), 
b) the systematic neglect in social theory of the material aspect of social life 
(Latour, 2005; Preda, 1999), c) the future-oriented character of the traditional 
notion of action puts emphasis on events that, because of its future realisation 
condition, can only be located in the mind of individuals (Joas, 1996). By putting 
all the emphasis on the internal character of an action, social theory has failed to 
account for the way in which material reality is constructed and approached by 
individuals. An increasing body of literature criticising this bias or gap in social 
theory has started to appear since the mid-twentieth century (Frank, 1991; 
Shilling, 2007). Most authors developing this criticism argue that theorisation 
about embodiment is of major importance for a theory of action. The body is not 
only the material resource through which individuals relate to the material 
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world, but also a major subject and object of individual and social meaning 
(Turner, 2008; Waskul & Vannini, 2006). 
Agent-based modelling has methodological features to deal with aspects of 
embodiment. The possibility to directly represent heteronomous and 
autonomous agents in the model has given researchers the possibility to explore 
the cognitive character of individual actors, as well as the implications of the 
materiality of social life. Some of the features implemented replicate simple 
ecological conditions about individual constitution and capabilities e.g. endowing 
them with a visual field or restricting the possible distance covered by an agent 
in each iteration (e.g. Acerbi & Parisi, 2006; Epstein & Axtell, 1996). Some other 
features are not modelled in an analogical fashion, but do have important 
implications for agents’ behaviour and in emerging populational patterns and 
results. Memory is one of these features. In game theory, for example, memory is 
mostly implemented as the capacity to store information about the partner’s past 
strategies (e.g. Axelrod, 1984, 1997b). Despite the simplicity of the 
representation, some strategies e.g. tit-for-tat, can be linked to specific 
behavioural choices in some real contexts (Axelrod, 1997b). Through these 
choices, the resulting emergent behaviour can gain significantly in both empirical 
adequacy and complexity. A third set of bodily features regularly explored, such 
as life expectancy and reproduction, do not affect agent’s behaviour directly, but 
can have significant effects on the simulation as a whole, for they create 
additional challenges or opportunities for optimisation of individual strategies 
(Acerbi & Parisi, 2006; Axelrod, 1984; Epstein & Axtell, 1996). Computational 
social science has not produced much literature addressing the body as a 
symbolic resource. This is partly due to the low level of cognition agents have in 
the models, but also to the fact that agent-based models focus on social 
implications of individual action. Complex subjective accounts of these symbolic 
processes are probably beyond the scope of agent-based modelling as a method, 
at least in this current state, but the implications of symbolic bodily features 
could be operationalised and explored at the population level.   
This section has focused on the concept of action as the main subelement of the 
more robust concept of agency. It was argued that the concept has been 
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traditionally developed around two key tenets: rationality and purposiveness, 
for these two elements allowed for the articulation of a widespread formalisation 
programme in social science. The significance and adequacy of these tenets was 
challenged based on their implicit theoretical assumptions and the way social the 
operation of social methods reflect these assumptions. It was suggested that 
there is nothing in agent-based modelling that requires keeping those tenets as 
fundamental. By moving attention away from rationality and purposiveness, it 
was suggested, computational social science can benefit from and contribute to 
mainstream social theory on two fronts: a) alternative interpretations of 
decision-making heuristics and b) implications of the embodiment of action. The 
next section will show that discussion on these two fronts is closely linked to the 
reconceptualisation of the concept of interaction.   
Interaction: Time, space and process 
The concept of interaction has had a subordinated role in the traditional theory 
of action, for it is taken regularly as a special case in which action is oriented 
toward others. Individuals, when facing social encounters, have expectations 
about the behaviour of the other individual they are interacting with and adjust 
their own behaviour accordingly. In this section, a key theoretical challenge to 
this conceptualisation will be briefly presented and the possible contribution of 
agent-based modelling to the conceptualisation of interaction will be addressed. 
Following the insights of sociological theorisation on interaction since the second 
part of the twentieth century, it will be argued, agent-based modelling can 
complement its prospective contribution on decision-making heuristics and 
embodiment with contributions on contextual embeddedness, regarding time, 
space and process.      
Theorisation on interaction as such is scarce for, as said above, in the layered 
model that has dominated social science there is a presupposition of reduction. 
There is not too much theoretical discussion about how interaction is supposed 
to be reduced to action for, in most cases, it is considered an empirical, not a 
theoretical matter. Recent focus on time and process in social science (Adam, 
1990; Bash, 2000; Elias, 1993) and the popularisation of complexity and 
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emergency theories in social disciplines (Bunge, 2000a; Byrne, 1998; Urry, 
2006), however, have led to challenge the alleged straightforwardness of the 
reduction. The problems faced by the reductionist accounts are made manifest 
by Parsons’ double contingency theorem. Parsons (1949, 1991), provided one of 
the most theoretically robust account of the traditional theory of action in social 
science. Although more commonly known for his systemic approach, Parsons 
envisioned a grand theory based on the idea of voluntaristic individual action. 
The emphasis on action was because Parsons believed sociology needed an 
analytical approach able to identify the constitutive units of social life. In 
Parsons’ (1949) account, ‘action’ was framed in the wider concept of ‘unit act’. 
This was composed by a) an actor performing the action, b) an end the action is 
set to pursuit, and c) a situation, which, at the same time, combines the condition 
and the means of action. An action, according to Parsons, was simply a process 
oriented to the attainment of the given end.  
Parson realised that, while understanding individual action requires a process of 
interpretation of the normative orientation of the actor, in line with the 
Weberian interpretive tradition, the understanding of interaction requires a 
more complicated process. The problem was to understand how exchange could 
become constant in such a way as to develop social order.  For this, Parsons 
made use of the psychoanalytical categories of ‘alter’ and ‘ego’. In order to 
engage in interaction, each participant should adopt a position, either as alter or 
ego. Interaction should eventually emerge through a process of 
‘complementarity of expectations’ (Parsons & Shils, 1962).  The double 
contingency, however, comes from the fact that there is no way to determine 
when a participant should behave as alter or ego. There is a clear circularity 
prior to the interaction that cannot be avoided by any of the participants. 
Parsons’ solution to this problem relies on the alleged existence of shared norms 
and values that culturally determine the encounter throughout and eventually 
allow for the complementarity of expectations. This solution was criticised as 
plausible only under the oversocialised conception of the individual that 
Parsons’ theory is usually criticised for (Wrong, 1961) and, as later authors (e.g. 
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Habermas, 1991; Luhmann, 1995) claim, does not really solve the issue of the 
foundations of interaction, but only presupposes them. 
Parsons’ double contingency theorem leads to questioning whether interaction 
can be subsumed under action using a strategy that does not imply endogenising 
the rules of interaction. While it is possible to produce some knowledge about 
several aspects of social life through this epistemological decision, 
understanding the nature and constitutive character of interaction remains an 
issue social science has to address. To that end, it might be of value to analyse 
alternative conceptualisations of interaction, especially those put forward by 
sociological theories that challenge the roots of the concept of action. Sociology 
experienced the widespread challenge to the traditional conceptualisation of 
rational action in the mid-twentieth century. Yet, unlike the other social sciences, 
sociology put forward a deeper criticism (e.g. Garfinkel, 1967; Horkheimer & 
Adorno, 2002; Mead, 1932, 1972; Schütz, 1967). While other disciplines 
restrained themselves to the criticism of the idealistic nature of the rationality of 
action (Grüne-Yanoff, 2007; Simon, 1986), sociology challenged the very nature 
of the traditional concept of rational action at the methodological and 
epistemological levels. Of interest here is the challenge advanced by sociological 
theories concerned with the problem of action in situational and developmental 
contexts, that is, when the social character of action is framed and explained 
through processes. These theories highlighted the deficiencies of the traditional 
notion when the ‘social’ is to be understood as a complex iterative process of 
signalling and interpreting, grounded on contextual awareness and background 
knowledge.  
When the aforementioned problem of double contingency is reviewed, it 
becomes clear that the traditional concept of action does not provide any insight 
into the why and how of social reproduction. Giddens’ (1984) structuration 
theory, for example, developed as a post-Parsonian micro-macro synthesising 
approach, focuses on the reproductive aspect of social life through the 
postulation of the duality of structure. Some other theories, such as symbolic 
interactionism, following mostly the insights from Mead (1972) and developed 
closely to the principles of American pragmatism, and Luhmann’s (1995) neo-
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systemic approach, put a greater emphasis on the complex interactive character 
of interaction and the important role played by communication. Other 
approaches, such as ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967) and phenomenology 
(Schütz & Luckmann, 1974), showed how important and influential background 
knowledge and previous experiences are. Although taking different perspectives, 
all these sociological theories try to account for the lack of context in the 
traditional approach to action.      
Without going into the specificities of each theory, there are two elements of this 
challenge to the traditional concept of action that had significant implications in 
subsequent theorisation and are worth mentioning in the discussion about 
computational social science. The first is about the recognition of the temporal 
and spatial embeddedness of human action. The second is about the general 
implications of a processual approach to the sociological understanding of the 
micro-macro/structure-agency dualisms. Regarding the former, generalisation 
and abstraction efforts in modern social science have been followed by a 
tendency to unbind social phenomena from their particular temporal and spatial 
contexts (Bergmann, 1992; May & Thrift, 2001; Nowotny, 1992; Urry, 2000), 
because of the previously mentioned overemphasis on the mental character of 
action and the popularisation of increasingly refined quantitative methods 
(Abbott, 1997; Esser, 1996; Mjøset, 2001). Martins (1974) argues, for example, it 
is the means-ends scheme that Parsons took from Weber, not the macro 
normative approach, which accounts for the lack of diachronicity in structural 
functionalism. The reason is that forward-looking approaches to individual 
action focus on rational individual deliberation. The relationship between means 
and ends is normative, in the sense that, under a given notion of rationality, the 
mean makes the end expected. The end itself, however, needs not occur (Macy & 
Flache, 2009; Sintonen, 1989; Turner, 2003b). Action does not have to be 
spatiotemporally embedded. It only needs to be normatively plausible i.e. 
rationally expectable, regarding the means and ends connection.     
Agent-based modelling is not bound by traditional methodological 
spatiotemporal limitations. As a simulation method, agent-based modelling 
provides a way to include a direct representation of the temporal dimension of 
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the model, making it possible to track and locate changes of the system and its 
components (Hartmann, 1996; Winsberg, 2010). Likewise, the object-oriented 
character of this simulation method provides a way to build geographically 
explicit models or more abstract spatial distributions, such as networks. The 
importance of time and space as simple containers or movement resources in 
social life and computational modelling should not be underestimated 
(Edmonds, 2011). This is in part why simple models such as cellular automata 
can provide useful information about social phenomena. Schelling’s segregation 
model continues to provide robust results in several replications and extensions 
over the years, including, for example, irregular grids, abstract networks and 
even explicit GIS (Aydinonat, 2007; Banos, 2012; Clark & Fossett, 2008; Pancs & 
Vriend, 2007). Clustering was proven to occur in several types of populations, 
including those that prefer multicultural neighbourhoods, provided that 
individuals are sensitive to small changes in residential composition (van de Rijt, 
Siegel, & Macy, 2009). The possibility to experiment with different 
spatiotemporal implementations has provided a greater understanding of the 
powerful mechanisms of distribution asymmetry underlying this simple model 
(Bruch & Mare, 2009; Reardon & O’Sullivan, 2004).   
The temporal and spatial dimensions, however, can have a role beyond simple 
containers or organisational resources. Time and space could also be used in 
agent-based models as production resources i.e. as factors that affect social life 
either by significantly producing structural constraints or by being consciously 
taken into account by individuals making decisions. This particular relationship 
with the spatiotemporal dimension has gained increased recognition in social 
theory in the last few decades (Adam, 1990; Gieryn, 2000; Nowotny, 1992; Urry, 
2000). In several social phenomena, different conceptualisations of time and 
space appear as a resource that individuals consciously interact with. In 
contentious politics, for example, temporal motivations derived from factors 
such as age and expected duration of the contentious event affect the decision to 
join (Aminzade, 1992). In turn, literature about the different spatial 
conceptualisations in human interaction has led to a more robust and specialised 
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theorisation, reflected, for example in the conceptual separation of place from 
space (Gieryn, 2000).  
Computational social science has methodological features that allow addressing 
these spatiotemporal aspects of social life. In many game-based models, for 
example, individuals could choose to change strategy according to the stage of 
the game (Hoffmann, 2000). Likewise, experimentation with different spatial 
structures is something practitioners have been interested in from very early on 
(Flache & Hegselmann, 2001). While there still much work to be done in this 
area, limitations are not methodological, but organisational. The amount of 
literature produced about Schelling’s segregation model is partially derived from 
a self-reinforcing dynamic in which different implementations and replications 
lead to an even further theorisation about this particular phenomenon. The 
model is still relevant in contemporary social science because theorisation about 
segregation has achieved high level of generality and robustness (Bruch & Mare, 
2009; Fossett & Dietrich, 2009). Not many other topics and models, however, 
attract that much attention nor achieve such degree of abstraction, even though 
there are legitimate methodological reasons to do so.   
Regarding the implications of a processual account, these sociological theories 
challenging the traditional approach to action claim it is necessary to stop 
thinking about the relationship between action and interaction as one of 
reduction. As Turner (1988) suggests, attempts to define interaction in terms of 
action have regularly ended in a regression to psychology or in an explanatory 
shift directly into social structures. It is in interaction where action is 
contextualised and it is through interaction that social processes could be better 
explained. It is not an intermediate concept between micro action and macro 
structure; it is, instead, the very epicentre of social life. This shift from action to 
interaction in the study of processes is evident in contemporary perspectives, 
such as relational sociology (e.g. Emirbayer, 1997),  theory of practice (e.g. 
Schatzki, 2001), or the new French pragmatism (e.g. Boltanski & Thévenot, 
2006), where the redefinition of the concept of action has been followed by 
revisions of associated key concepts, such as agency (Emirbayer & Mische, 
1998). 
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One key assumption of the redefinition of the relationship between action and 
interaction has to do precisely with the connection these two concepts have with 
agency. The tenability of the layered model rests on the assumption that there is 
an identity relationship between actors and agents. This, however, is one of the 
reasons why many of the synthesising theories of the seventies and eighties 
failed (Alexander, 1992). When theories equate actors with agents they commit 
the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. “Rather than replacing or reinterpreting 
the familiar dichotomy between actors and structures, the identification of actors 
with agency actually reproduces it in another form […]. What results is a mixture 
rather than a solution, a compromise rather than a reformulation” (1992, pp. 1–
2). This is why in many of the contemporary approaches seek to reformulate this 
relation either by redefining longstanding concepts or by introducing new ones. 
In relational sociology, for example, agency, instead of a capacity for action of 
actors, is reconceptualised as “a temporally embedded process of social 
engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), but also oriented 
toward the future (as a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward 
the present (as a capacity to contextualise past habits and future projects within 
the contingencies of the moment” (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 963). Likewise, 
in the new practice theory, the tension between individual and society has been 
replaced by the introduction of the notion of practice: “[P]ractice approaches 
promulgate a distinct social ontology: the social is a field of embodied, materially 
interwoven practices centrally organised around shared practical 
understandings”(Schatzki, 2001, p. 12). 
This has an important implication for the way dualisms are meant to be 
approached in social science. A point constantly emphasised by process theorists 
(Abbott, 2001b; Bash, 2000; Dépelteau, 2008; Elias, 1978) is that co-
deterministic views of social phenomena i.e. those that posit a hierarchical 
interlevel view of the social domain, lose most of their value when phenomena 
are approached processually. Micro and macro, it is argued, only become useful 
analytical categories when there are restrictions that force to make the analysis 
synchronic. This restriction has methodological roots. The main reason is the 
variable-centred approach that has dominated social methods. The problem with 
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this approach has been erroneously reconstructed as a tension between 
qualitative and quantitative methods (e.g. Abell, 2004; Esser, 1996). Yet, at its 
core, it is a problem of formalisation, which can equally occur in both 
approaches. Data from social phenomena, as mentioned before, usually comes 
from the observation of states, not actions. When an aspect such as race is 
quantified, the variable takes one value between white, black, mixed race, etc. 
That state, however, is fixed. It does not have history, connection to other 
variables and, most importantly, connection to the actors’ actions (Abbott, 
2001b; Byrne, 1998). The micro and macro tension in social science arises from 
the fact that any particular definition of variables places restrictions on the kind 
of operations and relationships that can be methodologically suggested, but not 
from any fundamental theoretical-methodological difference.   
Process theorists acknowledge that every action has a specific space-time locus. 
Every action is situated in a context of interaction with other individuals, the 
natural and the artificial. When contextualised, the extension of interactions in 
time builds a network of relations in time and space that should constitute the 
sociological explanandum at any point of inquiry (Abrams, 1982; Bash, 2000; 
Elias, 1978, 1993). The limited success realising the implications of this 
theoretical claim in mainstream social science is due to methodological 
challenges. Yet, while traditional methodologies have problems moving away 
from the variable-centred approach, agent-based modelling, as the title from 
Macy and Willer’s (2002) influential article suggest, presents a novel account to 
shift from ‘from factors to actors’ in the analysis of social phenomena. When a 
simulation is run, different agents with cognitive and behavioural differences 
engage in processual interactive relations of different levels of complexity with 
each other and the environment.          
The interaction-oriented character of agent-based modelling can be better 
understood by moving back to the pre-social theorisation era. Computational 
social science was developed following two early types of simulation 
methodologies developed outside social science. The first is simulation 
employing cellular automata. This technique became popular because it allows 
exploring the emergence of macro patterns from locality-dependent interaction 
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in a population composed by simple entities or objects, operating through 
discrete space and time. It has been used to study several topics in the physical 
and life sciences since the mid-twenties and found a particular niche in those 
areas where analytical methods are not considered suitable (Hoekstra, Kroc, & 
Sloot, 2010; Wolfram, 1994).  
In cellular automata the individual entities do not receive significant attention. 
First because in some cases, such as fractals, they do not have specific natural or 
biological analogues; second, because there are significant operational 
limitations in the design of the model e.g. a limited number of states. This lack of 
consideration for robust characterisation of individual entities also comes from 
the underlying belief that the simpler the characterisation of the entities, the 
easier it would be to explain the macro outcome (Mandelbrot, 1973; Wolfram, 
2002). This belief was also heavily emphasised in the initial methodological 
discussion (Axelrod, 1997b; Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005), in 
which agent-based models were thought of as tools for theoretical exploration.  
The second type of simulation that nurtured the interactive character of agent-
based modelling is distributed artificial intelligence. Whereas in the research 
with cellular automata agents could only have a limited number of states, in the 
field of distributed artificial intelligence a more robust and complex range of 
agent architectures and behaviours were be explored. The focus of this field of 
inquiry was not agency, however. Developed since the seventies as a subarea of 
artificial intelligence (Moulin & Chaib-Draa, 1996), distributed artificial 
intelligence was not focused on the particular constitutive and behavioural 
capabilities of artificial agents, but on the distribution and coordination of 
knowledge and actions. It was developed as an operational area related with 
problem-solving interaction. Two subfields can be identified in distributed 
artificial intelligence: distributed problem solving and multiagent systems. The 
latter approach was concerned with the problem-solving interaction of a 
collection of autonomous problem solvers, normally referred to as “agents”. The 
analogy with social phenomena was natural and many of the early social 
simulations originated from this area of research. The very name multiagent 
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systems dominated in the early years of computational social science, until it was 
replaced by the nowadays more common agent-based modelling (Gilbert, 2010).  
The main concern for many of these researchers was to cope with the challenges 
posed by the increasing implementation and expansion of information systems 
in different areas of research and in practical application. These systems were 
considered particularly challenging for they require the concurrent processing of 
large amounts of information, which raises questions regarding efficacy and 
efficiency. The traditional approach to artificial intelligence was considered 
insufficient because of its focus on individual action. Accounting for the 
organisational power emerging from interaction of the different entities 
intervening in the system was thought to require a different theoretical 
foundations (Hewitt & Inman, 1991; Tokoro, 1993). This scepticism about 
traditional artificial intelligence led researchers in the field to draw on 
alternative approaches to social actions, such as sociology of practice or symbolic 
interactionism, which present a more complex and elaborated vision of social 
interaction, and put a major emphasis in the interactive character of the 
simulation (Conte & Castelfranchi, 1996; Gasser, 1991; Schillo, Fischer, & Klein, 
2001). Unlike the contemporary approach to agent-based modelling in 
computational social science, the research using cellular automata and 
distributed artificial intelligence did not overemphasise entities over structural 
arrangements. Before the introduction of social theory, these methods put more 
attention on the outcome of interactive processes.     
This section has argued the concept of interaction can be better approached in 
agent-based modelling by moving past the assumption that interaction is just a 
special case of action oriented towards others. This traditional conceptualisation 
fails to account for the temporal and spatial dimensions that underlie social 
phenomena, as well as for the processual character of interaction as such. 
Regarding the former, it was argued that the time-evolution of agent-based 
simulation could be used to empirically explore the implications of different 
philosophical approaches to the concept of interaction. It can provide 
information about the way time and space provide a context for interaction and 
constitute themselves in interaction resources. Regarding the latter, it was 
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suggested, co-deterministic theories of social phenomena moved computational 
social science away from an early theoretical focus on the processual and 
embedded character of interaction. This deviation, however, is not deeply rooted 
in the way agent-based modelling works. The method can use the flexibility of 
computer code and the processual character of computers simulations to 
account for these features of interaction.     
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the implicit theoretical assumptions underlying the use of 
agent-based modelling as a social research method. The focus was the 
methodological representation of agency, action and interaction in the method. It 
was argued that computational social science adopted a layered model of the 
three concepts, ordered by theoretical subordination. This is a widespread 
theoretical approach in social research since the XVIII century and is allegedly 
consistent with the basic principles of bottom-up modelling. Yet, it also comes 
with unnecessary assumptions and sets important restriction for understanding. 
The layered model limits the conceptualisation of agency for it is bound to a 
stringent account of rationality and rests on a philosophically unnecessary 
principle of causal and ontological reduction, which are not reflected in the 
practice of agent-based modelling, either in the environmental structure or in 
agents’ architecture. In turn, the layered model also poses important limitations 
to the concept of action, for it links it with the notion of purposiveness, which, 
again, agent-based modelling does not depend on. Finally, it was claimed the 
concept of interaction should not be conceived simply as a special instance of 
action, for it points to a very different aspect of social phenomena.  
Agent-based modelling, it was argued, can instead provide important insights for 
the redefinition of the relationship between agency, action and interaction, based 
on its representational advantages, compared to other social methods, regarding 
decision-making heuristics, embodiment and embeddedness. The most 
important methodological advantage of agent-based modelling, however, is that 
it provides is the possibility to “imitate one process by another process” 
(Hartmann, 1996: 77). Several micro-macro/structure-agency synthesising 
accounts stress the need to develop a processual approach in social science. Yet, 
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this plea is still commonly pushed into the background in mainstream social 
science. Theorisation stills relies significantly on social dualisms. The theoretical 
implications of developing a processual account of social phenomena have been 
widely underestimated in the field of computational social science, as well as in 
the wider mainstream social science. First, because there is a theoretical-
methodological underdevelopment in social science to do so; second, because 
there is something inherently synchronic about the apprehension of human 
activity in general (Abbott, 2001b; Elias, 1993). 
Computational social science can contribute to mainstream social theory by 
redefining the theoretical-methodological assumptions of agent-based modelling 
around the notion of process. While theories of everyday life sociology, such as 
symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, could give insights about how 
social life depends on a delicate balance emerging from social negotiation in 
interaction, there are methodological limitations to understanding long-term 
social change using these theories (Adler, Adler, & Fontana, 1987; Martins, 
1974). The possibility of tracking system changes and its objects in agent-based 
modelling can be helpful in achieving this understanding. The method can also 
help unveiling the connection between action and interaction. Social theories 
that highlight the important role of interaction (e.g Habermas, 1991; Luhmann, 
1995; Mead, 1972) usually consider that the complexity of social phenomena is 
achieved by complex interactions. Traditionally this has led to overemphasising 
the symbolic aspect of human interaction. Agent-based modelling, however, 
provide the tools to explore this question from a different perspective. Simple 
models, such as cellular automata, are evidence that not all the complexity in 
social phenomena depends necessarily on the complexity of human interaction.      
To produce valuable contributions, however, as a methodologically oriented field 
of inquiry, computational social science should not approach the problem of 
reproduction of social life philosophically, as it has done so far, for example, with 
the concept of emergence. The vagueness and ambiguity surrounding the 
concept, in contrast to the initial hype (Baker, 2012; Corning, 2002; Epstein, 
2006; Kim, 2006a), should serve as a warning of the thorny philosophical issues 
that are still unresolved in the philosophy of social science. The problem has to 
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be approached by linking epistemological and ontological concerns to the 
methodological features of the social method from which information is 
obtained.  
In agent-based modelling, epistemological and ontological concerns have to 
accommodate the fact that this method employs models of artificial societies. 
There are several methodological aspects of theory that need to be reviewed in 
their consistency with the practice of agent-based modelling, such as the 
simplification of the cognitive features of the agents and the possibility to model 
the environment. There is a need to be careful at this point. Because of the 
flexibility given by object-oriented programming, the practitioners in the field 
have advantages regarding modelling the individuals, the environments and the 
relational setting. This flexibility, however, demands from the practitioners a 
more rigorous approach regarding representation, in order to decide what goes 
in and what is left out during the process of modelling (Frigg, 2006; Winsberg, 
2010).  
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Entities and Processes 
It is commonly thought that computational social science provides evidence in 
support to the philosophical principles of methodological individualism. In some 
cases, there is an explicit normative support, suggesting that the method fully 
adopts the philosophical programme (Hedström, 2005; Manzo, 2007b; Neumann, 
2008). In some others, there is an acknowledgement about some differences e.g. 
in agent-based modelling agents are interdependent, but the compatibility is still 
stressed (Macy & Flache, 2009). In most cases, however, this supports is diffused 
in the overall practice and responds to the adoption of theoretical- 
methodological assumptions that typically match the philosophical programme 
of methodological individualism (Epstein, 2006), for example, by using fully-
fledged traditional individualist methodologies, such as game theory (Macy & 
Willer, 2002), by relying theoretically on traditional individualist theorists 
(Meyer et al., 2009) or by decisions concerning the process of modelling, such as 
not representing institutions in the models (Conte et al., 2001). This latter aspect 
is fundamental in the understanding of how agent-based modelling works. The 
method is said to focus on the explanation of social phenomena by postulating a 
bottom-up transition for the micro to the macro level, based on the interaction 
on the individual agents located at the micro level. In this chapter it will be 
argued that the individualist view of the practice of computational social science 
is only tenable by misrepresenting and oversimplifying the philosophy 
underlying the methodological individualist position and its compatibility with 
widespread epistemological and ontological principles of general contemporary 
science. 
The text is organised as follows: In the first section, the micro-macro and 
structure-agency dualisms are reviewed. It will be argued that the notion of 
levels associated with these dualisms is strongly linked to a distortion of 
individual contributions to the debate and of the philosophical tenets underlying 
each dualism. Later, the way in which the dualisms have been approached and in 
computational social science is described. It is claimed that the entity-based and 
dynamic character of agent-based modelling are the two features through which 
the method is linked to methodological individualism. In the following two 
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sections, these two aspects are discussed. The third section analyses the 
philosophical foundations of methodological individualism and shows that these 
foundations are not only problematic, but also not reflected in the practice of 
agent-based modelling. The fourth section does the same analysis for the 
dynamic aspect of the method.    
The micro-macro and structure-agency dualisms 
The micro-macro and structure-agency dualisms are considered the most 
important theoretical topic in social science (Alexander & Giesen, 1987; Archer, 
1996). These dualisms are usually conceived as the American and the European 
version, respectively, of the basic assumptions for explaining the constitution of 
the social life. They deal with the idea that social life seems to rely on the 
interaction of entities or forces at different levels of reality and with different 
properties, for example, the individual and the state. There are some clear 
differences between the two, including the fact that what is usually called a state 
is an institution that contains a collection of individuals. This leads to particular 
distinctions in epistemology and ontology, for example, regarding whether the 
goals of the state can be reduced to the goals of the individuals comprising it. In 
no discipline has this topic received more attention than in sociology. Psychology 
and history, due to their nature of study, tend to focus more on the micro/agency 
and macro/structure, respectively (Wagner, 2003; Winch, 1990). Economics, on 
the other hand, has mostly favoured micro/agency views because of the 
theoretical-methodological success of the neoclassical paradigm (Tribe, 2003). 
Finally, anthropology because of its strong reliance on qualitative methods and 
the focus on local analysis of non-Western non-capitalist societies, has not 
produced robust philosophical theorisation (Kuznar, 1997). Sociology, on the 
contrary, has developed as a multiparadigmatic discipline, where a great 
diversity of approaches to these dualisms coexist both in time and space (Ritzer, 
1975). 
In spite of the importance of this topic and the amount of literature produced 
about it, there is still strong and widespread disagreement on even some of the 
most basic philosophical issues underlying the discussion. The problem starts 
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with the way the dualisms themselves have been historically reconstructed. 
Sociology, unlike the other social disciplines, has a strong tendency to link 
theoretical discussions back to the classics (Baehr, 2002; Connell, 1997; Hughes, 
Sharrock, & Martin, 1995). There is a basic assumption, paradigmatically 
reflected, for example, by the existence of a Journal of Classical Sociology, that 
crucial theoretical discussions can benefit from the inclusion of the classics, 
because they delineated or anticipated the key theoretical tenets of these 
discussions. This trademark of sociological theorisation, which some consider 
has a negative effect on sociological theory, is still pervasive both in the 
mainstream and many of the peripheral areas developed late in the twentieth 
century (Buttel, 2002; Giddens, 1987).  
Sociological theory has not achieved a high level of formalisation, so the process 
of theory development and change depends on a complex hermeneutic 
reconstruction of the classical tradition. The interpretation of this classical 
tradition has to deal with the fact that the understanding of the classics relies on 
many texts that were put together using unpublished or unfinished manuscripts 
or secondary data, such as lecture notes. It also has to account for the fact that 
social theorists’ theoretical-methodological approaches do not remain invariant 
over time (Hughes et al., 1995). Social dynamics have also played a role. The 
historical-geographical context has had a significant weight on the way this 
tradition is reconstructed. The work of Weber, and with it the German neo-
Kantian sociology, for example, was not introduced into American sociology until 
the late thirties. The political and ideological contexts have had influence as well. 
Parsons’ interest in Weber derived partially from the way Weber’s approach 
radically differed methodologically from the strong empiricism that dominated 
American academia in the early twentieth century. In the same way, the 
functionalism and positivism associated with Durkheim’s account is mostly due 
to the discussion about positivism in British sociology during the sixties and 
seventies (Turner, 2007).        
This historical backtracking has the downside that, due to all the different 
elements that have to be taken into account, individual contributions can be 
easily oversimplified and/or misrepresented, putting an unnecessary burden on 
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the reconstruction of the discussion.  Take the case of Durkheim and Goffman. 
When historically reconstructing the discussion, Durkheim is usually aligned on 
the macro/structure side and Goffman on the micro/agency side. Durkheim 
certainly developed a position stressing the important role of society, 
popularised by statements such that the object of sociology are social facts, as 
“[…] manners of acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are 
invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over 
him” (Durkheim, 1982, p. 52). Yet, the implications of these statements can be 
easily overblown. The Rules of Sociological Method is a methodological manifesto 
that focuses more on advancing Comte’s philosophical principles than in actually 
setting the methodological foundations for Durkheim’s own approach (Lukes, 
1992). Durkheim has a place for agency in his account. It is hard to notice it 
because it is addressed in his writings about morality, which have not received 
the same attention as his major sociological work, partly because much of it has 
never been translated (Ceri, 2005; Shilling & Mellor, 1998). It is also neglected 
because it stands in opposition to the traditions of the enlightenment and 
romanticism, especially the Kantian (Durkheim, 1961).   
Something similar happens with Goffman. The dramaturgical approach to face-
to-face interaction put forward in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life is 
usually considered one of the paradigmatic cases of micro/agentic approaches to 
social theorisation. The popularity of the book, his first major publication, has 
significantly eclipsed Goffman’s movement towards the macro/structural factors 
of face-to-face interaction in his latter work. While the core of the dramaturgical 
approach revolves around individual decision-making, in later writings Goffman 
suggests, among other things, that autonomous individual intention is not the 
source of behaviour. “If persons have a universal human nature, [he claims], they 
themselves are not to be looked to for an explanation of it. One must look rather 
to the fact that societies everywhere, if they are to be societies, must mobilise 
their members as self-regulating participants in social encounters” (Goffman, 
1982, p. 44). There is nothing biological about this ‘nature’. He is talking about 
behavioural traits that are acquired through social interaction. When this nature 
is acquired, he says, “the person becomes a kind of construct, built up not from 
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inner psychic propensities but from moral rules that are impressed upon him 
from without”(Goffman, 1982: 45).      
Technical and interpretative challenges posed by Durkheim and Goffman’s 
theoretical accounts can be partly blamed for the oversimplification and 
misrepresentation of their theoretical position. Another important reason for the 
inadequate reconstruction of individual contributions is the way the dualisms 
themselves are understood. The micro-macro and structure-agency dualisms, as 
said, are usually distinguished in geographical terms: the former prevails in the 
American literature, whereas the latter does it in the European. Yet, 
philosophical principles underlying both dualisms are different. The micro-
macro dualism is more overarching, for it is introduced in social science 
following a wider concern in general science about the mereological structure of 
nature (Schaffer, 2003; Stoljar, 2010). Because of this connection, the most 
significant difference between the two dualisms is that the micro-macro dualism 
significantly relies on the positivist notion of levels of nature (Halfpenny, 2003). 
This reliance on a layered view of the world has been reinforced in the micro-
macro dualism by the strong connection to the quantitative methodological 
tradition, which played a significant role in the development and consolidation of 
sociology in the United States, during the early decades of the twentieth century 
(Calhoun, 2007; Turner & Turner, 1990). 
The assumption of a layered nature has made the micro-macro dualism more 
reliant on traditional philosophical issues associated with the discussion about 
levels, such as reduction (Silberstein, 2002). It has also introduced an important 
ontological tendency to equate the micro level with the level of intentional 
agents. Although some accounts of the structure-agency dualism also call for 
reduction (e.g. Knorr-Cetina, 1981a), this reduction usually does not reach the 
radical reductionism of some of the micro (e.g. Collins, 1981) and macro (e.g. 
Blau, 1977) reductive account. In turn, although in many cases individual actors 
are agents (e.g. Giddens, 1984), there are also formulations in which different 
kinds of social collectivities are taken as agents (e.g. Touraine, 1977). The 
layered view of the world also had important implications for those attempts, 
advanced during the last decades of the twentieth century, trying to solve the 
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dualism. While the agency/structure dualism was approached via synthesis (e.g. 
Bourdieu, 1998; Giddens, 1984; Habermas, 1991), the efforts to move past the 
micro-macro distinction were articulated in terms of transition between levels 
(e.g. Alexander, 1987) or by the introduction of a third level i.e. meso level (e.g. 
Little, 1991).  
Although the synthesis or linkage of the micro-macro/structure-agency dualism 
was the most important theoretical project in sociology during the last decades 
of the twentieth century (Alexander, Giesen, Münch, & Smelser, 1987; Knorr-
Cetina & Cicourel, 1981), the outcome can hardly be considered satisfactory. The 
dualisms still underlay the overall practice of the discipline, both at the 
theoretical and the methodological levels (Barnes, 2003; Ritzer, 2011). The 
persistence of these ‘two sociologies’, as Dawe (1970) labels them, each focusing 
on the exploration of social life following opposite theoretical-methodological 
strategies, might be strongly linked to the fact that the philosophy of social 
science has been built around those dualisms. The discussion about levels has 
strongly permeated social science’s basic assumptions about ontology, reduction, 
explanation, description, causation and generalisation (Little, 2007). The 
philosophical principles for each case are not necessarily the same.  
Because of this lack of clarity regarding the philosophical foundation of the 
dualisms, it is difficult to identify the epistemic and non-epistemic factors 
influencing the distinctions, which eventually renders the different reductive and 
non-reductive accounts incommensurable (de Regt et al., 2009; Ylikoski & 
Kuorikoski, 2008). Due to the all-encompassing character of the dualisms, the 
discussion about their foundation has developed a strong epistemological and 
ontological character, leaving aside methodological concerns (van Bouwel, 
2004). The philosophy of social science has failed to provide integrated accounts 
of ontology, epistemology and methodology. Empirical work eventually starts 
referring to the dualism in an overly simplified way or dismissing theoretical 
assumptions altogether. This has led to the well-known gap between theory and 
practice in social science (Abbott, 2001b; Coleman, 1986; Gintis, 2009a; Porpora, 
2008). 
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The reasons why methodological concerns should be included in the theoretical 
reflection about the micro-macro/structure-agency dualisms is that methods 
inform in significant ways the intuitions about philosophical aspects of the social 
world. As mentioned, one of the reasons why the levels perspective is more 
common in the micro-macro dualism is because of the strong reliance on 
quantitative methods, where a clear distinction in the formalisation and 
measurement of individual- and system-based variables can be made. 
Methodological considerations are important for a theoretical account because, 
first, measurement of social aspects can be politically or ideologically informed 
and, second, this measurement can produce changes on the same phenomenon 
being measured (Hacking, 1996; Little, 1998). The measurement of poverty is an 
example of the former. Using the scale variable income distribution to measure 
poverty provides important advantages in terms of standardisation, which is 
crucial, for example, to easily measure the impact of public policy. It is, however, 
a very poor indicator of what poverty really means in the social domain, for it 
does not account for the different aspects and context from which poverty can 
result (Sen, 2001). Labelling theory provides an example of the latter. The basic 
assumption behind this theory is that social categorisation can produce 
behavioural change in individuals inside or outside the social group that has 
been labelled in a particular way. Goffman’s (1968) work on stigmatisation is 
paradigmatic.  
By introducing methodological considerations into the discussion about social 
dualisms, the basic assumptions underlying the discussion, which by now are 
diffused in a complex network of overlapping arguments, have to be 
reconsidered. The micro-macro/structure-agency discussion is reconstructed in 
social science as a ‘history of ideas’. In this reconstruction, individual 
contributions receive significant attention. Yet, as shown, when reconstructing 
the debate in this way, the narrative coherence is kept together through the   
oversimplification and misrepresentation of some important elements of these 
individual contributions, as well as the neglect of the differences between both 
dualisms. This, it will shown in the next section, has an important implication for 
the way the dualisms have been adopted in computational social science.  
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Agent-based modelling and the social dualisms  
Two elements of agent-based modelling are crucial for understanding its 
connection with the micro-macro/structure-agency dualisms in social science: 
its dynamic and individual-oriented character. The dynamic character is 
provided by the information processing capabilities of computer programs. The 
practice of modelling is based on the manipulation of one object: the source, in 
order to get information about a second object: the target, on which direct 
experimentation is not possible for technical, moral or theoretical-
methodological reasons. The relationship mediating between the two objects is 
one of representation. The source is meant to represent the target in aspects that 
are deemed important within the context on which the model is used (Frigg, 
2006; Suárez, 2010). The information processing capabilities of computer 
programs allow using computer models to represent some time-evolution of the 
target phenomenon (Gooding & Addis, 2008; Hartmann, 1996). In the case of 
agent-based models, the time-evolution produced by running the program is 
taken to represent the temporal evolution of the system. The changes produced 
in the model by the execution of the program are meant to represent the changes 
the phenomenon of interest goes through over time (Gilbert, 2000).      
The individual-oriented character of agent-based modelling is given by the fact 
that the method is predominantly an instance of object-oriented programming. 
Models are built as a collection of self-contained programs controlling their own 
behaviour, according to built-in data structures and procedures (Gilbert & 
Troitzsch, 2005). The term ‘agent’ is introduced following its use in the field of 
distributed artificial intelligence, a sub area of artificial intelligence developed 
since the seventies (Moulin & Chaib-Draa, 1996). As the name suggest, this 
subfield, unlike traditional artificial intelligence, focuses on the distribution and 
coordination of knowledge and actions. It emerged as a practical problem-
solving area of research, aimed at finding solutions for the challenges posed by 
the increasing implementation and expansion of interconnected information 
systems (Hewitt & Inman, 1991). The ‘social’ in distributed artificial intelligence 
has to do with the fact that some of the agent’s procedures depend on input 
received from the surrounding.   
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Agency in distributed artificial intelligence is approached from a narrow and a 
broad view. The narrow view suggests agents have four basic features: 1) 
autonomy: they operate without human or artificial interference and have 
certain degree of control over their actions, 2) social ability: agents can interact 
with each other, 3) reactiveness: agents can perceive the surrounding 
environment and act in response to the input from it, and 4) proactivity: 
behaviour is not just reactive, but can also respond to built-in goals (Wooldridge 
& Jenning, 1995). The broad view complements these features with other 
human-like attributes, both at the physical level e.g. locomotion, and the 
cognitive level e.g. emotion-like responses (Carley & Newell, 1994; Wooldridge & 
Jenning, 1995).  
Computational social science developed following the insights of the narrow 
view. Autonomy is taken as a key feature, for it not only accounts for the crucial 
foundation of agency in the philosophical domain, but also gives methodological 
advantages, such as the possibility to build a model with heterogeneous agents. 
Social ability has also been highlighted, although the emphasis has been put in 
the interdependence that derives from this interactive capacity of agents (Macy 
& Willer, 2002). Reactivity and proactivity have been methodologically 
constrained, following insights from complexity theory. Reactivity has been 
articulated as a need to make agents follow simple rules and proactivity has been 
reinterpreted in terms of adaptive behaviour. First, because of the assumption 
that complex phenomenon at the macro level can emerge from simple adaptive 
interaction at the micro level; second, because simple rules make easier to 
identify the operating mechanism (Axelrod, 1997a; Gilbert, 2008; Miller & Page, 
2007).  
The object-oriented character of agent-based modelling has been used in 
computational social science to put forward a methodological agenda that picks 
up the basic postulate of methodological individualism: explanation in social 
science should be based on individuals and their actions (Epstein, 2006). 
Methodological individualism is more closely associated with the micro-macro 
than the structure-agency dualism because it relies on the level ontology and 
equates the micro with the individual level (Udehn, 2001). Computational social 
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science, by the adoption of methodological individualism, introduces the micro-
macro dualism into its philosophical foundations and, with it, all the 
philosophical principles and terminology that underlie the dualism, such as 
‘bottom-up’, ‘microfoundations’, ‘microspecifications’ or  ‘macropattern’. Agent-
based modelling becomes a “[…] bridge between the micro and macro level” 
(Macy & Willer, 2002, p. 162 Emphasis added).  
The dynamic character of the model becomes relevant for the bridging. The time-
evolution of the computational model in computational social science is not only 
used to represent a time lapse, but also the time evolution of the phenomenon of 
interest in terms of a level transition from the micro to the macro. With the 
incorporation of methodological individualism, computational social science not 
only adopts the micro-macro dualism, but also picks a side. Agent-based models 
are said to provide bottom-up explanation of social phenomenon (Epstein & 
Axtell, 1996; Macy & Flache, 2009). This vertical directionality in the transition 
between levels that is added to the temporal representation of the evolution of 
the phenomenon is meant to account for the basic ontological tenet of 
methodological individualism, according to which the relationship between the 
micro and the macro is one of supervenience i.e. macro entities are ontologically 
determined by micro entities (Hedström & Bearman, 2009; Udehn, 2001). By 
understanding the social as supervenient, agent-based modelling provides an 
account of temporal reductionism in the micro-macro link.              
It is argued that agent-based modelling departs from traditional methodological 
individualism because of the embeddedness of individual action (Macy & Flache, 
2009). Yet, while relational and environmental factors are fundamental for the 
model’s operation, the output of the models is usually read off only in terms of 
individual intentional action. Despite the fact that spatially explicit models of 
segregation yield results that cannot be adequately accounted for by aspatial 
measurements of segregation (Bruch & Mare, 2009; Reardon & O’Sullivan, 2004), 
Schelling’s model is commonly addressed in agent-based modelling in terms of 
individual preferences alone. This partly following Schelling himself, who frames 
the tipping model of segregation within his methodological individualist account 
of explanation (Schelling, 1978).  
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In what follows, it will be argued that the level ontology, introduced in 
computational social science by the adoption of methodological individualism 
and the micro-macro link, has had negative implications. The micro-macro 
dualism permeates the practice of social science at so many levels that the 
articulation of a coherent account of epistemological and non-epistemological 
goals of social science becomes difficult. In computational social science, the 
introduction of the philosophical framework of the dualism has produced some 
important limitations in the use of agent-based modelling. These limitations, it 
will be shown, do not necessarily reflect methodological drawbacks of the 
method because they emerge in the narrative to fill the gap between the model 
design output and its interpretation as a second-order task.  
The individual-micro level reconsidered 
The level ontology associated with the micro-macro link and methodological 
individualism has been formulated in many different ways (Alexander & Giesen, 
1987; Udehn, 2001). Yet, there are three main core philosophical assumptions 
underlying the micro-individualist accounts that are relatively widespread. One 
is epistemological and the other two are ontological (Epstein, 2007). It will be 
shown that these three assumptions are not justified in the practice of agent-
based modelling.    
The primacy of intentionality 
The epistemological assumption of methodological individualism suggests that, 
because individuals and their actions are the main constituent of social 
phenomena, the intention ascribed to the action by the individual should have a 
central role in explanation. This is probably the most widespread assumption of 
methodological individualism (Demeulenaere, 2011; Elster, 2007; Hedström, 
2005; Martin, 2011). Yet, it has two very important epistemological 
subassumptions for which justification is rarely provided: the first one is about 
what is gained in explanation by focusing on intentionality; the second is about 
intentionality taken as a property of individuals.   
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Methodological individualism has not articulated an explicit account of its goals 
of explanation, both epistemological and non-epistemological (Lukes, 1968; 
Udehn, 2001). That, however, is key to understanding the prospects and 
limitations of this philosophical account (de Regt et al., 2009; Ylikoski, 2009). 
The fact that individuals make decisions based on intentions is not a reason in 
itself to assume intentionality should have a crucial role in the explanation of 
social life. Associating a particular behaviour with a social norm, for example, can 
suffice if prediction is the explanatory goal in mind. The usefulness of 
intentionality for other explanatory goals widely regarded as important e.g. 
control, depends on how much of the world is constituted intentionally. Micro 
approaches to everyday life suggest individuals do not go about their life deeply 
reflecting about everyday interaction (Garfinkel, 1967; Schütz, 1967). Even 
accounts of intentional action acknowledge intentionality is not ubiquitous. In 
Weber’s (1978) account, for example, two out of four ideal types are not 
intentional: those that are motivated by emotions of tradition. For those two that 
are intentional, interpretive research is aimed at discovering the context of 
meaning in which actions are embedded. Some of these contexts, Weber 
suggests, strongly determine individual action, so knowledge about the context 
might suffice for explanatory goals such as control. Unless a clear account of 
explanation is spelled out, intentionality should be kept for the analysis of 
particular contexts, under particular explanatory goals.  
Intentionality is sometimes also justified philosophically, by widespread 
scientific values, such as realism (Hedström, 2005). There are, however, 
technical and theoretical reasons to question the general validity of these claims. 
Among the latter is the fact that a proper account of these values is never spelled 
out. Scientific realism, for example, can be articulated in semantic, 
epistemological or ontological terms (Chakravartty, 2007). Different kinds of 
realisms lead to different kinds of epistemological approaches (Martin & Heil, 
1999; Psillos, 2009). Explaining intention in terms of maximisation is realistic 
from a descriptive perspective, but not from a cognitive one. Individual motives 
could follow a criteria of maximisation from a descriptive perspective, but that is 
not necessarily the reason why individuals behave that way (Conte & 
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Castelfranchi, 1995). The cognitive realism of intentional action is, at the same 
time, difficult to prove. Intentionality itself is not accessible, so there is always 
attribution of intention to particular actions. Issues, for example, of self-
reporting, can be associated to respondents not being truthful, but also to 
cognitive biases that affect the attribution (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Interpretive 
approaches, where attribution is made by the researcher, can avoid some of 
these biases, but not all (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Additional problems arise, like 
the possibility to impute a different context of meaning for intentional action, a 
problem that is constantly stressed in comparative studies (Geertz, 1973; Winch, 
1990).   
The association of intentionality with the individual actor is at the core of the 
contemporary notion of agency and is one of the key differences in the micro-
macro dualism. Yet, despite its intuitive soundness, the linking has important 
philosophical assumptions on which there is no widespread consensus (Lukes, 
1968). The idea of imputing intentionality to actors has strong connections to 
another social dualism: free will-determinism. While this is a longstanding 
dualism in Western thought, it played a major role in the political and 
philosophical literature since modernity and was one important predecessor of 
the micro-macro distinction (Alexander & Giesen, 1987; Kramnick, 2010). The 
inquiry about free will has a distinctive individualist connotation. When this 
concept was articulated in the far-reaching moral inquiry of the enlightenment, a 
particular view of agency, in which intentional individual action becomes an 
individual property of the actor performing the action, was generated (Archer, 
2004; Joas, 1996). This Kantian approach to morality in which individual actor 
and agent are equated is at the core of Durkheim’s (1961) criticism, as well as 
Goffman’s (1990) notion of human nature, described above. While this 
connection is usually one of the basic postulates of the micro-macro, it only 
obtains by oversimplifying the approach to agency and the social world (Bunge, 
2000b; Lukes, 1968).  
It has been suggested that the linking of intentionality and individual actor is one 
of the reasons why, in general, the project of linking or synthesising the micro-
macro/structure-agency dichotomies has not been successful (Alexander, 1992). 
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Others go even further and suggest the idea of the individual is just a myth of 
modernity (Midgley, 2003). These are not isolated positions. Challenges to the 
attribution of agency to individual actors are not uncommon, although the 
philosophical implications of these challenges are rarely explored. Both Dewey 
(1928, 1958) and Mead (1972), for example, developed a processual approach to 
action and interaction in which agency was clearly a property that developed out 
of social interaction. Yet, Mead’s interactive approach to agency was 
‘individualised’ in symbolic interactionism, so as to fit traditional methodological 
individualism (Joas, 1997), while Dewey’s account only made it to social theory 
since the nineties (Abbott, 2007; Emirbayer, 1997). Alternative approaches, such 
as Elias’ figurational sociology or Luhmann’s systemic approach, have received 
recognition for their methodology and general theoretical approach, but the 
philosophical implications are rarely developed. Elias, for example, is mainly 
known for his case-based process sociology (e.g. Elias, 1982), but his discussion 
about how the semantics of the scientific worldview shape social theory and 
understanding have been rarely discussed (Elias, van Krieken, & Dunning, 1997; 
Elias, 1991, 1993). Luhmann’s account, on the other hand, is discussed in terms 
of its connection with Parsons’ functionalism and its approach to complexity 
science. Yet, his discussion about the political and contextual nature of the 
philosophical foundations of the modern notion of individual are neglected (Loet 
Leydesdorff, 2003; Luhmann, 1986, 1995).       
The pervasive character of the epistemological assumption about the primacy of 
intentionality of methodological individualism does not seem to be linked to the 
robustness of its philosophical foundations, but rather to its vagueness and 
ambiguity. The fundamental subassumptions about why intentionality should be 
important in the first place and why intentionality should be considered and 
individual property are far from well-delineated. A context of research in which 
they do not seem to be necessary is not difficult to devise. While the 
epistemological and non-epistemological goals of the programme of 
methodological individualism remains undefined, the prospects and possibilities 
of an approach to explanation based on intentional action will remain far from 
conclusive.   
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The furniture of the world 
The two ontological assumptions of methodological individualism, on the other 
hand, are closely connected for they both have the same philosophical basis. The 
first one is relies on the principles of scientific materialism and realism; the 
second, on causation. The first assumption refers to what is commonly called ‘the 
furniture of the world’. Modern science is empirical and scientific materialism 
has become the most widespread approach to scientific ontology (van Fraassen, 
2002). Materialism is a form of ontological monism, suggesting that matter is the 
fundamental metaphysical object of reality (Wimsatt, 2007). In contemporary 
science, ontological materialism is usually paired with epistemological scientific 
realism, which accounts for the truth-seeking nature of scientific theories 
(Bunge, 2010; Chakravartty, 2007). By linking both concepts, matter becomes 
the epistemological and ontological foundation of modern scientific inquiry. In 
the social domain, ontological materialism has been taken as the claim that 
individuals are the constitutive matter of the human world and society can only 
be considered material from a epiphenomenological perspective (Elster, 2007; 
Hedström, 2005).    
The soundness of the individualist position depends on the how much sense can 
be made of the concepts of materialism and realism, as well as the connection 
between the two, both in social and general science. Methodological 
individualism has prevailed in the philosophy of social science by suggesting 
there is a widespread agreement in contemporary philosophy of science about 
what scientific realism and ontological materialism are and the way they are 
connected (Bunge, 2000b; Kaidesoja, 2013; Ylikoski, 2012). However, that is not 
an accurate representation of the situation. There has been a resurfacing of non-
reductive materialism in contemporary science, advanced mainly by researchers 
working on complexity and philosophy of mind (Papineau, 2008; Polger, 2012). 
While not all these approaches move away from ontological monism, all of them 
have in common the rejection of straightforward reduction of the macro level in 
that way it is usually suggested by methodological individualists. The 
contemporary literature on modelling, on the other hand, with its focus on the 
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fictional aspects of the practice of modelling, has led to an increase of 
epistemological antirealist accounts in different areas of contemporary science 
(Suárez, 2009b). In turn, in order to cope with the challenges of instrumentalism, 
contemporary epistemological realism has led to deflationary i.e. very simplified 
or minimalist, forms of realism, vaguely explored in social science so far 
(Massimi, 2011; Sismondo, 1996). This deflationary realism is unlikely to 
provide support for the ontological programme of methodological individualism, 
both because it assumes a deflationary form of agent intentionality and because 
it rearticulates the connection between epistemology and ontology through a 
different kind of ontological objects, for example, structures (Kincaid, 2008; 
Ross, 2008).    
In social science, the connection between ontology and epistemology has led to a 
distortion of the former because of its implicit subordination to the 
epistemological and non-epistemological goals of the research programme. 
Culture, for example, is defined from an individualist perspective as a “[…] a 
cluster of desires and beliefs shared by a collectivity” (Hedström, 2005, p. 154). 
This definition, however, is not compatible with the most widespread definitions 
of culture, which consider artefacts as one definitional factor of the notion of 
culture (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Tomasello, 
2009; Vygotsky, 1978). Material objects are clearly ontologically distinct from 
individuals. The problem is not of linguistics. There is a systematic neglect of 
non-individual factors of the social world, either material, environmental or 
physical, that are downplayed in the ontological approach of methodological 
individualism (Bergmann, 1992; Dunlap, 2002; Gieryn, 2000; Murphy, 1995; 
Nowotny, 1992; Preda, 1999; Udry, 1995; Urry, 2004). 
The reason for that neglect is that those non-individual factors are sometimes 
considered irrelevant or unaccountable for from an epistemological or 
methodological perspective in methodological individualism (Bunge, 2000b; 
Epstein, 2007). Yet, methodological and epistemological constraints should not 
be straightforwardly transferred to ontology. The ontological character of non-
human factors can be endogenised and analysed through its effects on human 
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action. This approach can help meeting certain explanatory goals, but using this 
epistemological decision to suggest that non-individual properties can be 
ontologically reduced leads to a logical fallacy (Lukes, 1968). The fact that 
culture, taken as a cluster of desires and beliefs, can successfully explain the non-
individual ontological features of cultural macro phenomena is not because the 
success of the reductive ontological programme of methodological individualism, 
but because the concept of culture has been redefined in such a way that these 
non-human factors are not relevant anymore. The success of the explanation is 
guaranteed analytically, not empirically (Epstein, 2007; Polger, 2012).      
The ontological assumption about the furniture of the world is not particularly 
strong by itself. First, because the environment and the material world have an 
undeniable separate ontological status from that of the individual and, second, 
because scientific materialism and realism do not necessarily provide 
philosophical support for the reductive ontology of methodological 
individualism. This philosophical support, however, has been sought through the 
reliance on the metaphysics of causation. The individualist assumption about the 
metaphysics of causation combines epistemological and ontological elements, 
but these are not always articulated in the same way. In individualist 
approaches, causation is usually analysed through statistical association or 
distributions of individual variables, either reflecting biological or social 
individual properties e.g. age or income, or individual decisions e.g. defect or 
cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma (Barringer et al., 2013; Freedman, 1999; 
Woodward, 2007a). In both cases, causation relies on the assumption that there 
are individual variables that can be objectively measured. Causation, however, 
does not rely on a particular ontological category or entity, but on the notion of 
expectation (Woodward, 2013a). This idea of causation as expectation has been 
dominant in social accounts of intentional action. The focus has been on 
identifying, abstracting and generalising intentional states or individual 
properties that make a given individual action expected (Martin, 2011; Weber, 
1949). 
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The metaphysics of causation             
When the discussion about causation shifts from the individual to the social, the 
metaphysics of causation changes as well. It goes from a regularity account to 
one of dispositions. Expectation is replaced by causal powers through the focus 
on the causal efficacy of action. The argument has two basic formulations. The 
first one focuses on the ontology of causation from a temporal perspective; the 
second one, from a powers perspective. The latter suggests there are entities i.e. 
individuals, with some particular powers i.e. agency, that can be used to produce 
changes in the entities themselves or in other entities by the exercise of the 
power it possesses i.e. action (Ahmed, 2007; Sehon, 2007). The problem with this 
approach is that the idea of causal efficacy of action is linked to the traditional 
idea of agency and intentionality. There are three basic downsides: 1) when the 
focus is on intention, bodily motion is neglected, for the focus is on the link 
between intentions and action (Sintonen, 1989), 2) the causal connection is 
assumed by the very introduction of the description of action in intentional 
terms, for it provides the conditions for individuation of action (Turner, 2003b) 
and 3) intentional causal explanation does not necessarily correspond to actual 
causation, for intentional attributions, as mentioned, do not always match the 
real motives behind a given action (Winch, 1990).   
The problems for the ontology of dispositions put forward by methodological 
individualist is not problematic only for the connection with agency and 
intention, but also by the very conceptualisation of the causal connection 
between causal relata. The most straightforward way to understand agent 
causation in the social domain is to take agent’s intentionality as the cause, and 
the action as the effect (Weber, 1978). The problem with this, however, is that 
there is a metaphysical gap between the cause and effect, arising precisely from 
the neglect of bodily action, which is not easily justifiable from a powers 
metaphysics (Ellis, 2008a; Sehon, 2007). Another option is to suggest the action 
is the cause and the effect is desired outcome, but this is even more problematic, 
if both are meant to be changes in the world, such as actions. There are, in 
principle, no criteria by which they can be individuated, unless the effect is 
retrospectively explained by the original intention (Rose, 1954). This solution 
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faces the same metaphysical problem as the first one, while adding another 
complications for methodological individualism, for it leads to dispense with 
human intentionality (Ross, 2008; Sehon, 2007). These philosophical difficulties 
have led to address the causality of action mostly in terms of the means-ends 
scheme, both taken as mental states (Schulte, 1999; Wrong, 1961).  
Focusing on the means-ends relationship undermines the very dispositional 
account of causation the methodological individualists try to put forward. The 
ontology of dispositions cannot be used to reject the idea of the social, while at 
the same time keeping the idea of individual intentional action. Eventually, the 
ontological argument about the metaphysics of causation does not differ much 
from the epistemological argument of methodological individualism. If the 
ontology of dispositions is eventually put aside, just like the epistemological 
argument, the action-based metaphysics of causation are undermined by the 
vagueness and ambiguity surrounding the epistemological and non-
epistemological goals of explanation. If this ontology were kept, new problems 
would arise. If bodily motion is taken into account, for example, intentionality 
becomes a macro property of a micro brain state (Kim, 2005; Ross, 2005). The 
question of reduction would arise and social science would have to deal with the 
complicated discussion about reduction in the philosophy of mind.  
The temporal perspective of dispositional individual causation, on the other 
hand, is also based on the idea of individual powers, but the argument is 
articulated based on assumptions about the spatiotemporal character of social 
phenomena, not the link with individuals’ intention. This approach does not 
focus on the productive capacity of the powers, but on their spatiotemporal 
individuation. It is claimed that “[t]he causal efficacy of actions would be readily 
seen if we were able to press a pause button that suddenly froze all individuals 
and prevented them from performing any further actions. All social processes 
would then come to an immediate halt” (Hedström, 2005, p. 28). Causal efficacy 
in this case, following its meaning in philosophy of mind, is taken to be a 
generative capacity of whatever is taken as a the relata of causation (Kim, 1993). 
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This temporal approach to dispositional causation is also problematic. Processes 
are conceptually characterised by their extension in time. The fact that the social 
would cease to exist given a hypothetical pause is not an empirical, but a logical 
conclusion. It is, again, analytically true. What is interesting about this 
hypothetical situation, however, is not what is says about the social, but what it 
says about the individual. In real life, individual action is not instantaneous. It is, 
instead, a process that extends over time. The individuation of action requires a 
process of intersubjective construction of meaning on behalf of the participants 
(Joas, 1996; Parsons, 1949) and/or of ascription of intentionality to a given event 
on behalf of the researcher (Little, 2010; Sandis, 2010). A hypothetical pause 
would also render individual action causally inefficacious, for action also has a 
spatiotemporal extension. The metaphysics of causation could not rely on the 
ontological status of individuals as individuals either. Individuals are constituted 
by lower-level biological processes. The pause would stop these processes as 
well and the ontological properties of an individual would not obtain. The 
temporal approach to the metaphysics of causation in social science is only 
tenable by relying on a distinctively anthropocentric conception of time. This, 
however, is an ill-suited way of grounding a robust and coherent ontology.  
Both approaches to the metaphysics of causation used to reject the idea of the 
social are tenable only when the basic ontological categories for the micro and 
the macro are defined differently for each. In the case of agentic powers of 
individuals, it requires using for the micro an account of causation based on 
expectability, while using for the macro an account of causation based on powers 
and dispositions. In the case of the spatiotemporal dimension, it needs linking 
the social ontology with an anthropocentric conception of time that is coarse-
grained enough to guarantee the ontological status of individuals and actions, 
but not of social phenomena. Both approaches remain pervasive in the 
philosophy of social science because of the lack of clarity about the furniture of 
the world and the explanatory goals of methodological individualism. 
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Is agent-based modelling an inquiry about individuals? 
The alleged support of computational social science to the programme of 
methodological individualism is due more to the object-oriented character of 
agent-based modelling, than to a compatibility with the philosophical principles 
of methodological individualism. Computational social science cannot be taken to 
provide support for the epistemological thesis of methodological individualism 
because the ‘agent’ employed in agent-based modelling differs in significant 
ways from the ‘agent’ of social theory and philosophy. As mentioned before, 
computational social science adopted the narrow view of agency from 
distributed artificial intelligence. While the output produced by agents is usually 
interpreted using intentional language, the cognitive architecture is so basic that 
it can hardly be said to replicate the human cognitive processing behind 
intentional behaviour. In methodological individualism, underlying the idea of 
intentionality is an assumption of rationality, developed following the belief that 
an intricate cognitive structure allows processing information in a complex way 
(Archer, 2004; Kramnick, 2010). In the explanation of action, traditional social 
science has moved from accounts of perfect rationality downwards, for example, 
by limiting rationality through a restriction on the amount of information an 
agent can receive and process, based on the perception of the environment 
(Shafir & Leboeuf, 2002; Simon, 1986). Computational social science, on the 
contrary, has moved from an account of zero rationality upwards. Most models 
work on relatively simple reactive input-output behaviour, with no necessarily a 
clear or real cognitive analogue (Gilbert, 2006).  
The research agendas are different for both approaches to agents’ decision-
making. Methodological individualism has focused on modifying theories of 
rationality in order to account for observational data. This modification has been 
performed both at the descriptive and normative levels, guided by 
methodological restrictions and possibilities, as well as a deeper concern on the 
redefinition of the foundations of human rationality (Grüne-Yanoff, 2007). The 
advances in behavioural and cognitive science are key for this line of inquiry 
(Gintis, 2009a; Sun, 2006). The goal is to move from traditional instrumentalist 
accounts e.g. maximisation of utility, to realist accounts of human intentional 
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action (Conte & Castelfranchi, 1995; Hedström, 2005). In computational social 
science, on the contrary, the focus on agents has not really led to an exploration 
of rationality or intentionality. There is no theoretical build-up in terms of the 
account of rationality. Developments in areas such as behavioural and cognitive 
science are taken into account on a case-based criterion, so this contribution has 
not led to the development of any kind of theory of computational agency. The 
cognitive structure of the computational agents is mediated by modelling goals. 
It is not uncommon to see, for example, models using agents with zero rationality 
(e.g. Farmer et al., 2005), processing information in a non-symbolic way (e.g. 
Acerbi & Parisi, 2006) or using different computationally- or biologically-based 
decision-making strategies (e.g. Axelrod, 1997b). 
Without a robust approach to cognition and rationality, the description of the 
models in terms of intentional behaviour cannot be taken as more than a matter 
of added narrative to the model’s interpretation. Agent-based modelling could 
still be said to support a deflationary account of individual intentional action. It 
could be suggested that, even without an intricate cognitive structure, agent-
based modelling provides an epistemological account of the empirical 
consequences of intentional action. Such an account, however, risks, on one side, 
moving the analysis of intentionality back to instrumentalism and, on the other, 
removing the basic tenets of the notion of agency, to which the notion of 
intentionality is subordinated (Epstein, 2007; Klüver & Klüver, 2011). These two 
options are ruled out by contemporary methodological individualism, for they go 
against the realist aspirations of action theory and, even worse, might eventually 
render the concept of intentionality as such dispensable (Hedström, 2005; 
Kincaid, 2004).  
The same happens with the assumption about the furniture of the world. 
Computational social science has not subscribed to an individualistic ontology, 
nor is it bounded by the epistemological and methodological concerns of 
traditional social approaches, which required endogenisation. Agent-based 
models include a representation of an environment that works both as container 
and as object and determinant of interaction, for example, by providing food or 
constraining agents’ movement (Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Gilbert & Troitzsch, 
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2005). Many topics on computational social science, such as segregation, have 
generated a significant amount of literature about non-human factors, for 
example, space, for these factors can have a significant effect on the outcome of 
the simulation (Aydinonat, 2007; Banos, 2012; Bruch & Mare, 2009; Fossett & 
Dietrich, 2009; Pancs & Vriend, 2007). Furthermore, agent-based modelling 
provides evidence for the claim that one of the ontological downsides of 
traditional theories of action is the neglect of embodiment, in spite of the fact 
that the physical constitution of individuals is both a symbolic and material 
resource for individual action (Shilling, 2007; Turner, 2008). Agent-based 
modelling gives the possibility to model individual agents as embodied objects. 
They can have different physical features, such as life span, memory, visual field, 
metabolism or reproductive capability, which would affect the way in which the 
phenomenon is represented and the simulation’s output is generated and 
analysed (Marchionni & Ylikoski, 2013).   
The topic of causation is difficult to appraise. Computational social science does 
not have a robust account of causation. In fact, the concept is just sporadically 
addressed. The few references to the concept do not match the discussion in 
social science, for causation in computational social science is usually 
conceptualised from the view of the algorithmic nature of the simulation 
(Epstein, 1999). Leaving that aside, it is difficult to suggest that the field helps 
advancing the metaphysical argument of methodological individualism against 
the causal efficacy of the social. As mentioned, agent-based modelling has not 
developed a robust account of cognition, which only allows for a very simple 
representation of the means-ends relationship. On the other hand, it provides 
tools for modelling non-individual factors, as well as bodily functions and 
movements. The methodology can provide important insights on those issues 
where traditional theories of action fail, but can poorly contribute to those other 
issues that methodological individualism would require it to be strong at.   
In terms of the spatiotemporal efficacy of action, it is clear that agent-based 
modelling provides a way to produce spatiotemporal individuation, due to the 
discrete nature of objects and their changes. This advantage provided by the 
nature of digital computation is methodologically useful, but it should not be 
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directly taken as ontologically realistic or relevant without further inquiry. Very 
simple questions such as whether wrapping or irregular grids make a difference 
for a cellular automaton show the sensitivity of simulation to particular 
spatiotemporal representations (Flache & Hegselmann, 2001; Hoekstra et al., 
2010). In the same way, the implications of particular assumptions about the 
spatiotemporal dimension should always be taken into account. There has been 
an increase in the use of agent-based modelling for the analysis of iterated 
games. Games strongly rely on the discrete and iterative structure of turn taking 
for an alteration of this structure could even lead to the dissolution of the 
dilemma (Hoffmann, 2000; Kollock, 1998). Changes in the spatiotemporal 
interactive structure can have important implications. In computer science, this 
problem has a longstanding history and is reflected in popular models such as 
the dining philosophers suggest. Hypothesising a situation where a number of 
people, without communication with each other, have to coordinate the use of 
shared instruments in order to perform individual tasks, the model shows that 
the spatiotemporal structure regarding the use of the resources in time can 
significantly affect the efficiency of the system as a whole.        
In this section, the alleged support of agent-based modelling to the actor-based 
philosophy of methodological individualism was discussed. It was argued that 
this approach has three basic philosophical principles, one epistemological and 
two ontological. The epistemological principle refers to the primacy of 
intentional action in the explanation of the social world. The two ontological 
principles refer to the furniture of the world and the metaphysics of causation. It 
was claimed that both ontological principles were significantly influenced by the 
epistemological, but that the epistemological principle, at the same time, was not 
clear about the goals of explanation. Methodological individualism over-relies on 
the notion of intentional individual action, performed by rationally motivated 
actors. Yet, it was argued, this was not a claim for which agent-based modelling 
provides methodological support. Agent-based models use embodied and 
embedded agents with a very simple cognitive structure. While the results can be 
interpreted in terms of individual action, this interpretation neglects the 
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representational richness of these models and undermines the potential 
usefulness provided by the methodological flexibility of the method.    
The dynamics without the “bottom-up” 
Along with the individual-oriented character of methodological individualism, 
the conceptualisation of the dynamic character of the simulation is the second 
important point of connection between this philosophical perspective and 
computational social science. One fundamental assumption in the field is that 
agent-based modelling provides a way to understand the dynamic transition 
between levels. The time-evolution of a simulation does not only depict changes 
of entities in time, but also an epistemological transition from the micro to the 
macro. It depicts bottom-up dynamics. This latter assumption sets requirements 
regarding the philosophical character of the spatiotemporal transition.  
Computational social science has tried to meet the philosophical requirements 
regarding the time-evolution of social phenomena by the introduction of the 
concepts of emergence, supervenience and realisation, mostly following their use 
in contemporary philosophy of mind and complexity science (Cioffi-Revilla, 
2014; Conte, 2009; Epstein & Axtell, 1996; Gilbert, 1995; Hedström, 2005; 
Sawyer, 2004b; Squazzoni, 2012). The notion of emergence has played an 
important role in complexity theory because of its focus on the whole-parts 
relationship. Complexity theory relies on the assumption that complex behaviour 
is not centrally controlled. It is meant to arise because of the autonomous 
interactions of its components (Holland, 1995; Miller & Page, 2007; Mitchell, 
2009; Simon, 1962). The notion of emergence theoretically covers that feature of 
complex systems. The concept of emergence is used to describe the process by 
which individual, localised behaviour of the component parts give rise to 
complex macro patterns that, once they have emerged, present a relatively stable 
character that is not fully determined by and/or dependent on the character of 
these component parts (Clayton, 2006; Francescotti, 2007; Goldstein, 1999). 
Agent-based modelling, as mentioned, focuses on the interaction of agents as 
self-contained computer programs interacting iteratively in an artificial 
environment. The concept of emergence became popular in computational social 
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science because of the way computer simulation allows tacking the 
spatiotemporal development of patterns in physical and/or social space.  
In what follows, it will be argued that the way the concepts of emergence, 
supervenience and realisation have been incorporated in the theoretical-
methodological apparatus of agent-based modelling does not help clarifying the 
philosophical assumptions underlying the dynamics of a simulation. First, 
because there are important unresolved philosophical issues about these 
concepts, both in philosophy and social science; second, and most important, 
because theorisation about the spatiotemporal dimension has been pushed into 
the background and accounted for only as a secondary aspect of the vertical 
transition between ontological levels of reality.   
Emergence  
The most noticeable case of the constraints introduced by the ontology of levels 
is the concept of emergence. This is the most widespread of the three concepts 
both in computational social science and philosophy. The notion of emergence is 
commonly described as the question of whether ‘the whole is more than the sum 
of its parts’. It addresses, first and foremost, a mereological issue. It enquires 
about the relationship between parts and wholes, both from an epistemological 
and an ontological point of view. This question has been explored in terms of 
features such as qualitative novelty, unpredictability, ostensibility, etc. 
(Francescotti, 2007; Goldstein, 1999). ‘Emergence’ is introduced in 
computational social science following its use in complexity science (Gilbert, 
1995; Holland, 1995; Miller & Page, 2007). It responds to the need of accounting 
for the componential or constitutive relationships between individuals and 
society, in this case, by postulating a bottom-up level transition from the 
individual to the social. The concept of emergence experienced a significant rise 
in popularity since the eighties. However, due to the difficulty of articulating a 
consistent and robust account of it, there has been an equally increasing 
discontent in the last few years (Corning, 2002; Kim, 2006b), which is 
particularly noticeable in computational social science (Baker, 2012; Epstein, 
2006). 
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The problem with the concept of emergence is that, regardless of the intuitive 
appeal of the idea, it is difficult to use it in a scientifically robust way. Initially, the 
problem is developing criteria to scientifically measure features such as novelty. 
There is no consensus, among other things, on whether this criterion should be 
contingent on the state of knowledge. Water, for example, was taken as an 
example of emergence by some British emergentists of the late nineteenth 
century, for it was believed that its properties could not be explained by the 
properties of its constitutive entities: hydrogen and oxygen. Yet, subsequent 
development in quantum mechanics led some to reject its emergent status 
(Clayton, 2006; McLaughlin, 2008). Most importantly, the problem is that there is 
significant divergence on epistemological and ontological issues, which has led to 
several different conceptualisations of the relationships of autonomy and 
reduction between levels in emergent processes (Francescotti, 2007; Polger, 
2012).  In the case of water, for example, whereas some suggested the emergent 
character was dependant on the way its properties as a liquid differ or could not 
be anticipated by knowledge of the properties of its chemical constituents, some 
others suggested this character was dependant of how water can be conceived as 
a heteropathic outcome of a chemical reaction (McLaughlin, 2008).  
Underlying these two approaches to the emergent character of water is one key 
difference in the historical conceptualisation of emergence. On one side, there is 
a synchronic conceptualisation of emergence that focuses on the coexistence of 
entities or properties at two different levels. On the other side, there is a 
diachronic conceptualisation of emergence that focuses on the historicity 
preceding the appearance of the emergent entity or property (Humphreys, 
2008). These two conceptualisations of emergence have generated two separate 
research programmes that are not entirely compatible. Autonomy and reduction 
have been addressed in different ways for each case. The synchronic approach to 
emergence, for example, relies heavily on the notion of supervenience, so as to 
address the ontological and epistemological character of interlevel relations, 
while diachronic account is more focused on matters of spatiotemporal 
generation (Corning, 2002; Goldstein, 1999; Humphreys, 1997, 2008).           
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Along with the difficulties generated by the differences in the synchronic and 
diachronic research programmes on emergence, the issues about autonomy and 
reduction are becoming more difficult to solve, since disagreement regarding 
these aspects has grown in contemporary philosophy. Another important 
traditional distinction is the literature on emergence is that between weak and 
strong emergence (Bedau, 2008; Chalmers, 2006). The former suggests that 
high-level phenomena are conceptually or metaphysically reduced to or 
necessitated by low-level phenomena. The latter suggests high-level phenomena 
can instead be partially or fully autonomous. When the concept of emergence 
was revived in philosophy during the second part of the twentieth century, 
thanks mostly because of its articulation into the complexity framework, an 
important assumption behind the revival of the concept was that only an account 
of weak emergence was tenable in contemporary science. The reason for that 
was that twentieth century metaphysics tended towards ontological monism 
(Bunge, 2010; Kim, 2005; Welshon, 2002). Yet, no real consensus exists 
regarding the nature of weak emergence, nor how it should be measured. Bedau 
(2008), for example, suggests emergence has to do with derivability only by 
simulation. This is an appealing approach for computational social science, for it 
explicitly links emergence and computer simulation. Yet, derivability depends 
significantly on how simulation is conceived (Baker, 2012), which, at the same 
time, depends on particular conceptualisations of modelling and representation 
(Frigg, 2006; Parker, 2013; Winsberg, 2010).      
Along with the difficulties in defining weak emergence, in recent years the 
traditional claims against strong emergence have also been put to test. The 
approach to materialism traditionally used to support emergence has been 
challenged (Koons & Bealer, 2010; Polger, 2012; Schaffer, 2003). The particular 
way in which contemporary science has mixed materialism, ontological monism 
and the ontology of levels has been questioned from several fronts, for example, 
in terms of whether there is a fundamental level or whether there should be 
levels at all. The basic understanding of autonomy and reduction have also been 
challenged (Cartwright, 1983; Hendry, 2010; Sturgeon, 2001; Vicente, 2006). 
This second challenge is naturally connected with the first one, but it adds 
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further epistemological and methodological issues. It questions, for example, the 
use of the notion of reduction ‘in principle’ to justify the epistemological and 
ontological programme of reductionism in science. This criterion, it is argued, is 
not robust enough to justify a particular philosophical position, among other 
things, because it is based on relatively simple, idealised or exceptional cases. 
The reduction of chemistry to physics, for example, is usually justified referring 
to the hydrogen atom, which is a special case due to its symmetry (Hendry, 
2010).    
Supervenience 
Problems with autonomy and reduction in the analysis of emergence has usually 
been dealt with by the introduction of the concept of supervenience 
(Beckermann, 1992; Kim, 2005; McLaughlin, 1995). The contemporary usage of 
the concept derives from Davidson (2001) discussion about the connection 
between mental and brain states in philosophy of mind. From there, it later 
expanded to other branches of philosophy and general science (McLaughlin, 
1995). The notion of supervenience is used to articulate scientifically the notion 
of ontological dependence among inter-level properties, although in some cases 
it is discussed in terms of entities. The concept is usually formulated by 
suggesting no two things can differ in their supervenient properties without also 
differing in their subvenient properties. High-level properties are then said to 
supervene on low-level ones, to imply they lack of ontological autonomy. 
Supervenience became popular because it allows accounting for weak and 
synchronic emergence in a robust manner. Due to the materialist character of the 
contemporary approach to supervenience, low-level properties are usually 
physical properties. For methodological individualism, low-level properties are 
naturally those of the individual actors, while high-level properties are the 
different orders of the social. 
The concept of supervenience is mostly used by non-reductive materialists to 
keep the autonomous character of emergent phenomena, without having to give 
up ontological monism. Yet, supervenience is used by reductionists as well, for 
supervenient properties can be thought to be fully determined by the subvenient 
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base, which leads to epiphenomenalism (McLaughlin, 1995). The framework of 
supervenience allows for different approaches to determination. It can range 
from a weak notion of dependence in terms of covariation, to a strong approach 
in terms of logical or lawful necessitation (Kim, 1993). The covariation approach 
does not have serious philosophical implications, for any two properties can 
show covariation, even without being causally related to each other. That is why 
most philosophical accounts of supervenience tend to focus on strong 
approaches to determination. Supervenience in the social domain is usually used 
to argue that, even if there is something referred to as social entity or property, 
its existence is purely epiphenomenal (Hedström & Bearman, 2009).  
This epiphenomenal approach results problematic. The conceptualisation of 
supervenience in the social domain depends on an epistemological formulation 
of the furniture of the world that assumes individuals is all there is to the social 
domain. This position, as mentioned in the previous section, is not tenable. In 
social science, the metaphysical conceptualisation of social entities or properties 
has been narrowed down and delimited epistemologically, giving a 
straightforward understanding. A first problem with this approach is that it 
neglects important issues associated with strong formulations of supervenience, 
for these are usually articulated in terms of laws or causation (Davidson, 2001; 
Kim, 2005; McLaughlin, 1995). A typical example is to question whether 
consciousness is lawfully supervenient to the physical constitution of individuals 
by discussing whether it could be possible to have an individual identical to the 
rest in terms of physical constitutions, but differing from them in terms of not 
having conscious experience (Chalmers, 1996).   
In the social domain there is no robust account of nomological interlevel 
relationships on which the concept of supervenience can be grounded. This 
might be particularly true for social complexity science, since the open-ended 
and path-dependant nature of complex phenomena have been used to 
undermine the possibility of a nomological account of social phenomena 
(Castellani & Hafferty, 2009; Kincaid, 1988). Complexity highlights the fact that 
social phenomena are very sensitive to initial conditions, due to the high degree 
of interdependencies within and between systems, as well as the retroactive 
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character of the social processes. Even without considering the implications of 
the complex systems approach, the notion of causation of methodological 
individualism does not provide a solid enough foundation for grounding the 
analysis of supervenience in the social domain. As mentioned, this movement 
puts forward different metaphysical accounts of causation, depending on the 
level that is being referred to. This constitutes a first obstacle for the analysis of 
supervenience in terms of inter-level relations of dependence, for a common 
causal background for both levels should be established first.    
A second problem, partially derived from the first one, is that, due to the 
assumption of epiphenomenalism, social science dismisses the topic of identity 
in the discussion about the link between individual and social properties. In 
philosophy of mind, on the contrary, the discussion about supervenience had 
explicitly addressed an older debate in the field about brain and mental states 
identity (Place, 2004; Smart, 1959). Supervenience has been framed within the 
type-token distinction, which roughly translate to an inquiry about the 
universals-particulars distinction (Kripke, 2001; Wetzel, 2009). This framing has 
major implications for the conceptualisation of supervenience, both at the 
methodological and theoretical levels. The type-identity theory, for example, 
rules out the possibility of multiple realisation, while the token-identity theory 
does not (Kripke, 2001; Putnam, 1975).   
 The individualistic delimitation of the furniture of the world generates 
additional difficulties for an account of supervenience in the social domain. Social 
properties allegedly supervene on individuals and their actions (Healy, 1998; 
Hedström & Bearman, 2009), but this approach to supervenience faces 
difficulties when it is meant to account for the causal connection between levels. 
The causal approach to supervenience developed in philosophy of mind heavily 
relies on the principle of causal completeness or closure of the physical i.e. all 
physical events have a sufficient physical cause, and the principle of 
overdetermination or exclusion i.e. if there is a sufficient cause for one event, 
then no other event can be also taken as cause of it, unless it is a true case of 
causal overdetermination (Davidson, 2001; Kim, 1993, 2005). These two 
principles do not obtain in the social domain. The domain of individual actors 
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alone is clearly not causally complete, as the example of culture just showed. 
Without the first principle, the second is not feasible (Raymont, 2003; Vicente, 
2006).    
The notion of causal closure is important because it also depends on the 
conception of properties. Supervenience cannot be applied to many important 
social phenomena for it cannot capture relational properties that are established 
by factors or properties outside the subvenient base, such as a formal role or 
status (Epstein, 2007). One way out of this predicament would be to take agency 
as an extrinsic property of individuals (Kim, 1993). While this has been 
suggested by several authors both in social (Abbott, 2001b; Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006; Elias et al., 1997; Emirbayer, 1997; Loyal & Barnes, 2001; 
Luhmann, 1995; Schlueter, 2007) and cognitive science (Clark, 2008; Kaidesoja, 
2012; Kincaid, 2004; Sterelny, 2003), it would certainly require a redefinition of 
the subvenient base which would challenge the basic tenets of individualism.  
Multiple realisation 
Multiple realisation is the less known concept of the three, but it is maybe the 
most important from the non-reductive perspective for it is used to suggest that 
high-level properties can be realised by different low-level combination of 
properties. Unlike emergence and supervenience, the concept of multiple 
realisation was originally articulated within the discussion about the reduction 
of mental phenomena (Fodor, 1974; Putnam, 1975). While there are a few 
references to the concept in the philosophy of social science (Kincaid, 1986; 
Little, 1991), its use has been limited within the context of the philosophy of 
mind and complexity. From the latter, the concept has made its way into 
computational social science (Conte, 2009; Epstein, 1999; Sawyer, 2005). 
Multiple realisation is important for non-reductionism for it is a way to refuse 
the identity thesis of reductionist accounts i.e. that there is a one-to-one 
ontological connection between high- and low-level properties. Those high-level 
properties that are multiply realisable, of which mental states are the canonical 
example, cannot be reduced, for any given mental state could be achieved by 
different subvenient brain states (Polger & Shapiro, 2008; Putnam, 1975).  
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Multiple realisation is strongly linked to supervenience, for it also refers to inter-
level determination. Yet, multiple realisation provides a more powerful way of 
rejecting reductionism. Supervenient properties can, in principle, be globally 
reduced. The assumption of the philosophy of the enlightenment that human 
nature is always and everything the same (e.g. Hume, 2007), for example, is 
fundamental for methodological individualism, for it allows spatiotemporal 
generalisation i.e. global reduction of supervenient properties. Multiple 
realisation, on the contrary, could only allow for local reductionism, if any. There 
would need to be as many reductions as there are different instances of the 
supervenient property (Kim, 2005; Walter & Eronen, 2011).  
Although the concept of multiple realisation is well-known in the discussion 
about reduction, in the last few years it has been subject to criticism by 
researchers concerned with the development of a more general realisation 
theory. Despite its popularity, it is argued, the concept of multiple realisation has 
been poorly articulated (Gillett, 2002; Polger & Shapiro, 2008; Polger, 2008a; 
Shapiro, 2004). The main problem with the lack of a proper delimitation of the 
concept is that it hinders the understanding of the conditions of realisation 
(Bechtel & Mundale, 1999; Bickle, 2010; Sober, 1999). Realisation, unlike 
supervenience and emergence, is a decidedly ontological issue. Given this, 
analyses of multiple realisation in the social domain that focus on 
epistemological reduction (e.g. Zahle, 2003) are misguided. Certainly, one of the 
problems in social science is that methodological individualism blends together 
methodological, epistemological and ontological concerns, but understanding 
realisation in terms of inter-theoretical reduction misses the point about the 
ontological roots of the concept. This focus in ontology is important, for to make 
sense of multiple realisation, the relata of realisation should be clearly identified. 
Not all relata can take part in realisation relations: theoretical statements are not 
ontological properties with dispositional features. In turn, not all relata can take 
part in multiple realisation relations: property instances are unique, and in that 
sense not multiply realisable. Finally, not all relata provide a scientifically useful 
account of multiple realisation: any two property instantiations can differ in at 
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least one aspect that can be taken as relevant for realisation (Polger & Shapiro, 
2008; Polger, 2008b; Shapiro, 2004).     
This last aspect about what properties can be realised is of fundamental 
importance for social science. Two issues here: The first one is that, because of 
the ontological character of the inquiry about realisation, a large amount of 
literature has focused on topics such as kinds (Bickle, 2010; Boyd, 1999). The 
discussion of kinds in social science, whether natural or social, however, is vastly 
underdeveloped. The ontology of properties in social science was developed, 
especially in methodological individualism, following a simplistic approach to 
property physicalism i.e. that properties of individuals that can be clearly linked 
to physical properties (Hacking, 1999; Kuorikoski & Pöyhönen, 2012; Little, 
1991; Michell, 2007). The second issue is that the analysis of realisation in 
philosophy has been strongly linked to functionalism, for the ontological 
autonomy of realised properties is usually justified in terms of non-causal 
functional kinds (Boyd, 1999; Fodor, 1974; Polger & Shapiro, 2008). The typical 
example is that of two corkscrews that differ in colour. This seems like an 
unlikely property to claim there is multiple realisation, for colour does not seem 
to affect the way the corkscrews work. Yet, functionalism is not valued positively 
in social science, especially sociology, because it is usually associated with 
macro/structuralist social science and because it has generated philosophical 
problems for social explanation, among others in terms of circularity or teleology 
(Bredemeier, 1955; Isajiw, 1998; Joas, 1996; Turner, 2003a).  
Is agent-based modelling an inquiry about spatiotemporal level transition? 
Unlike traditional methods, agent-based modelling provides a way to explore 
social phenomena processually (Gilbert, 2000; Hartmann, 1996). Yet, the 
philosophical restrictions introduced by the ontology of levels has led to the 
conceptualisation simulation dynamics in a vertical way, in terms of a levels 
hierarchy, eventually neglecting the spatiotemporal character of social dynamics 
that are being represented. The problem with this approach is that the 
unresolved issues about the concepts of emergence, supervenience and 
realisation led computational social science to erroneously focus on solving 
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peripheral issues, leaving the most basic philosophical questions about social 
dynamics untouched. The recent transition from the theoretical-methodological 
to the empirical in computational social science (Heath et al., 2009; Meyer et al., 
2009; Squazzoni & Casnici, 2013), as well as the lack of results from this 
philosophical inquiry, eventually led to the neglect of the philosophical character 
of spatiotemporal dynamics of social phenomena and the abandonment of these 
concepts. Although some still consider theorisation on the philosophical features 
of level transition important (e.g. Conte, 2007), the use of concepts such as 
emergence in recent research within computational social science is more off-
hand. There is occasional reference to literature that dealt with these topics in 
previous years, but there no current systematic effort to articulate this 
spatiotemporal framework adequately. The concept of emergence, which played 
a definitional role in the past, has even been substituted or omitted in some 
accounts of agent-based modelling, for example, by concepts such as mechanism 
(Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Manzo, 2007a; Salgado & Marchione, 2012).  
The lack of theorisation about the spatiotemporal dynamics of agent-based 
modelling has not necessarily created a gap in the understanding of the 
methodology. The diachronicity of social phenomena is interpreted in a Humean 
way, as discrete state changes. This view satisfies the requirements of 
methodological individualism, for changes can be represented in terms of the 
effects of individual actions. Yet, as discussed, the philosophy of methodological 
individualism combines scientific and folk elements of perception that shape 
judgments about the furniture of the world and the metaphysics of causation, 
according to anthropocentric criteria of spatiotemporal ontology. This view, 
however, is inadequate for two reasons: its reliance on the possibility of an 
unproblematic spatiotemporal individuation and the use of the notion of levels 
for the definition of epistemological and ontological objects of inquiry.  
The major difficult associated with the notion of levels in social science is that 
the connection between these levels is never correctly specified. That is why, in 
part, why the notion of levels is connected with so many issues in epistemology 
and ontology (Little, 2007). This has an important impact when defining the 
objects of inquiry.  There is, however, one key issue that has not received enough 
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attention in the discussion about reductionism in social science. Due to the fact 
that the philosophy of social science tends to mash together methodological, 
epistemological and ontological concerns, little effort has been put in identifying 
the different ways in which reductionism can be achieved and how it is 
manifested (Weinberg, 2001; Wimsatt, 2006). Awareness of this issue is 
important because it allows separating the theses about reductionism, as formal 
strategies for the production of scientific knowledge, from reductionist 
approaches, as particular implementations of these theses, according to some 
epistemological and non-epistemological goals of explanation (Hiddleston, 2010; 
Polger, 2012; Sturgeon, 2001). The epistemological assumption about explaining 
the social world in terms on individuals and their actions is one such thesis; neo-
classical economics is one such approach. The latter puts the former in a wider 
theoretical-methodological context in which it is connected to other particular 
theses e.g. maximisation of utility, and a methodological apparatuses e.g. 
traditional equilibrium economics (Tribe, 2003; Winch, 1990).  
Distinguishing between theses and approaches to reductionism is important for 
most attention in the philosophical literature has been paid to the relative 
success of different approaches. Evaluations in terms of success, however, are 
misleading for they usually focus on whether the given approach solves the 
specific problem at hand without raising significant philosophical objections. The 
neo-classical paradigm, for example, has been questioned mostly because of the 
way its particular approach to rationality fails for some specific cases (Elster, 
2009; Sen, 1977; Shafir & Leboeuf, 2002) but it has not been questioned to the 
same extent regarding the warrants for explanation in terms of individuals and 
actions. As said above, the goals of explanation are rarely addressed, partly 
because they usually are not explicit, which makes that reductionist theses, such 
as explanation in term of intentional action, are just questioned partially.         
A focus on explanatory goals and the theses of reductionism could initially show 
often overlooked issues, for example, that a reductionist approach to ontological 
emergence is untenable if the subvenient base is taken to be composed by 
individuals and their actions. The accumulated material production of 
humankind and the biophysical environment are ontological constituents of 
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social phenomena (Latour, 2005; Pickering, 1995; Preda, 1999). This is one 
crucial difference between traditional methodological individualism and 
computational social science. They have different conceptualisations of the 
furniture of the world. An account of emergence should radically differ in both 
cases because of this key ontological difference. If emergence were to be 
explained reductively, the account could only achieve epistemological reduction, 
if anything. Yet, as suggested, epistemological reduction succeeds partly because 
of oversimplifications, such as the approach to culture, or because of the use of 
particular cases that make the analysis plausible, such as the hydrogen atom. 
Epistemologically, however, there is a question whether the notions of autonomy 
and reduction aim at problems worth solving in the social domain. In philosophy 
of mind, the main concern is whether properties left unreduced are 
epiphenomenal or unreal (Kim, 2005; Polger, 2012). Leaving the question of 
what counts as real aside, it is clear that individuals refer to all kind of social 
properties when planning or justifying their behaviour. This is a fact that is well 
acknowledged by individualists (Hedström & Bearman, 2009; Ylikoski, 2012). 
These properties are certainly not epiphenomenal from an intentional point of 
view.    
Many social properties are not epiphenomenal from a structural point of view 
either. A property such as “being the boss” is not the same type of property as 
“having cerebral functions”, despite both are used in statements about 
individuals and their actions. The first one is not a projectible property of the 
individual holding that property i.e. it cannot be used in a generalisation that can 
be used for prediction, for it only applies as long as the individual occupies that 
position. It is, however, projectible for vertical organisations as abstract 
organisational arrangements (Boyd, 1999; Epstein, 2008a; Goodman, 1983). 
Social properties could be reduced to projectible individual properties, and that 
is in part one of the main goals of methodological individualism, but this 
reduction implies a loss of information. In the case of hierarchical organisations, 
that lost information has to do, for example, with the dynamic aspect of the 
structure. The same is the case for physical or environmental factors. Schelling’s 
(1971) model of segregation can be explained without an explicit spatial 
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representation. If the spatial representation is explicit, however, it is the spatial 
measurements that yield better understanding of the phenomenon (Banos, 2012; 
Bruch & Mare, 2009; Pancs & Vriend, 2007; Reardon & O’Sullivan, 2004). 
Because it is not restricted by an individuals-only ontology, agent-based 
modelling can better account for these structural properties that can be 
semantically, but not ontologically reduced to individuals.  
The problem with loss of information in the approach to reduction is that it leads 
in many cases to ‘in principle’ reductive explanations. Yet, ‘in principle’, as 
mentioned, is not a solid criterion on which key philosophical decisions can be 
justified (Cartwright, 1983; Hendry, 2010). Reduction, and the underlying notion 
of levels, could still find adherents in social science because of methodological 
constraints on data collection and analysis (Abbott, 2001b; Klein & Stockley, 
2009; Udehn, 2001) and because of the explanatory goal of methodological 
individualism regarding the explanation of the social world in terms of individual 
intentions (Elster, 2007; Hedström, 2005; Martin, 2011). Computational social 
science, however, could be better off dropping the individualists’ notions of 
reduction and levels altogether. Agent-based models can operate under a more 
robust conceptualisation of the furniture of the world, with different 
assumptions about individual cognitive features and is not restricted by some of 
the analytical constraints of other social methods. The main focus on the 
exploration of the dynamic should not be the assumption about level transition, 
but about dynamic character of social properties.  
The leave the focus on ontological levels behind, computational social science 
could benefit more from the recent literature on realisation, than from that on 
emergence and supervenience. The contemporary theory of realisation focuses 
on properties as realisation relata (Gillett, 2002; Polger & Shapiro, 2008; 
Shapiro, 2004). That might be a fruitful area of inquiry, for the philosophical 
foundations of an understanding of social properties as certain structural 
arrangement that emerge and develop in time, involving the bio-physical, 
material and the conscious or unconscious participation of individuals is still 
missing (Hacking, 1999, 2002; Michell, 2007). The approach of contemporary 
realisation theory is interesting because it rejects a strong epistemological or 
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ontological definition of levels. This notion is only used from a perspectival or 
heuristic point of view (Bickle, 2010; Couch, 2011; Polger, 2010). This 
perspectival approach might be of great use, not only because it finds important 
correlates in contemporary philosophy of science (Craver & Bechtel, 2006; 
Schaffer, 2003; Wimsatt, 2007), but also because it could provide computational 
social science epistemic flexibility, in terms of the selection of the goals of 
explanation. This is not possible for methodological individualism because of its 
ontological commitment with the notion of levels and the primacy of individual 
intentionality for explanation.   
Dismissing the notion of levels could allow computational social science to 
switch from an approach to dynamics as a vertical transition to one of dynamics 
as spatiotemporally extended processes. Although “time” and “space” have been 
common subjects of study in the history of social sciences, their implications in 
the social domain have not been properly understood (Baert, 2000; Bergmann, 
1992; Nowotny, 1992; Urry, 1995, 2000). There is a vast amount of literature 
dealing with the temporal and spatial aspects of social life, especially since the 
second part of the twentieth century.  This literature, however, is scattered 
around the different social disciplines. It does not stem from an inter or 
subdisciplinary field of study (Bergmann, 1992; Nowotny, 1992), nor has it been 
consistent or continuous over time either (Adam, 1990). The notion of process as 
such has been interpreted in three basic ways: developmental, constitutional or 
trend (House, 1970; Liguori, 1942; MacIver, 1964). The first one takes process in 
an analogue way to developmental biology, emphasising transition between 
stages of development. The second takes it in a way similar to the notion of 
emergence, emphasising interaction. The third one takes process simply as 
spatiotemporal variations shown by statistical analysis. The concept, however, is 
also used informally in many ways: 1) to designate an entire disciplinary area or 
field of analysis, 2) to emphasise the diachronic aspect of social life, 3) to 
describe phenomena for which there is no proper knowledge of the causal path 
that led to them, 4) as a mean to understand a chain of events controlled by 
specific parameters and time boundaries, 5) to designate an specific type of the 
meaning of process on (4) (Vayda, McCay, & Eghenter, 1991). 
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This diversity in the approach to the notion of process in social science is partly 
due to the fact that the concept is used following the folk meaning of process, but 
also to the lack of robust philosophical foundations for the conceptualisation of 
the spacetime dimension. The inquiry about temporality and process has 
historically been carried out mostly as speculative philosophy that, in some 
cases, is highly abstract e.g. Hegel’s dialectics, and, in some others, is concerned 
with issues beyond the scientific domain e.g. process theism (Rescher, 1996). 
The discussion about process started permeating scientific philosophy and 
empirical scientific thought since the late nineteen and early twentieth centuries 
(Rescher, 1996; Sawyer, 2005). This transition in the approach to process is 
associated with an increasing interest in the perception and measuring of time 
(Bergson, 2002; James, 1980; Russell, 1915) as well as the emergence of schools 
of thought, such as British emergentism (McLaughlin, 2008) and American 
pragmatism (Fisch, 1996). While process and temporality have been 
substantially linked to empirical issues, the inquiry on this matter has not been 
entirely detached from speculative philosophy. Some of the most relevant and 
comprehensive sources, such as Whitehead’s (1978) process metaphysics, 
continued the discussion in that vein, even though they can be fruitfully applied 
latter applied in several empirical domains. In the case of agent-based modelling, 
the discussion on process was picked up from the wider area of complex 
adaptive systems, where an important emphasis has been put on the temporal 
character of adaptive responses of the system and its components (Bickhard, 
2011; Gilbert, 2000; Ilya Prigogine, 1981; Miller & Page, 2007). 
While there are several issues associated with the development of a process 
ontology (Helin et al., 2014; Rescher, 2000), the key problem is that if process is 
taken as a composite object, for example, as a collection of events, a major issue 
emerges in terms of individuation of those componential entities (Casati & Varzi, 
2008; Cutting, 1996). At the level of action, as mentioned, individuation is 
possible because of the very semantic formulation of the action in intentional 
terms (Sintonen, 1989; Turner, 2003b). In spatiotemporally extended social 
processes, individuation is also made intentionally, in terms of relevance of 
spatiotemporal markers to the analysis or understanding of the process 
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(Abrams, 1982; Griffin, 1992; Sewell, 2005; Tilly, 2008). Intentional 
individuation, however, is not a criterion for individuation robust enough that 
can be generalised. The literature on causal processes, where individuation is a 
major issue associated with causal transmission, suggests the best way to 
approach this problem is to take process as one single object (Dowe, 2000; 
Hitchcock, 2004; Menzies, 2004; Salmon, 1984).  
A major philosophical implication of treating processes as single entities has to 
do with ontology. In Western thought, especially with the analytical approach to 
empirical science since modernity, entities have been taken as the basic 
ontological object. The problem is that entities are spatiotemporally fine-grained 
(Casati & Varzi, 2010; Machamer et al., 2000; Rescher, 1996). The spatiotemporal 
granularity of modern ontology i.e. the spatiotemporal individuation of the 
furniture of the world, as the case of the hypothetical pause shows, is closely 
connected with judgments grounded on perception (Casati & Varzi, 2010; 
Steward, 2011). Leaving perception aside, there are, in principle, no solid 
reasons to reject coarse-grained ontological objects that have a significant 
spatiotemporal extension. That is what new theories of explanation, for example, 
contemporary mechanism do, with the entity-activity/interaction dualism and 
the focus on the productive character of processes as a whole (Bechtel & 
Abrahamsen, 2005; Glennan, 2010; Machamer et al., 2000).  
In social science, as mentioned, there are weak e.g. Elias’ (1978) figurational 
sociology, and strong e.g. Luhmann’s (1995) systemic approach, antecedents for 
this antireductionist spatiotemporal ontology. The key challenges for the 
development of this ontology is to unbind the notions of actor and agent and, 
ultimately, to give up the basic postulates of social dualisms (Alexander, 1992; 
Bash, 2000; Bunge, 2000a; Emirbayer, 1997). Naturally, a big part of the 
development of this ontology is how much sense can be made of a coarse-grained 
ontology. Exploring all the issues associated with conceptualising process in this 
way goes beyond the scope of this text. Yet, it is clear that it is in in the functional 
conceptualization of processes as single entities where agent-based modelling 
can play a major methodological role. Part of the success of the entity-based 
ontology of contemporary science is that scientific methods allow for synchronic 
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analysis (Dupré, 2013; Rescher, 2000; Woodward, 2013b). Agent-based 
modelling, however, allows for diachronic analysis, as well as an understanding 
of the productive character of social life, because of its focus on real interaction 
among the different entities. While the spatiotemporal discreteness of the 
models can easily be translated into an entity-based fine-grained ontology, as it 
is done when arguing in support of the principles of methodological 
individualism, the most interesting use of agent-based modelling could be in the 
understanding of the features and implications of process ontology.   
In this section, the alleged support of agent-based modelling to the bottom up 
transition suggested by the philosophy of methodological individualism was 
discussed. It was argued that the three concepts usually used to describe this 
transition: emergence, supervenience and multiple realisation, are ill-defined 
and led to an unnecessary focus on the vertical transition between levels, instead 
of a real focus on spatiotemporal dynamics. This focus on vertical transition has 
been reinforced in social science because the role of time and space are poorly 
understood, which has lead to a poor conceptualisation of the notion of process. 
Literature on causation suggests that, in order to understand spatiotemporal 
dynamics, the entity-based character of ontology should be modified, so as to 
conceptualise processes as spatiotemporal extended objects with a productive 
character. Agent-based modelling can provide support for the redefinition of 
social ontology by a focus on the processual and productive character of social 
life.        
Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the widespread assumption that computational social 
science supports the philosophical programme of methodological individualism. 
It was argued that the conceptualisation of the micro-macro/structure-agency 
dualisms from which the programme of methodological individualism is 
developed is flawed. These dualisms, while trying to capture an analytical 
distinction that was thought to be scientifically useful, have been perpetuated in 
social theory by misrepresenting and oversimplifying individual contributions to 
the debate of the understanding of the social life.  
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In the case of methodological individualism, the dualisms have been approached 
in terms of levels of reality and reduction of social properties and entities. 
Computational social science has been linked to these two assumptions of 
methodological individualism through a concern for agents and bottom-up 
dynamics. It was shown, however, that agent-based modelling does not fit the 
epistemological and ontological foundations of these two assumptions of 
methodological individualism, but, on the contrary, provides evidence for a 
better reformulation of social epistemology and ontology. The individualist 
character of methodological individualism is not supported because of the 
secondary role given to cognition, and the emphasis on the bodily features of the 
actors and the non-human factors of the world. The bottom-up character is not 
supported because of an already poor definition of a levels transition and 
because, unlike the traditional individualist approach, agent-based modelling 
provides a way to understand productive processes.     
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Conclusions and Future Work 
The preceding chapters were organised so as to present a network of 
interrelated issues about the philosophy of computational social science. 
Throughout the six chapters, the main interest was to identify key problems 
related to the methodology, epistemology and ontology of computational social 
science.   
Chapter one discussed the pitfalls of the traditional approach to verification and 
validation. It focuses on the tenability of the distinction between the two 
concepts. The key problems with the way the distinction is articulated are the 
alleged formal character of the process of verification and naïve empiricism in 
the approach to validation. The former does not allow an understanding of the 
experimental character of modelling and the importance of the process of 
conceptual modelling, whereas the latter hinders discussion of what the model is 
being validated against. In addition, in order to understand the different ways in 
which models can be valued, the processes of verification and validation require 
paying attention to the social epistemology of the field, because diverse social 
criteria influence the evaluation of the models. 
Chapter two put forward a general approach to modelling and theorising. The 
need to include developments from the literature about modelling, 
experimentation and philosophy of simulation in computational social science 
was highlighted. A correct conceptualisation of modelling requires emphasising 
its manipulational and representational features. Increasing attention to these 
issues will be likely to have effects on the overall practice, starting from the 
conceptual modelling and ending in the process of validation. Additionally, while 
separating model and theory might be difficult, especially in the social sciences, 
the practice of modelling needs to be discussed in terms of its overall place in the 
process of research and production of knowledge.  
Chapter three reviewed the connection between agent-based modelling and the 
new account of mechanistic explanation. While contemporary ideas about 
mechanisms have been used by analytical sociology to support the programme of 
methodological individualism in social science, the dominant perspective in 
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general philosophy of science has some features that differ radically from the 
principles of methodological individualism. The focus on production and 
causation of the mechanist perspective has been misrepresented in analytical 
sociology. This misrepresentation undermines the agenda put forward by 
mechanists, by unnecessarily grounding the approach on an inadequate causal 
spatiotemporal perspective. Computational social science can be better 
articulated by restoring those elements of general mechanism that have been 
distorted in analytical sociology, for they can allow a better understanding of the 
processual character of agent-based modelling.       
Chapter four analysed the approach to explanation of computational social 
science. Traditional theories of explanation in the philosophy of science tried to 
develop monolithic objectivist accounts of explanation, which led to the neglect 
of the different ways in which explanation and understanding can be achieved. 
An account of explanation requires an adequate articulation of its 
epistemological and non-epistemological goals. In computational social science, 
these goals are related to the practice of social simulation as a scientific practice 
relying heavily on the features of the experimental character of computational 
models. The knowledge and skills of the practitioners, the structural 
organisation of the field and the connection with some other areas of social 
research where agent-based modelling is thought to have an impact e.g. policy, 
are important.        
Chapter five linked the practice of agent-based modelling with social theories of 
agency, action and interaction. The interpretation of agent-based modelling in 
computational social science usually follows a hierarchical layered model of the 
connection between these three concepts. In this model, action allows both for 
the operationalisation of agency, as well as the reduction of interaction. The 
layered model, however, is only tenable because of the individualist perspective 
through which agent-based modelling is normally approached in computational 
social science. This individualist bias has led to the neglect of a significant 
amount of literature that does not fit the paradigm. Some of this literature, 
however, could provide important insights for the understanding of the 
connection between these concepts and the processual character of the models. 
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That is particularly relevant for some aspects such as the embodiment and 
embeddedness of social life. 
Chapter six examined the foundations of the individualist bias in computational 
social science. Agent-based modelling is said to provide evidence for the 
philosophical programme of methodological individualism because of the object-
oriented and processual character of computer simulation. Claiming this support, 
however, just reinforces a view of social dualisms that has been constructed 
based on misrepresentation and oversimplification. Computational social science 
can be said to support the programme of methodological individualism only by 
overlooking important philosophical differences regarding the modelling of the 
agents and the environment and the time-execution of the computation model. 
The practice of agent-based modelling can be better understood by 
reinterpreting the philosophical meaning attached to the interpretation of the 
entities: human, natural and artificial, as well as the processual aspect of the 
simulation as a level transition.      
While the argument developed in each chapter was independent, there are some 
transversal topics that can be identified across the text. Because of the analytical 
character of the thesis, these topics were not explicitly advanced in a 
propositional fashion. They are, however, the foundations for the approach to 
the philosophy of computational social science advanced in this thesis: 
Individualism and social dualisms 
Computational social science has neglected the gap between the outcome of the 
model and its interpretation by treating the matter as a first order task. Because 
agent-based modelling in social science does not operate at a high level of 
abstraction, the interpretation of a simulation is put together by articulating a 
cogent narrative around a model’s features and output. When models are 
interpreted following the individualist paradigm, the narrative is plausible 
because of the object-oriented character of the method still allows for 
interpreting changes in the model as the result of intentional actions of the 
agents. This view, however, neglects crucial elements of the operation of agent-
based modelling. These models differ from traditional methodological 
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individualism in the approach to the cognition, embodiment and embeddedness 
of the agents. When the differences in these three elements are taken into 
account, instead of a weak support for methodological individualism, the method 
seems to provide evidence against it. Agent-based modelling does not advance an 
inquiry into the foundations of individual intentional action; it advances an 
inquiry into manipulable artificial societies, with a broader ontological base. It 
provides the opportunity for a new philosophy of the social, by moving past the 
restrictions imposed by traditional variable-based synchronic methodologies in 
social research. 
The dominance of methodological individualism in social science is mostly due to 
methodological reasons. A wider philosophical support for individualism is 
usually advanced by suggesting a relative consensus in the scientific values of 
contemporary philosophy of science and the correspondence of these values 
with those of methodological individualism. Both of these assumptions are not 
correct. In the case of agent-based modelling, they have become an obstacle to 
the development of adequate philosophical foundations. The notion of 
epistemological and/or ontological levels of the social is the most overlooked 
constraint on the interpretation of the spatiotemporal evolution of a 
computational simulation. It has misleadingly led to a focus on the vertical 
transition among levels. Practitioners need to move beyond the individualist 
paradigm and social dualisms. Computational social science needs to seriously 
explore what elements of the simulation are playing a decisive role, both in 
terms of the way they shape the practice of modelling and the way they are 
manifested in the results.  
Regarding the simulation and its results, computational social science needs to 
move to a definition of an adequate base ontology, based on a correct 
conceptualisation of the material aspects of the model and the representation. 
This starts by including in the narrative those non-human aspects that explicitly 
affect the outcome of the simulation e.g. space in Schelling’s model, as well as 
exploring the time-evolution of the simulation from a spatiotemporal, not an 
epistemological perspective. Pushing these aspects into the background hinders 
the discussion of their effects, oversimplifying the narrative about the 
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functioning of the simulation. As a second step, as mentioned in chapter two, one 
important challenge for the philosophy of computational social science is the 
approach to the notion of ‘artificial society’. It significantly affects the approach 
to representation in the field. As discussed, differences in the approach to 
‘artificial society’ have led to noticeable differences in the narrative developed 
for the interpretation of the results, for example, in terms of the definition of the 
target of representation and the way the simulation is interpreted as depicting a 
level transition. Regarding the practice of modelling in general, as it will be 
discussed below, it is necessary to identify the goals of explanation and the 
pragmatic factors affecting social research using agent-based models.     
Explanation 
The rationales for explanation in social science, as discussed in chapter four and 
six, are difficult to identify. They are grounded in both epistemology and 
ontology, but are rarely made explicit. Suggesting, for example, that the social 
world should be explained in terms of intentions because people act 
intentionally is, as discussed in chapter six, already a very epistemologically and 
ontologically loaded claim. It assumes people act intentionally, that intentionality 
is an individual property, that all or the majority of the social world is 
constructed intentionally, that intentionality can be measured, that it can be 
measured objectively and, most importantly, that this measurement will provide 
relevant and sufficient information about whatever questions that could be 
asked about the social world. Ideally, an account of explanation should provide 
evidence for all these assumptions and, in turn, this evidence should convey 
more information than a simple: ‘because individuals are all there is’, which is 
what the philosophy of individualism usually comes down to. This is an 
ontological claim that cannot fully justify all of these epistemological 
assumptions, if any. Epistemology and ontology have to be clearly separated 
when delineating an account of explanation. This is especially the case when the 
ontology on which the account is grounded is flawed.      
Computational social science has to take insights from the philosophical 
literature about two crucial distinctions: that between explanation and 
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understanding and that between the epistemological and non-epistemological 
goals of explanation. The separation might look artificial at some points, but it is 
fruitful, especially when contrasted with traditional theories of explanation in 
social science and the philosophy of science. The key aspect of the explanation-
understanding distinction has to do with the acknowledgement of knowledge 
production and acquisition leaving behind the idea of a transcendental knowing 
subject. An account of explanation cannot be articulated around a single 
monolithic goal when the cognitive needs, states and skills of the individuals 
involved are taken into account. Explaining to kids, for example, is not the same 
as explaining to peers. Cognitive differences were shown to have distinctive 
effects, for example, in the way regular activities such as replication are 
perceived. The second distinction, between epistemological and non-
epistemological goals, places these individual differences into context. Simplicity 
in an explanation might be taken to mean the number of entities referred to in 
the explanation, but could also refer to how familiar the knowing subject is to 
those entities.  
Computational social science has to think seriously about the requirements and 
implications of the practice of computational modelling in social science. The 
approach to this issue should not be grounded on an abstract ontological 
perspective or an epistemological perspective assuming an objective relationship 
between the object and its explanation. It requires, instead, to focus on a 
perspective in which explanation originates after properly spelling out the 
epistemological and non-epistemological goals it is aimed at satisfying, according 
to the cognitive features of the individuals involved. In computational social 
science, these goals are associated with traditional problems in social science, 
such as the important philosophical status given to intentional explanations, as 
well as particular individual aspects linked to the practice of computer 
modelling, such as programming skills.      
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Social epistemology 
There is a clear need to undertake research on the social epistemology of 
computational social science. Social epistemology has been significantly 
neglected in social science for it is usually conflated with constructivism. These 
are, however, two entirely different approaches. Social epistemology is linked to 
the social factors regulating the structural organisation of the field and the way 
this organisation shapes the knowledge that is produced. Acknowledging that 
scientific activity is socially constrained does not necessarily lead to partial or 
strong constructionism or relativism. These organisational factors need to be 
addressed, regardless of the particular position about the ultimate goals of 
science and its achievability. The fact, for example, that visual additions aimed at 
satisfying psychological instead of epistemological goals are not perceived 
negatively in computational social science is linked to the way that the values, 
ideologies and interests of the practitioners are normalised within the field. Each 
discipline or area of studies develops a rational and consensual social regulation 
of norms and expectations about the aims, procedures and goals of the practice 
of science. In computational social science, this regulation has made the 
satisfaction of these non-epistemological goals an acceptable practice. 
A focus on social epistemology is necessary because it can be both descriptive 
and prescriptive and because it can work at different social dimensions. It can 
provide, for example, a descriptive account of the effect of frameworks and 
protocols in the field. These two tools were developed after the 
acknowledgement that the dissemination practices employed in computational 
social science did not provide an adequate explanation of computational models 
and their assumptions. However, except from the review of the ODD protocol 
discussed in chapter one, there has not been a systematic analysis of the impact 
of frameworks and protocols in computational social science. This descriptive 
approach to social epistemology is necessary because, in the case of frameworks 
and protocols, there are significant structural and philosophical differences that 
are reflected, among other things, in the questions included in the protocols and 
the way these questions are organised. As mentioned, it was only after a first 
review of the ODD protocol that a section on ‘Basic principles’ was added. The 
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initial neglect of questions on theoretical background is probably associated with 
the more general neglect of theoretical issues in the practice of modelling.  
 Social epistemology can, as well, provide a normative approach to the problem 
of model evaluation, taking into account, for example, the fact that frameworks 
and protocols neglect community criteria for validation. Computational social 
science has to pay significant attention to social epistemology because it could 
become the best tool for making the tacit explicit. Social epistemology can 
account for the different dynamics of the field, by inquiring into the conditions of 
normalisation that operate in the practice of modelling. This can prove valuable 
for computational social science due to the relative novelty and high degree of 
interdisciplinarity in the field. Theoretical, methodological and technical 
knowledge is significantly fragmented and unevenly distributed among the 
practitioners, usually following traditional disciplinary boundaries. It turn, it can 
also help closing the gap between the experimental and the reporting phase in 
the practice of computational modelling. Frameworks and protocols are meant to 
address that gap, but it is not clear, for example, what researchers are supposed 
to do with them. Protocols for example could be included as an appendix, put 
online for free access or provided by the authors per request. All these 
alternatives generate conditions that can affect in particular ways activities such 
as replication.     
Models and experiments 
Computational social science needs to develop a more robust approach to 
modelling in terms of the conditions for representation and the criteria for the 
evaluation of a good representation. ‘Simplicity’ or ‘abstractness’ by themselves 
are criteria that do not allow conceptualising the connection between the source 
and the target adequately.  It is necessary to acknowledge the three-place nature 
of the practice, which would, at the same time, lead to the acknowledgement of 
the scientific usefulness of different styles of modelling. These styles of modelling 
cannot be rejected on abstract criteria without delineating first an account of 
explanation. The epistemological restrictions imposed by the individualist 
paradigm should not be used to judge the adequacy of representation either. It is 
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important to connect the discussion about different styles of modelling with the 
discussion about the place of these models in the wider process of knowledge 
production. This connection could, for example, lead to an increasing focus on 
the process of conceptual modelling, which is often overlooked in computational 
social science and, as discussed in the first chapter, has a negative impact during 
the process of evaluation of the simulation.  
One major issue that needs to be addressed when discussing modelling from the 
wider perspective of the production of knowledge is that of epistemological 
contextualism and perspectivism (Brendel & Jäger, 2005; Chakravartty, 2010a; 
Kincaid, 2004; Morrison, 2011). In formally oriented social science, those two 
aspects tend to be neglected so to avoid falling into epistemological relativism. 
The influence of pragmatic aspects in scientific explanation has usually been 
taken by relativist positions as evidence for the fallibility of science. Yet, as 
shown, especially in chapters two and four, these aspects should be better 
understood from the perspective of the epistemological and non-epistemological 
needs and goals of the knowing subject, as well as the place of that particular 
model in the process of construction of knowledge. Contextualism and 
perspectivism are natural outcomes of the acknowledgement of the influence of 
social and individual pragmatic aspects of explanation. Addressing these issues is 
of particular relevance for computational social science, where problems of 
commensurability are common, due to the syntactic and semantic flexibility.    
In turn, computational social science has to acknowledge the experimental 
character of models. It is important to understand the neglected materiality of 
computer simulation. Computational models are used to produce processual 
representation of a target system, which is manipulated in several ways, so as to 
guarantee the adequacy of representation. This connection with the target is not 
formal, but is not entirely empirical either. Addressing the philosophy of 
simulation will allow for a better conceptualisation of the connection with other 
methods and approaches to the notion of proof. The formality of the method, 
however, is important in terms of addressing causality. Although a systematically 
overlooked aspect in the discussion about verification and validation, as 
mentioned in chapters three and four, causation can be introduced in 
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computational social science in terms of mechanisms and interventions. Both 
approaches to causation have the advantage that they do not rely on abstract 
philosophical apparatus, but address causation from an experimental 
perspective. A better approach to modelling in terms of experimentation could 
eventually lead to a better approach to causation and with it, to robustness and 
generalisation.     
Process philosophy 
The key aspect of this approach to the philosophy of computational social 
science, but, at the same time, the most underdeveloped, is the development of a 
process ontology that adequately captures the spatiotemporal extension of social 
life. While some contemporary literature has started to seriously enquire about 
the notion of process from an ontological and an epistemological perspective, 
entity-based philosophy is still dominant in contemporary philosophy. Despite 
its pervasiveness, the limitations of this approach are clear. Throughout this text 
it has been shown how the entity-based character of methodological 
individualism cannot provide sound foundations for the understanding of the 
processual aspects of a computer simulation. The problem with entity-based 
philosophy is that there has not been a robust methodological alternative that 
allows for the development of different philosophical foundations. Because of the 
empirical character of contemporary science, the philosophical foundations are 
unlikely to change if this methodological alternative is not available.  
Computational simulation provides one such alternative. The key features of 
agent-based modelling as a method are its focus on interaction and process. 
While these two aspects are widely acknowledged in the literature, the way they 
are accounted for is not appropriate. Interaction is reduced to action and the 
dynamics are approached as a level transition. The two aspects are conceptually 
disconnected spatiotemporally because the analysis in both cases is still 
synchronic. A more fruitful approach could result from strongly linking 
interaction and process. Spatiotemporal interaction should be understood in 
terms of productive processes. Production has been poorly conceptualised 
because of the focus on reductive accounts to ontology and epistemology, for 
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example, regarding causation. Yet, the thesis referenced several developments in 
the philosophy of science, social theory and cognitive theory that suggest the 
need to push the philosophical boundaries towards a processual understanding 
of social life in real diachronic terms.  
This requires a further exploration of the possibilities and limitations of agent-
based modelling. The exploration of the implications of different spatial 
configurations has occurred to a certain extent over the years, but the same has 
not happened with time. A new line of inquiry should be aimed at this direction. 
Certainly agent-based modelling cannot answer all questions when addressing 
social dynamics. The method has limitations, either in practice or in principle, 
related to aspect of representation and power of computation. Agent-based 
models, for example, usually do not have a large population of agents, for that 
feature can significantly increase computing time. In turn, the low integration 
between GIS and agent-based models is partially due to the difficulties arising 
from inputting and operating GIS files in an agent-based model. Most important, 
for many phenomena that can be explored using agent-based models there is not 
enough data available, if any at all, which puts a heavy burden on the process of 
representation.       
Another important aspect is that, like with any other method, good research 
practices are required when using agent-based models. The method could be 
used to explore large parametric spaces just to find significant relationships 
among variables. In terms of the knowledge produced regarding a given social 
process, this does not differ much from typical correlational analysis. This is why 
an effort to articulate a robust philosophy of computational social science is 
important. Traditional philosophy of social science has important limitations in 
the apprehension of spatiotemporal features, partially derived from the 
limitations that traditional social methods have regarding this issue. Because of 
the methodological features of agent-based modelling, the development of a 
philosophy of computational social science can greatly contribute to the 
important and much needed rearticulation of the general philosophy of social 
science.    
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